Abstract. This paper touches on various philosophical theories of emotion through the analysis of a few entries in the *Lexicon philosophicum* (1692, 1713) by Etienne Chauvin: the articles “Affectus” and “Passio” (‘emotion’) and “Admiratio” (‘wonder’). Chauvin’s *Lexicon* is usually considered to be the first ‘modern’ philosophical dictionary. By investigating its definitions and sources – the scholastic sources, such as the commentaries on Aristotle, as well as the modern ones, such as Bacon, Descartes and the Cartesian Pierre Cally – I will provide some instances of the complexity of this work.

In many entries of the *Lexicon*, he lists different opinions on the same subject without taking up a position of his own. Here and there, however, he distances himself not only from the scholastic tradition, but also from Descartes’ natural philosophy and metaphysics. On the whole, Chauvin seems to be distrustful of the pretense of constructing all-embracing systems of philosophy, and he is more interested in underlining the continuity between modern, scholastic and ancient philosophy, rather than emphasizing the novelty of Descartes’ thought.

Keywords: Emotions, wonder, philosophical dictionaries, 17th century, Cartesianism, Etienne Chauvin

Introduction

The *Lexicon philosophicum* by the Huguenot savant Etienne Chauvin (1640-1725) is considered to be the first ‘modern’ philosophical dictionary, in as much as it examines and compares the scholastic and the modern definitions of each term. Thus it is a particularly suitable text for studying how early modern theories of emotion were commonly received and compared to the scholastic tradition up to the end of the 17th Century.

About half the entries in the *Lexicon* are dedicated to the science of nature: physics, chemistry, astronomy, and anatomy. Another feature that makes it different from previous Latin philosophical dictionaries – and one his contemporaries did not fail to notice – is that Chauvin not only deals with scientific terms (‘verba’), but also with things (‘res’): he describes and illustrates by means of tables the functioning of the latest instruments applied to scientific research, such as the barometer, the thermometer, the telescope, the engyscope (i.e. the microscope) and the ‘machina pneumatica’. The latter was an air pump used for experiments with the air and vacuums, Chauvin’s specialty in the field of physics (he had been a member of the ‘Classis physico-medica’ of the Berlin Academy of Sciences since its establishment in 1700, his name having been suggested by Leibniz).

Chauvin’s work had a very wide circulation. Not only does it draw an interesting picture of the state of the art – and that is why I will pay some attention to the sources the author made use of – but it was also widely read, and its influence on further developments of philosophical culture deserves to be explored. Another reason for the interest of this inquiry, as we shall see

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below, is that an analysis of the contents of the *Lexicon* shows that – contrary to what the majority of modern scholars still believe – Chauvin cannot be merely seen as a Cartesian. His work is a good example of the fact that at the turn of the eighteenth century Descartes’ thought was regarded not only as a reference point which could not be set aside, but also as a stage to be overcome even by many so-called Cartesians.

In his *Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne* of 1854, Francisque Bouillier wrote that Chauvin’s *Lexicon* was “un des plus considérables monuments élevés à Descartes en Hollande, […] un essai d’encyclopédie universelle, un grand dictionnaire philosophique, où on donnait l’explication par ordre alphabétique de tous les termes de la philosophie cartésienne”. However, Bouillier was probably a little biased, since he thought that Descartes was “le seul père de la philosophie moderne.”

Yet nowadays Chauvin is still thought of as a Cartesian, even by some of those modern scholars – not only French – who wrote useful studies on his intellectual biography, his work as a journalist, his contribution to the cultural life of the Huguenot refugees in Rotterdam and in Berlin, and his correspondence with Leibniz at the time of the founding of the *Societät der Wissenschaften*. As a matter of fact, Chauvin’s *Lexicon* is much less ‘Cartesian’ than one might think.

In many entries in the *Lexicon*, he lists different opinions on the same subject without taking up a position of his own. Here and there, however, he distances himself not only from the scholastic tradition, but also from Descartes’ natural philosophy and metaphysics. This is also evident when reading the *Disputationes* over which Chauvin presided in Berlin between 1696 and 1710, while he was teaching philosophy at the Collège Français: in his teaching Chauvin proves to be inclined towards an experience-oriented use of reason and the emancipation of natural science from metaphysics. Moreover, he thinks that metaphysics cannot be considered to be a science at all. He does not believe that we can have a clear idea of God or our soul, nor that we can grasp the ultimate essence of matter. He is distrustful of the pretense of constructing all-embracing systems of philosophy.

Thus by the end of the century, roughly speaking, he can be seen as fully belonging to the early Enlightenment, standing closer to John Locke or Samuel Pufendorf than to Descartes. Several entries that Chauvin added to the second edition of his *Lexicon* constitute a contribution to the spreading of the modern doctrines of natural law and the idea of tolerance, whereas new additions to the old entries discuss Locke’s theory of knowledge.

The title of the first edition of the *Lexicon* is a somewhat modest one, in so far as Chauvin does not presume to be giving a complete explanation of all possible philosophical terms: he says that he tried (‘conatur’), not that he succeeded, and that he does not mean to *concludere* (‘to close’, ‘to conclude’), but rather to *recludere* (‘to open’, ‘to disclose’). Nevertheless, the *Lexicon* was a success. It was reviewed in the most important contemporary journals, such as the *Journal des sçavans*, the *Philosophical Transactions*, and Jean Le Clerc’s *Bibliothèque Choisie*. It can still be found in almost every European historical library, sometimes in both the first and the second editions. Some of Chauvin’s definitions were included in later major reference works, such as Johann Georg Walch’s *Philosophisches Lexicon* (1726) and Ephraim Chambers’ *Cyclopedia* (1728). Through this latter text, Chauvin’s definitions reached Diderot and d’Alembert’s *Encyclopédie*, the *Encyclopædia Britannica* (1771) and the *American Dictionary of the English Language* (1828) by Noah Webster, the so-called ‘founding father of American scholarship and education’. As an irony of history though, most of the definitions these dictionaries draw on from Chauvin’s *Lexicon* – which is known, once again, as the first modern philosophical dictionary – are not the definitions he gave to the modern authors (the ‘recentiores’), but those he gave to the ‘veteres’, or the ‘scholastici’.

In this paper I will focus on a few entries of the *Lexicon* related to the topic of emotions, mainly the articles “Affectus” and “Passio” (‘emotion’) and “Admiratio” (‘wonder’).
Affectus and passio

The entry “Affectus” in the Lexicon begins with a critical account of the stoic definition of affectus as an opinio or iudicio. Chauvin rejects this definition because judgment, according to him, is action, whereas affectus is passion: a passion of the soul or mind (passio animi), to which the body contributes through the perturbation of blood and animal spirits.\(^{12}\)

Then Chauvin mentions the definition of affectus by the Peripatetic school: “motus appetitus sensitivi circa bonum, vel malum opinatum, cum vehementi & non-naturali spirituum corporeum mutatione.”\(^{13}\) The following brief critical account of the Peripatetic theory of emotion is drawn partly from Thomas Aquinas,\(^{14}\) and partly from the Anthropologia, sive Tractatio de homine (1683) by Pierre Cally, a Cartesian who taught philosophy at the University of Caen in Normandy.\(^{15}\) As we shall see, Cally is the main source for those parts of the Lexicon where Chauvin illustrates Cartesian opinions. Generally speaking, Chauvin does not only draw on the Anthropologia, but also on other works by Cally, such as his Institutio philosophiae\(^{16}\) and his commentary on Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy.\(^{17}\)

As for the Peripatetic definition of emotion, Chauvin objects that affectus has nothing to do with appetitus (the ‘appetite’ of the sensitive part of the soul: ‘desire’, or ‘faculty of desire’), because a man runs into it even when he does not want to.\(^{18}\) Thus the Lexicon rapidly turns to the modern definition of affectus, the definition given by the ‘recentiores philosophi’, meaning – in this case – the Cartesians.

A longer account of the Aristotelian theory of emotion is given by Chauvin under the entry for “Passio” (which is nothing but the Greek word for the Latin affectus; in fact Chauvin does not clearly distinguish the meaning of the two words.)\(^{19}\) But even under the entry for “Passio”, the main source of the Lexicon is actually a modern work: a Treatise on Man by Honoré Fabri (1607-1688) from which Chauvin takes almost the entire text of his article on “Passio.”\(^{20}\) The Jesuit Fabri is an important source for Chauvin, who draws quite often on his works, especially on topics that deal with the natural sciences: in the article “Passio” Fabri plays the role of the representative of the ‘Peripateticorum scholae’. His works on physics were actually quite different from previous Aristotelian handbooks, in as much as they set out the matter in a deductive form, and made large use of mathematics and empirical observations. Nevertheless, Chauvin quotes Fabri’s text as the common explanation of the physical process that takes place in various parts of the human body when an emotion occurs.

According to the traditional scholastic definition, emotions are motions of the soul caused by the apprehension of a good or an evil object, which bring about unnatural (violent) changes in the body. This was the definition adopted by Thomas Aquinas and the one commonly accepted up to Descartes’ time,\(^{21}\) not only by the strictly scholastic literature, such as Eustache de Saint-Paul’s Summa philosophiae,\(^{22}\) but also by the early modern moralists, such as the skeptic Pierre Charron\(^{23}\) or the stoic Guillaume du Vair,\(^{24}\) and also by the authors of two of the most important 17th century Latin philosophical dictionaries, Rudolph Goclenius\(^{25}\) and Johannes Micraelius.\(^{26}\) All these traditional definitions regard emotions as movements, or actions of the sensitive part of the soul: according to the Aristotelian scholastics, the soul enables man to accomplish different activities (from nutrition to thought), thus it has to comprise different faculties, which can be understood as distinct parts of the soul. According to Descartes, instead, soul is a simple substance, it has no parts\(^{27}\) and it only has one faculty, namely the faculty of thinking. Thus the ‘passions of the soul’ must refer to this single capacity and they can only be regarded as states of thought.\(^{28}\)

When Chauvin turns to the definition of affectus by the modern philosophers, he takes it almost to the letter from Descartes’ Passiones animae: “commotio mentis, quae ad eam speciatim refertur; quae producitur, conservatur & corroboratur per aliquem motum spirituum.”\(^{29}\)
Descartes holds that our body reacts on its own when it encounters some object, or follows some impressions in the brain; it precedes the reaction of the soul and it passes its own state on to the soul through the pineal gland and the motion of the animal spirits (the finest parts of the blood). It is hence from the body that something irrational and irrepressible comes to form human emotions.

Chauvin follows Descartes by locating the physical seat of emotions in the brain, not the heart. But he neglects the role of the pineal gland on the basis of more recent anatomic observations. According to Descartes, the little gland hangs in the middle of the brain, above its cavities (the ventricles), and is capable of reacting to the least movement of nerve filaments caused by the animal spirits. However, in an addition of 1713 to the entry for “Glandula”, Chauvin mentions the observations of two anatomists, Caspar Bartholin and Joachim Targier, whose results diverged from those of Descartes: according to them, the gland is not located at the source of the animal spirits, and it is not so mobile, because it is anchored by veins and arteries.

As for the union of body and soul, we are thus left with the idea that soul is joint to all the parts of the body, not to a particular one. Chauvin’s theory of the interaction between thinking substance and extended substance is close to the views of occasionalism, as illustrated by his entry for “Conjunctio” (derived from Pierre Cally’s Anthropologia) and his dissertation De homine, where he says that the correspondence between the reciprocal actions and passions of mind and body is nothing but the effect of God’s will.

On the other hand, Chauvin follows Descartes in stressing the natural function of emotions for man’s self-preservation. According to Descartes, none of the emotions that nature gave us are always vicious (something that Aristotle too would have agreed with). He underlines this positive significance against the Democritean or stoic account of emotions, which prescribed to the wise man a radical detachment from passions. It is in fact to Democritus that the first comparison between medicine and philosophy is ascribed, in as much as the former heals diseases of the body, whereas the latter frees the soul from passions. Ever since then, this idea has been a fil rouge in the history of philosophy – from Cicero, who uses it in some well-known passages of the Tusculanae, to Wittgenstein, who still compares philosophical method to a therapy in his Philosophical investigations. In the course of the 17th century, this paradigm merges with the Baconian project of the liberation of knowledge from prejudices (expurgatio intellectus) and the Cartesian rules for the direction of the understanding. Spinoza’s Tractatus de intellectus emendatione is based on the same aim: introducing his treatise, the Amsterdam philosopher compares his own search for wisdom to the condition of a man who seeks a remedy for a deadly disease. Spinoza’s positions are later adopted by Ehrenfried Walter von Tschirnhaus (1651-1708), who gives his important methodological work the title of Medicina mentis (1687). The title of Medicina mentis is also used by the Halle divine Joachim Lange (1670-1744) for his 1704 work on the philosophical principles for the ‘aegre mentis sanatio’ and the search after truth.

In a short note with a Cartesian flavour, written in Paris probably in 1676, Leibniz gives the role of medicina mentis to geometry, in as much as it serves as a model to increase the power of thinking. Other authors, like Chauvin, reduce the extension of this concept to the particular field of logic. One of these authors is Johannes Clauberg, whose works – as we shall see later – are among the sources of Chauvin’s dictionary. In Clauberg’s Logica vetus et nova (1654), the paradigm of logic as medicina mentis is explicitly connected to Bacon’s and Descartes’ philosophical theory of prejudices.

In a dissertation on logic – one of the disputaciones discussed by his students in Berlin – Chauvin claims likewise that logic is just as necessary for intellectual life as medicine is for animal life, because it frees the understanding from the errors and faults that infect it. It is true, Chauvin continues, that a few men were able to set themselves free from their ‘animi morbis
atque defectibus’ even before logic was invented, purely by means of natural reason. Nevertheless, compared to this sort of natural logic, the ‘logica artificialis’ provides a quicker and more practical way to the acquisition of science, as it makes up for the natural weakness of human understanding with its formal rules.

The classification of emotions

In the last part of the article “Affectus”, Chauvin spends some time on the opinions held by ancient, scholastic and modern philosophers concerning the number and possible classifications of emotions. He mentions the ancient idea that there are four principal emotions (desire, fear, joy and sorrow) from which all others originate, quoting Virgil, Horace and Cicero. Chauvin gives precise references for those very famous quotations – actually this is something he rarely does, but here again he is taking an entire extract from Cally’s text:

> The number of the aforementioned emotions is uncertain both to ancient and modern philosophers. Among the ancients, Plato affirms in the *Theaetetus* that the emotions bearing a name are many, and those that do not bear a name are countless. Cicero mentions four of them at various places – namely grief, fear, desire and joy – as the principal emotions, to which all others refer as their origin. *Hence they fear and desire, rejoice and grieve*, Virgil, Aeneid. VI [733]. And Horace, Epist. I, 6 [12]: *Whether he rejoices or grieves, desires or fears, what difference does it make?*

Chauvin also mentions that the Peripatetics (and we can think for instance of Thomas Aquinas) usually list 11 emotions. Other philosophers, it continues, distinguish primary emotions (*admiratio*, *amor* and *odium*) from secondary ones. These second-level emotions can be classified according to time: so *desiderium* and *fuga* pertain to the future, because they refer to a good or bad thing to come; in the same way, *gaudium* and *tristitia* pertain to the present, because they concern a present object; *bona* and *mala conscientia* pertain to the past, because they refer to an action - good or evil respectively – which took place in the past.45 This criterion is similar to the one Descartes adopts in his *Passions de l’âme*,46 although the terms and the classification do not correspond exactly to those we find in Chauvin’s dictionary. On the other hand, it was an obvious criterion to organize at least that particular group of emotions. The Aristotelian authors had adopted it too.47 Among the moderns, we might also think of Locke and Hobbes, who in different ways had made use of the time-based criterion when writing about emotions.48

But all these classifications, according to both Chauvin and Cally, are based upon equally uncertain grounds. As Plato wrote in the *Theaetetus*, in fact emotions can be divided into an infinite number of modes, and in most cases we do not even know their names.49

Among modern theories, Chauvin mentions that of a modern author (‘apud recentiores nonnemo’) who holds that, strictly speaking, there is only one single emotion, namely love.50 When reading this, one could at first sight think of Augustine, rather than a modern author: Augustine’s view that every emotion stems from love was widely known and discussed (e.g. by Thomas Aquinas in his *Summa theologiae*).51 Having to think of a modern philosopher, one would have thought of Malebranche, who claims that love is the primary impulse that leads all other emotions. But Malebranche does not explicitly reduce all emotions to love. In his *Recherche de la vérité*, he says that there are two main emotions, ‘amour’ (love) and ‘aversion’ (dislike, hate). But although hate is contrary to love, it is never separate from love, for its object is evil, and evil is nothing but a lack of good (‘privation du bien’). Thus to flee from good means to flee from a lack of good, that is to say, to love good.52 In the end, Malebranche says: “L’amour et l’aversion sont
donc les deux passions mères, opposées entre elles; mais l’amour est la première, la principale et la plus universelle.”

In any case if we look at Pierre Cally’s *Anthropologia*, which is Chauvin’s source for this passage too, we discover that the author Chauvin is talking about is not Malebranche, but actually another Oratorian, Jean-François Senault (1599/1601-1672), who in 1641 (long before Malebranche wrote the *Recherche*) had published a treatise on emotions entitled *De l’usage des passions* – an extremely successful book, which was reprinted several times and translated into English, German, Italian and Spanish.

Unlike the scholastic line of thought, Senault claims that love is the one and only passion – and he gives credit to Augustine for this view. Philosophers, Senault says, have given different states or qualities of love different names – like the sea, that bears different names when it washes up on different shores – but all of them are the same love, because all of them are operations (or effects) of the one and the same human soul.

After mentioning Senault’s opinion, Chauvin turns again to Descartes, who spoke about a restricted number of primary emotions (six) and held up *admiratio* (‘étonnement’, wonder) as the ‘first of all’. Wonder is one of the most interesting ‘passions of the soul’ to consider if we want to understand the relationship between emotions and intellectual knowledge.

*Admiratio*

The entry for ‘Admiratio’ is another good example of how complex an overlap of sources we can find in the *Lexicon philosophicum*. Chauvin mentions here the possible uses of wonder that Descartes too had named: this emotion helps us to imprint the memory of rare or unusual things on our minds, and urges us to learn previously ignored notions.

But Descartes had also emphasized how risky wonder can be if we keep using it too often, whereas Chauvin praises it without reserve and calls it ‘the principle of philosophy’ and ‘the seed of science’.

Part of Chauvin’s article comes as usual from Pierre Cally’s *Anthropologia*. The definition of *admiratio* as ‘animi affectus’ summarizes Cally’s exposition and a passage taken from Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel’s *Philosophia Burgundica*, which was also quoted by Cally. But Cally spent more time on the excesses of admiration as a source of pride, decrying its vanity through quotations from Ecclesiastes and, unlike Chauvin, he did not say much about the benefits of admiration as a motive in the search for knowledge. The last part of Chauvin’s article is not drawn from Cally:

Wonder is useful to learn what previously escaped us. For whoever wonders compares an unknown object to one he previously knew, from which it looks different, and he searches for the reason why it is different. And indeed this act of comparison and enquiry is very natural to reason, and no less helpful to knowledge than the argumentation that deduces what is unknown from what is known. Therefore wonder is the principle of philosophy, the seed of science; it is named broken science and, when the children have it, it is a sign of good disposition.

This sort of short praise of wonder, which is consistent with Chauvin’s two main interests, scientific research and teaching, comes from a further source: the first book of Francis Bacon’s *De augmentis scientiarum*, although it is not quoted directly here, but rather via Johannes Clauberg. The ‘abrupta scientia’ Chauvin is talking about was actually for Bacon the knowledge of God, which – unlike the knowledge we can have of creatures – is a necessarily ‘broken’, ‘interrupted’ science.
Descartes and his followers sharply distinguish between emotions, that arise in the soul as a consequence of corporeal motions, and volitions, which are motions of the soul actively caused by the soul itself. From a Cartesian standpoint, wonder (‘admiration’) is distinct from doubt (‘dubitatio’), in so far as wonder is an affectus, or passio, whereas doubting is a motus, or an actio of the will (‘volitio pura’). This view is radically different from the traditional one: Goclenius’ Lexicon, for instance, still held that dubitatio (or ἀπορία) is a πάθος. Dubitatio and admiratio were already closely associated with one another in William of Moerbeke’s Latin version of the famous passage of the first book of Metaphysics (I, 2) where Aristotle says that men begin to philosophize because of wonder (θαυμάζειν).

Nevertheless, even Cartesians treated dubitatio as a sort of parallel to admiratio, for doubting takes place at the beginning of philosophy on an intellectual level, just as wonder is the principle of philosophy on an emotional level. Nicolas Malebranche, for example, followed Descartes in distinguishing ‘admiration’ as an emotion (‘passion’) from ‘curiosité’ as a volition (‘inclination’), but still thought that wonder and curiosity retain a functional complementarity in the search for knowledge: according to nature, Malebranche says, wonder must lead to curiosity and curiosity must lead to the knowledge of truth.

Chauvin’s Lexicon, under the entry for ‘Dubitatio’, defines doubting as «is animi motus, quo, re accurate perpensa, & libratis utrinque rationum ponderibus, haeret quasi suspensus ac incertus ad utram partem se se determinet, hoc est, utrum propositam quaestionem affirmet, vel neget». Now this is similar to the Aristotelian definition of the word. But it is worth noting that according to Chauvin Aristotle’s doubt and Descartes’ doubt are but one and the same thing:

Hence both Cartesians and Aristotelians deservedly teach that those who begin to apply themselves to philosophy must doubt everything comes to their knowledge, and they hold that doubt is a sort of principle preparing and causing the understanding to attain a clear and distinct perception.

Then he recalls two more well-known passages about aporein from Aristotle’s works: Metaphysics, III, 1 and De coelo, I, 10. Here again, Chauvin is drawing on the Anthropologia by Cally, who referred also to several commentaries of Metaphysics, III, 1, including those by Averroes, Albertus Magnus, Thomas Aquinas, Alexander Ales and Pedro da Fonseca. As Constance Blackwell recently pointed out, the proximity between Descartes and Aristotle was much more trivial at the time than it is today, probably because of the traditional Latin translation of Aristotle’s aporein into dubitatio, an equivalence that every learned man had in mind, having read William of Moerbeke’s translation of Metaphysica, or later Latin translations and commentaries that were based on the Aristoteles latinus. This meaning was lost in the modern translations we are used to working with: we now tend to translate aporein as ‘being in difficulties, puzzlement, perplexity’ – when we do not leave it in Greek. What Descartes did not say – Descartes does not mention Aristotle, because he wants to present his argument as something new – was clear to Chauvin, and even more explicit in Cally’s Anthropologia, where Aristotle’s argument comes at the beginning of a chapter entitled “Probatur mens humana existere”, meaning that it plays the same role that Descartes’ doubt played in laying the basis for the principle of the cogito. But contrary to Descartes, Cally starts with a premise: “Sed ne videar aliquid novi moliri, proponam primo argumentum, a quo ipse Aristotelis contendit omnem scientiam esse incohandam” – he names Aristotle, precisely because he does not want to present his argument as something new. Just like Cally, Chauvin seems here to be more interested in underlining the continuity between modern, scholastic and ancient philosophy, rather than emphasizing the novelty of Descartes’ thought.
Conclusion

In the dictionary entries for “Affectus” and “Passio”, we have seen how Chauvin sets out the traditional – stoic and Aristotelian – definitions of emotion, yet criticizes them from a Cartesian standpoint: first of all, he objects that in the emotional process soul is not active, but passive; secondly, that emotions do not concern the sensitive part of the soul, but the soul as a simple thinking substance. He thus adopts the Cartesian definition of emotions and follows most of Descartes’ opinions on this topic. On the other hand, Chauvin seems to suggest that some of Descartes’ opinions, like his understanding of the function of the pineal gland, might be obsolete. Furthermore, he puts into perspective the novelty of Descartes’ philosophy, pointing out the common features of Cartesian method and Aristotelian tradition. This is specifically evident when we look at the complex of ancient and modern sources Chauvin draws on for his articles “Admiratio” and “Dubitatio”, where Aristotle’s and the late scholastics’ views on the positive function of wondering are closely associated to those of Bacon and Descartes.

In this way, the author of the Lexicon philosophicum rejoins a typical eclectic attitude of the German early Enlightenment. As stated by Johann Franz Budde – a contemporary of Chauvin, and the source of many additions to the second edition of his dictionary – at the beginning of the 17th century “few can be found, who would follow Descartes in all his opinions, just as few among the learned men would not adopt some of them.”

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References

1 Lexicon rationale sive Thesaurus philosophicus ordine alphabetico digestus, in quo vocabula omnia philosophica, variasque illorum acceptiones, juxta cum Veterum, tum Recentiorum placta, explicare; & universe quae lumine naturali sciri possunt, non tam concludere, quam recludere conatur Stephanus Chauvin… (Rotterodami: P. van der Slaart, 1692); in the following pages I will cite from the second, enlarged edition: Lexicon philosophicum (Leovardiae: F. Halma, 1713).
3 Bouillier’s Histoire de la philosophie cartésienne was dedicated to Victor Cousin in the following terms: “A vous tout entière la gloire de nous avoir ramenés aux idées innées de Descartes, à la Raison de Malebranche, et d’avoir restauré, pour ainsi dire, cet élément divin de l’intelligence contre lequel s’était conjuré tout l’empirisme du dernier siècle.”
4 Disputatio prima philosophica, in qua Quid ipsa sit Philosophia, genuinaque Philosophandi ratio expenditur, 1696; Disputatio philosophica secunda, de Logica in genere, 1696; Disputatio philosophica de Existentia, et Essentia corporis, 1697; Disputatio Philosophica, Generalem Disciplinæ Moralis Synopsis exhibens, 1697; Exercitatio ethica de Actione humana, 1700; Theses philosophicae de homine, 1710, all printed in Berlin, by Ulrich Liebpert.
5 On Chauvin’s anti-metaphysical attitude, see my “Étienne Chauvin e il suo Lexicon philosophicum”, in Lessici filosofici dell’età moderna. Linee di ricerca, ed. E. Canone («LIE», vol. 114, Firenze: Olschki, 2012) (forthcoming). Nevertheless, it was not unusual to be to a certain extent Cartesian and empiricist: see Ariew, R., “Cartesian Empiricism”, Revue roumaine de philosophie 50 (2006): 71-85. Cf. e.g. the entries for “Experientia” and “Experimentum” in Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, 229-30: an interesting mixture of Cartesian and Baconian method towards research into physics.
6 Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, entries: “Aristocratia”, “Autarchea”, “Bellum”, “Civitas”, “Democratia”, “Foedus”, “Jus”, “Jusjurandum”. Chauvin’s relationship to the contemporary school of natural law was also a personal one, since he was the father-in-law of Jean Barbeyrac (1674-1744), the French translator of Pufendorf’s main works.
7 See the entry for “Cultus Dei seu Religio”, Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, 162.
8 This is the case example of the entry for “Cognitio”, where Chauvin adds a two column summary of the Essay on the Human Understanding by John Locke (‘Anglus quidam vir illustris’) to the explanation of the Scholastic and Cartesian theories of knowledge (Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Cognitio”, 113-4).

9 See above, note 1.


11 I am going to deal more extensively with this topic in a forthcoming book on Etienne Chauvin, and the sources and legacy of his philosophical dictionary.


14 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1 IIae, q. 22 (Cinisello Balsamo: Edizioni San Paolo, 1999), 656-9.


18 “Verum a praestantissimis viris repuditatur haec definitio: neque enim possunt capere, qui affectus animi dicatur hominis appetitus, cum sit in homine, ipso etiam invitio; sicut saepe est timor, saepius ira, saepissime tristitia sive dolor […] Si appetitus in homine etiam invitio occurreret, homo secundum eandem suæ partem, mentem puta, appeteret simul, & non appeteret; quod fieri non posse ex eo consentiunt omnes Philosophi, quod propertea in morali disciplina doceant, mentem nullam posse invitam sive coäctam.” (Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, 31).

19 It is in fact a quite hazy matter: it is not by chance that Chauvin calls his definition of emotions a “definitio, sive descriptio” (Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Affectus”, 31; the italics are mine). Cicero also used the word ‘perturbationes’, in a passage cited by Augustine and referred to by Thomas Aquinas (Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1 IIae, q. 22, a. 2).

20 Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Passio”, 471; cf. Fabri, H., Tractatus duo: quorum prior est de Plantis et de generatione animalium; posterior de Homine (Parisii: F. Muguet, 1666), 390-8 (Chauvin does not give reference for Fabri’s Tractatus here). Under the entry for “Amor”, Chauvin draws again from Fabri his physical explanation of the motion that accompanies ‘amor passionalis’ (this time giving a precise reference: Lexicon philosophicum, 39-40; cf. Fabri, H., Tractatus duo, 404-7).


22 “Animi passio definitur a morali philosopho: motus appetitus sensitivi ex apprehensione boni vel mali cum aliqua mutatione non naturali corporis […] Illud etiam a nonnullis adjecturit ‘cum aliqua mutatione corporis non naturali.” Neque enim solent excitari passiones ab alia aliqua excedente corparis immutatione, præsérim quod etiam illum motum qua naturaliter cor modo dilatatur et modo contrahitur.” Summa philosophiae quadrirpartita (Parisii: C. Chastellain, 1609), II, 100-1. The Summa by the Cistercian Eustache de Saint-Paul was a very widespread Scholastic handbook on philosophy. Descartes knew it and considered it a good example of the genre.


25 Goelenius, R., Lexicon philosophicum quo tanquam clave philosophiae foris aperiretur (Francocuri : M. Becker, 1613), s.v. “Passio”, 804: “Motus Appetitus sensitivi, qui affectus dicitur. Hic enim sit cum mutatione non naturali corporis, nempe quia ea distrahitur cor a motu sibi naturali, etsi inter passions aliae motionem afferant minus, aliae magis a natura alienam. Graeci πάθος affectum omnem sine sensu etiam intellexere.”
26 Micraelius, J., Lexicon philosophicum terminorum philosophis usitatorum (Stetini: M. Höpfner, 1662), s.v. “Affectus”, 71-2): “Affectus (alias dicti perturbationes, passiones, πάθη) sunt motus animalis, ab appetente facultate ex appetitu & aversione mali, ad aliquid persequerendum vel amoliendum, excitati.”


28 On the transformations of the philosophical conceptions of emotions from the 13th to the 17th century, and on the lacks of the historiographical image of a radical opposition between the Aristotelian tradition and the early modern ‘revolutionary’ theories, see Perler, D., Transformationen der Gefühle Philosophische Emotionstheorien, 1270-1670 (Frankfurt a. M.: Fischer Verlag, 2011).

29 Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Affectus”, 31; cf. Cally, P., Anthropologia, 271. Note that Descartes used ‘animea’ instead of ‘mentis’: “those perceptions, sensations or emotions of the soul which we refer particularly to it, and which are caused, maintained and strengthened by some movement of the spirits” (Descartes, R., Passions de l’âme, I, 27; AT XI, 349; CSMK I, 338-9).


31 Caspar Bartholin the Younger (1655-1738) was a Danish physician. Joachim Targier (Joachimus Targirus), author of the Medicina compendiaria (1698), was a Dutch physician, who had also been a pupil of the philosopher Johannes de Raey in Amsterdam.

32 Generally speaking, this was true for Descartes too (see Passions de l’âme, I, § 30), but he claimed that the mind-body interaction was more intense in that particular area of the brain.

33 “Conjunctio et mentis et corporis proximum est utriusque commercium, indeque actionis et passionis reciprociato ex ordinazione divina constanter resultans” (E. Chauvin, Lexicon philosophicum, 132; cf. Cally, P., Anthropologia, 211-2); “mutuum actionum passionumque, quod mentem inter & corpus humanum intercedit, commercium plane videtur referendum in sapientissimae Dei institutum seu placitum” (E. Chauvin, Theses philosophicae de bonnre, § 11).

34 Descartes, R., Passions de l’âme, III, artt. 211 (AT XI, 485; CSMK I, 403) and 212 (AT XI, 488; CSMK I, 404).


38 Spinoza, B., Tractatus de intellectus emendatione, § 7.

39 Von Tschirnhaus, E.W., Medicina mentis, sive Tentamen genuinae Logicae, in qua dissertatur de Metodo detegendi incognitas veritates (Amsterdam: Magnun et Rieuwerts Jr, 1687).

40 Lange, J., Medicina mentis, qua, praeissua Medica Sapientiae Historia, ostensaque ac recta Philomoria, secundum versus Philosophiae principia, Aegrea mentis sanatio, ac sanatae usus in veri rectique Investigatione ac Communicatione, in Gratiam traditur eorum, qui per solidam Eruditionem ad veram sapientiam contendunt (Halle : Wessel, 1704). In the preface of this work, Lange writes: “Et cum certum mihi aliisque indubitatum esset, Philosophiam nil aliud esse, quam Medicina Mentis, nec philosophari aliud, quam hujus medicinae studiolum esse” (Lange, J., Medicina mentis, “Praefatio”, § 9).

41 “Superest ut de ultima et meo judicio potissima Geometriae utilitate pauca dicam, quae consistit in medicina mentis, quod tamen illi fatoer demum intelligent, qui cum ea philosophiam primam et cognitionem passionum animi conjungent. […] Cultus autem ingenii consistit in aucta cogitandi id est
judicandi inveniendiique facultate, in quantum a casu ac fortuna non pendet, hanc autem facultatem pulcherrimis utique speciminibus exornat Geometria” (Leibniz, W.G., Geometriae utilitas medicina mentis, AA VI, 3, 452-3).


“Contendimus Logica aut magis, aut certe non minus ad vitam intellectualem esse et utilem, et necessariam; quam ad vitam animalem conservandam aut restaurandam cum utilis, tum necessaria est Medicina” (Chauvin, E., Disputatio philosophica secunda, q. 3).


Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, 31-2.

“De la même considération du bien et du mal naissent toutes les autres passions. Mais, afin de les mettre par ordre, je distingue le temps, et considérant qu’elles nous portent bien plus à regarder l’avenir que le présent ou le passé, je commence par le Désir” (Descartes, R., cupiat, metuuntve : quid ad rem ?)

For a comparison between Thomas Aquinas and Descartes on the classification of emotions, see Perler, D., (2011), 324-328 and 336-338.

In the brief list of emotions compiled by Locke in the Essay on the human understanding (book II, chap. 20, §§ 7-10), time is considered in the definition of the emotions (or ideas of emotions) of joy, sorrow, hope and fear. Hobbes claims that all the passions related to the senses concern the notion of a present object, whereas all the passions of the mind arise from the expectation that proceeds from the foresight of things to come (Leviathan, ch. 6; Elements of law natural and politic, ch. 8-9).

Plato Theaetetus 156B (in Platonis opera, ed. J. Burnet, I (Oxonii: Clarendon, 1900), 275. Even though Plato does not refer only to emotions here, but to perceptions generally speaking, among perceptions he names pleasures, sorrows, desires and fears (the four fundamental emotions according to the main tradition). For a similar view among Chauvin’s contemporaries, cf. e.g. N. Malebranche: “il y a des passions différentes d’une infinité de façons, lesquelles n’ont point de nom particulier [...]”. Le nombre des passions qui se font de l’assemblage des autres est nécessairement infini, parce qu’une même passion ayant des degrés infinis, elle peut en se joignant avec les autres se combiner en une infinité de manières” (Recherche de la vérité, ed. G. Rodis-Lewis, in Malebranche, N., Oeuvres complètes, ed. A. Robinet, I (Paris : Vrin, 1964), 186); “Si l’on considère de quelle manière les passions se composent, on reconnaîtra visiblement que leur nombre ne se peut déterminer, et qu’il y en a beaucoup plus que nous n’avons de termes pour les exprimer. Les passions ne tirent pas seulement leur différences de la différente combinaison des trois primitives [...] mais [...] encore des différentes perceptions, et des différents jugements qui les causent ou qui les accompagnent” (Malebranche, N., Recherche de la vérité, 220).

“Apud Recentiores nonnemo unam duntaxat contendit esse animi affectionem, nempe amorem, qui pro diversis modis diversis donetur appellationibus” (Chauvin, E., Lexicon philosophicum, s.v. “Affectus”), 31).

“Amor ergo inhians habere quod amatur, cupiditas est, id autem habens eoque fruens laetitia; fugiens quod ei adversatur, timor est, idque si acciderit sentiens tristitia est” (Augustine, De civitate Dei, XIV, 7; cf. also XIV, 9 and, against Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, 1a 2ae, 25, 2).

“Dans toutes les passions tous les mouvements de l’âme vers le bien ne sont que des mouvements d’amour [...] Enfin tout mouvement naturel étant une impression de l’Auteur de la nature, qui n’agit que pour lui, et qui ne peut nous tourner que vers lui, le véritable mouvement de l’âme est toujours essentiellement amour du bien, et n’est que par accident fuite du mal” (Malebranche, N., Recherche de la vérité, 143-4); “[l’aversoin] est entièrement contraire à l’amour, mais elle n’est jamais sans amour [...] elle n’est...
jemais séparée de l'amour […] et ainsi l'aversion de la privation du bien est l'amour du bien” (Malebranche, N., *Recherche de la vérité*, 214).


54 “Sans offenser la Philosophie, on peut se départir des sentimens de Platon & d’Aristote : Car il me semble qu’ils donnent plusieurs noms à une même chose, qu’ils diuisent l’unité de l’amour, & qu’ils prennent ses diuers effects pour des passions différentes. Aussi apres avoir bien examiné cette matière, je suis contraint d’embrasser l’opinion de Saint Augustin, et de soustenir auec luy, que l’amour est l’unique Passion qui nous agite : Car tous ces mouuemens qui troublent nostre ame ne sont que des amours desguisez ; nos craintes & nos desirs, nos esperances & nos desespoirs, nos plaisirs & nos douleurs sont des visages, que prend l’amour suyant les bons ou les mauuasis succes qui luy arriuent ; & comme la mer porte des noms differens selon les diuers endroits de la terre qu’elle arrouse, il change les siens selon les diuers estats où il se trouue […] ainsi parmy les Philosophes les qualitez de l’amour ont esté prises pour des Passions differentes ; & ces grands Homes se sont imaginez, qu’au tant de fois qu’il changeoit de conduite ou d’emploï, il deuoit aussi changer de nature & de nom. Mais si ce raisonnement estoit véritable, il faudroit que l’ame perdist son vnité toutes les fois qu’elle produist des effets differens.” *De l’usage des passions* (Leide : J. Elsevier, 1658), 27-8. In the following pages Senault refers to Augustine (the same passage quoted above) and to Bernard of Clairvaux (“Amor caeteros in se traducit affectus”, quoted in Senault, *De l’usage des passions*, 32; modified from Bernardus Clarae-Vallensis, *Sermones in Cantica canticorum*, LXXXIII, n. 3, in *Patrologiae cursus completus*, Series Latina Prior, ed. J.-P. Migne, CLXXXIII (Parisii, J.-P. Migne, 1854), 1182). The Oratorian picks out metaphors from a strongly platonizing Christian repertoire, see e.g. p. 31: “cette mesme Passion […] ressemble au Soleil, qui par vne mesme lumiere esclaire les Aigles & auegles les Hibous ; & s’il est permis de monter jusque dans les Cieux, elle se regle sur Dieu mesme, qui ne haït le pêcheur, que parce qu’il s’ayme soy-mesme.”

55 *Passions de l’âme*, II, art. 75 (AT XI, 384; CSMK I, 354-5).


57 *Philosophia vetus et nova ad usum scholae accomodata, in Regia Burgudia olim printrustata* (Paris, Michallet, 1678), 232. Jean-Baptiste Du Hamel (1624-1706) was also an Oratorian.


60 Cf. Clauberg, J., *De cognitione Dei et nostr… exercitationes centum*, Exercitatio LXXXI (“De usu admirationis, et quomodo tollatur”), in *Opera omnia philosophica* (Amsterdam, Blaeu, 1691), I, 733.


63 Aristote *Metafîsica* 1.2: A 982b, 12-13; in Moerbeke’s translation: “Nam propter admirari homines et nunc et primum inceperunt philosophari, a principio quidem paratiora dubitabilium mirantes, ut de lune passionibus et de his quae circa solem et astra et de universi generatione. Qui vero dubitat et admiratur ignorare videtur. Quare et philomitos philosophus alqualiter est, fabula namque ex miris constituitur. Quare si ad ignorantiam fugiendam philosophati sunt, palam quia propter seire studere persecuti sunt et non usus alcuuis causa”, *Aristotelis latinitus*, XXV, 3.2, ed. G. Vuillemin-Diem (Leiden, New York and Köln: Brill,
For wonder as the beginning of philosophizing, cf. of course also Plato *Theaetetus* 155D.

64 “C’est là l’institution de la nature, car l’admiration doit porter à la curiosité, et la curiosité doit conduire à la connaissance de la vérité” (Malebranche, N., *Recherche de la vérité*, 207). See also p. 155-6, where Malebranche says that the emotions of the soul are not different from those that follow the intellectual vision of something good: they are just stronger, because of the union of the soul with the body.


67 Cally, P., *Anthropologia*, 18. The entry for “Dubitatio” in the first edition of Chauvin’s *Lexicon* (1692) was closer to Cally’s text; in the second edition (1713) Chauvin erases all of Cally’s references to the commentators, except for Fonseca.


70 That is probably the reason why he always uses the term ‘recentiores’ instead of the stronger and more dangerous term ‘novatores’ to designate the modern philosophers.