

# THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF *PRUDENTIA* IN LOCKE'S CLASSIFICATIONS OF KNOWLEDGE

Giuliana Di BIASE\*

**Abstract.** During the seventeenth century, the concept of prudence underwent a process of radical transformation: its status as an intellectual virtue, seeking to apply right reason to the enactment of means to morally appropriate ends, had already become problematic during the Renaissance, but it is its moral significance which was brought into question in the writings of the seventeenth century theorists of *ratio status*. This gradual process of erosion is witnessed in some works of John Locke, especially his correspondence and some of his journal notes; however, some manuscripts of the philosopher dating back to the years 1670-1686 reveal he bestowed an important role on the virtue of *Prudentia*. These manuscripts contain different outlines of a classification of knowledge; the outlines are also evidence of a development in Locke's concept of *Prudentia*, which leads from an original interpretation in Scholastic terms to a rereading more strictly inspired by Cicero's notion of *decorum*. This paper aims at reconstructing the steps of this development; the point of departure of the analysis, and a fundamental key of interpretation, is a letter written by Locke to the Reverend Richard King in 1703, where he dwells on prudence and its proper business. The paragraphs examine the single outlines in detail and some journal notes relevant to the topic of discussion; a paragraph is devoted to a brief *excursus* on the history of the concept of prudence. In the last paragraph, I return to the letter to Reverend King, in order to argue that the development of the concept of prudence in Locke's thinking leads to its exclusion from the dominion of morals.

**Keywords:** John Locke, Richard King, *Prudentia*, *Politia*, Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, Scholastic philosophy, Stoicism

## Introduction

In writing to the Reverend Richard King on August 25, 1703,<sup>1</sup> Locke dwelled upon the virtue of prudence and the way to teach its rules to young gentlemen, in the context of a brief exposition of his educative method. The Reverend King was a great admirer of Locke's educational ideas: in his terms, «the experience of many years and

---

\* University "G. d'Annunzio", via dei Vestini 33, 66013 Chieti, Italy, email: giulianadibiase@unich.it

the knowledge of men and things» had made the philosopher «the perfect Socrates of the Age».<sup>2</sup> As is arguable from the content of the letter of August 25, King had asked Locke for a description of «the shortest and surest way for a young Gentleman to attain a true knowledge of the Christian Religion, in the full and just Extent of it»; besides, he was eager to receive some pieces of advice concerning the most appropriate books for teaching morals, prudence and politics.<sup>3</sup> As regards the first question, Locke's answer was significantly short (a detail King later complained about):<sup>4</sup> he recommended the reading of the Holy Scripture, in particular the New Testament, as the only text fundamental to a young gentleman as well as to anyone «professing Christianity, that would seriously set himself to know his religion». The reading of the Holy Scripture was recommended also with reference to morals, together with another few texts (among which Whichcote and Tillotson's sermons, Cicero's *De Officiis* and Aristotle). More space was devoted by Locke to politics: the list of books concerning this topic included the writings of Aristotle, Hooker, Pufendorf, but also the *Two Treatises of Government*. As for prudence, Locke's argument started with the denouncement of an omission: although this was usually «reckoned among the cardinal virtues», there was no treatise on morals, at least in his experience, which treated it «in its full Extent, and with that Accuracy that it ought». However, Locke seemed convinced there was a good reason for this omission: «every imprudent Action does not make a Man culpable *in foro Conscientiae*. The Business of Morality I look upon to be the avoiding of Crimes; of Prudence, Inconveniences». These words were intended to clarify King's request: he had asked for some pieces of advice concerning the teaching of morals, prudence and politics, as if this should be reckoned as a single question, but in Locke's opinion the questions were «two or three» and needed «a larger Answer». The objects of prudence and morality should be distinguished: this was what Locke's answer seemed to imply. Besides, he recommended only one book with reference to the teaching of prudence, that is the Book of Sirach, one of the Sapiential texts in the Old Testament. This might seem strange: Cicero's ideal of prudence as practical reason associated with active life was extremely relevant in the history of the concept,<sup>5</sup> not to mention the great authority Locke conferred to his moral teaching in *Some Thoughts concerning Education*. Locke's preference for the book of Sirach regarding the teaching of prudence is an important clue to a development in his understanding of the concept, as I shall attempt to demonstrate.

The foundation of prudence, the letter went on, «lies in knowing Men and Manners. History teaches this best, next to Experience; which is the only effectual way to get a Knowledge of the World».<sup>6</sup> The reference to history as one of the best means to acquire prudence was already in a journal entry for March 6, 1677,<sup>7</sup> where Locke recommended its study in order to be acquainted with «the great and useful instructions of prudence». However, this recommendation was addressed uniquely to those who were already familiar with the principles of morals, as they were the only ones who could profit from the study of history and from its most important teaching, to «be warned against the cheats and rogueries of the world»:<sup>8</sup> besides, Locke cautioned against a study of history merely as a way to establish a reputation as a historian, as well as against the danger of identifying the bellicose attitude proper of

the ancient conquerors celebrated by historians with «the chief if not the only virtue».<sup>9</sup> In *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, Locke expressed a similar caution: though characterizing history as «the great Mistress of Prudence and Civil Knowledge»,<sup>10</sup> he affirmed that «All the Entertainment and talk of History is of nothing almost but Fighting and Killing: And the Honour and Renown, that is bestowed on Conquerours (who for the most part are but the great Butchers of Mankind) farther mislead growing Youth, who by this means come to think Slaughter the laudable Business of Mankind, and the most Heroick of Vertues».<sup>11</sup>

If the study of history needed the assistance of moral principles in order to avoid being misleading, the study of morals should precede that of prudence; however, in “Study” Locke assigned an extremely important role to prudence, whose study he recommended immediately after that of religion. Twenty-five years later, in the letter to Richard King of August 25, 1703, Locke seems instead to push prudence to the borders of morality: he keeps it distinct from virtue when listing the requirements necessary «to complete a Man in the Practice of Human Offices» (prudence, virtue and good breeding), although he employs the traditional Scholastic lexicon when characterizing prudence as a cardinal virtue.<sup>12</sup>

However, a few lines above in the same letter, Locke complained about the absence of any *reliable* treatise on prudence: its rules were wrongly described by many writers, who have «their Eyes so fix'd on Convenience, that they sometimes lose the Sight of Virtue, and do not take care to keep themselves always clear from the Borders of Dishonesty, while they are tracing out what they take to be, sometimes, the securest way to Success». The strategic, not moral meaning conferred to prudence by many political and ethical writers during the Renaissance, when the rise of the notion of *ratio status* (reason of state) weakened the connection between prudence and justice, was probably what Locke was complaining about in the letter: conventionally associated with wisdom and the other cardinal virtues in the Humanistic doctrine of the good prince, prudence acquired an independent and self-sufficient role in the writings of the scholars of reason of state.<sup>13</sup> In Locke's time, clear evidence of this profound transformation was in a book by Baltasar Gracià, *Oràculo manual y arte de prudencia*,<sup>14</sup> Locke owned Amelot de la Houssaie's fortunate version of the book, entitled *L'homme de cour*.<sup>15</sup> Gracià and Amelot's combined literary creation marked a new chapter in the history of prudence, for the work became the most effective vehicle for popularization of methods and practices of reason of state. Amelot's book defined a political *ethos* for a new era: it was a reflection on a new competitive court society, in which courtly social rationality served to calculate human relations and prestige.

Locke's complaint about the strategic meaning attributed to prudence might explain why he had completely abstained from using the term in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, where he seemed to prefer roughly synonymic words such as “caution” and “wariness”.<sup>16</sup> In his previous writings, he had used the term “prudence” as a synonym for “slyness” only once;<sup>17</sup> apart from this exception, he usually seems to assign a moral significance to it.<sup>18</sup> Mostly, in some outlines of the branches of knowledge written between 1670 and 1686, Locke bestowed a very important role on prudence; these outlines are to be found in some manuscripts

belonging to the Bodleian Library (“Adversaria 1661”, MS. Film 77, pp. 1-3, undated; “Sapientia”, MS. Locke c. 28, dated 1672, p. 41; MS. Locke c. 28, fos. 50-51, dated 1677; MS. Locke f. 2, pp. 247-52, dated 1677; MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 110, 119-20, 122-23, written in 1677-8; MS. Locke c. 28, fos.157-58, date uncertain but not before 1678; MS. Locke c. 42B, p. 22, dated 1679; “Adversaria 1661”, p. 25, undated; “Adversaria 1661”, pp. 290-91, dated 1681; “Adversaria 1661”, back endpaper, undated; MS c. 28, fos. 155-56, undated).<sup>19</sup> These schemes represent an important source for investigating the relevance Locke attributed to the notion of *Prudentia*, and a privileged observatory from where it is possible to evince a development in his conception of the virtue, where an original interpretation in Scholastic terms leads to a rereading shaped on Cicero’s ideal of *decorum*. This process is less clearly delineated in Locke’s other writings: this is why this paper focuses mostly on these outlines. I will now analyze them separately, in order to point out the place and relevance assumed by the concept of *Prudentia* in each of them.

### **Scheme 1 (“Adversaria 1661”, pp. 1-3).**

In a classification of knowledge presumably dating back to 1670,<sup>20</sup> Locke names *Prudentia* as one of the four disciplines covering the territory of human knowledge, the others being *Theologia*, *Politia* and *Physica sive Corporum scientia*. This is the first of the many classifications written by the philosopher, who along with his contemporaries seems to share a strong interest in systematizing knowledge (a feature already apparent in Bacon’s project of an *Instauratio Magna* and fully developed in the encyclopedic works by Heinrich Alsted, John Amos Comenius, Athanasius Kircher, Gottfried Leibniz and many others).<sup>21</sup> Below is reproduced the outline of this first classification, leaving *Physica* aside:<sup>22</sup>

**Table 1**

(page 1)	Theologia.	Historica vel Rationalis
Deus		
Spiritus	Angeli	
Immortalitas	Anima separata. Resurrectio. Praemium. Poena. Caelum. Gehenna	
Cultus	Ritus. Ceremoniae. Sanctorum Invocatio. Sacerdotes	
Ethica	Lex naturae. Virtutes et vitia	
Revelatio	Miracula. Vaticinia. Insomnia. Visiones Enthusiastica. Profetia. Oracula	
Judaica	Creatio	
Christiana		

**(page 2)***Politia*

Fundamenta Ius Paternum  
 Consensus Populi

Forma Monarchia  
 Aristocratia  
 Democratia  
 Mixta  
 Constitutiones  
 fundamentales

Administratio Leges Civiles

**(page 3)***Prudentia*

Finis est  
 Felicitas Caelestis, quae pertinet ad Theologiam  
 Tranquilitas  
 Sanitas quae pertinet ad Physicam  
 Opes quae pertinent ad oeconomiam  
 Potestas quae pertinet ad Politiam  
 Fama  
 Gratia

Media ad hos fines  
 Sui Cognitio  
 In passiones suas imperium  
 Ingeniorum Cognitio  
 Consiliorum indagatio  
 Animorum Gubernatio Rethorica  
 Oeconomia  
 Venditio et Comptio-Historia mercatura cuiuslibet  
 Artis exercitium

*Schema 1* is inspired by the Scholastic concept of *Prudentia*, based on the Thomistic interpretation of Aristotle's notion of *phrónesis*. In his *Summa Theologiae*, Aquinas identifies prudence with an activity of reason which requires the knowledge of the universal principles of reasons in order to deliberate well on what it is better to do in determinate circumstances;<sup>23</sup> in Aquinas' terms, «that which is the chief act of reason in regard to action needs to be the chief act of prudence. Now there are three such acts. The first is to take counsel, which belongs to discovery, for counsel is an act of inquiry [...]. The second act is to judge of what one has discovered, and this is an act of the speculative reason. But the practical reason, which is directed to action, goes further, and its third act is to command, which act consists in applying to action the things counseled and judged».<sup>24</sup> This third act implies an exercise of will, which in Aquinas' thought is oriented to the good: prudence allows one to do what is good because it demands not only knowledge, but rightness of desire.<sup>25</sup> This is why prudence is counted among moral virtues, though it is superior to them: prudence is the mold and mother of all the virtues, of justice, fortitude, and temperance as well as of their subordinate virtues, because the latter are in the affective power of the soul, but prudence is in the cognitive power of the soul.<sup>26</sup> Human actions are a matter of prudence under the form of true; they are a matter of moral virtues under the form of good. Natural practical reason (*syndèresis*) determines the ends of moral virtues, while prudence determines the means to these ends.

Aquinas lists eight habits of minds, which he characterizes as integral parts of prudence (*memoria, intellectus sive intelligentia, docilitas, solertia sive eustochia, ratio, providentia, circumspectio, cautio*); these habits are such that they must all be present for any complete or perfect act of virtue. Moreover, Aquinas lists some subjective parts of

prudence (*militaris, oeconomica, legispositiva, politica*; as for theorizing, *physica, dialectica, retorica*), and some potential parts or closely allied virtues, analogue to those dispositions Aristotle recognized as proper of the *phrónimoi* (*eubullia* or deliberating well; *synésis* or judging well according to the common law; *gnóme* or wit to judge in matter of exception to general law).<sup>27</sup>

In *Schema 1*, Locke follows Aquinas' interpretation of prudence as practical wisdom, though Stoicism is another important source of inspiration.<sup>28</sup> As is shown by Table 1, Locke groups seven ends under *Prudentia* (happiness, tranquility, health, wealth, power, reputation, favor); some of them are cross-referenced to the other headings (as is for happiness, which stands for eternal beatitude and is cross-referenced to *Theologia*; similarly, health is cross-referenced to *Physica* and power to *Politia*). As regards the means (self-knowledge, mastery of one's passions, knowledge of wits, seeking for counsel, directing of minds, economy: selling and accounting; practice of manual arts), *Oeconomia* is cross-referenced to wealth and corresponds to the Aristotelian art of household management, as is confirmed also by a subsequent classification (*Scheme 3*).<sup>29</sup> The other means listed in *Schema 1* suggest an Aristotelian-Thomistic derivation as well, and the same may be said of the ends, though Stoicism (mainly Cicero) is another relevant source.<sup>30</sup> Starting with the last means, «*artis exercitium*» refers to the sphere of *téchnai* (skills or crafts),<sup>31</sup> which in Aristotle's classification of knowledge comes after the two dominions of theoretical and practical sciences; as for *Rethorica*, the art which teaches to direct minds («*animorum gubernatio*»), its mention among the means is coherent with Aquinas' teaching<sup>32</sup> and more in general with the Ciceronian-Humanist tradition, which characterizes prudence as the ultimate goal of rhetorical education.<sup>33</sup>

As regards the other means, both self-knowledge and mastery over passions are reminiscent of the classical philosophical tradition; the first represented an essential aspect of the Socratic-Stoic practice of *ars vivendi*,<sup>34</sup> the second was a fundamental principle in the teachings of Aristotle,<sup>35</sup> Stoics,<sup>36</sup> and in Christian morality, often echoed in the many *disciplinae passionum* written in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.<sup>37</sup> Another means, *consiliorum indagatio*, recalls Aristotle's concept of *eubullia*, the ability of inquiring through reasoning in order to attain good deliberation (lat. *consilium*);<sup>38</sup> according to Aristotle, *eubullia* represents a good disposition of mind necessary in order to be *phronimos*. As for *ingeniorum cognitio* (knowledge of wits),<sup>39</sup> the importance of knowing individual tempers was insisted on by Cicero<sup>40</sup> and, later, enforced by a persistent philosophical tradition imbibed by Stoic ideals, which had in Joan Huarte and Francis Bacon two important exponents;<sup>41</sup> in particular, the physician Huarte linked prudence to knowledge of wits and emphasized Cicero's insistence on the relevance of this knowledge for a good orator.

As regards the ends summoned by Locke under *Prudentia*, the Latin term *Gratia* denotes a favorable attitude towards others: its mention is reminiscent of Cicero's lexicon<sup>42</sup> and, more in general, of the Stoics' insistence on the benevolent attitude of the wise man,<sup>43</sup> an attitude which, as we shall see, plays an important role in Locke's ideal of an ethics of service to others. Similarly, *Tranquilitas* is a reminiscence of Stoicism<sup>44</sup> reinterpreted in a Christian perspective: in Locke's

classification, it stands for mundane happiness, which comes after happiness as eternal beatitude.

By putting on the same line, on pages 2 and 3 of *Scheme 1, Monarchia* and *Potestas, Aristocratia* and *Fama, Democratia* and *Gratia*, perhaps Locke was thinking of a correspondence inspired by Aristotle's *Politics*, where monarchy is the form of government whose supreme constitutive principle is the possession of power, aristocracy is the government based on the search for honor, and democracy is the way of administrating the state grounded on the exchange of benefits among equals. Being as it may, all the ends listed in *Scheme 1* have an apparent reference to the Aristotelian partition of goods in the first book of *Nicomachean Ethics* (happiness or the *summum bonum*; wealth, honor, power, health, pleasure, virtue). These same ends were grouped by Aristotle and his medieval commentators into three kinds of goods (*bona exteriora, bona corporis* and *bona virtutum*); the same partition was adopted by Aquinas when defining man's supreme end.<sup>45</sup> Locke seems to look for a perfect symmetry with this model when listing the ends of *Prudentia* in *Scheme 1*, though he substitutes pleasure with *Gratia*;<sup>46</sup> moreover, in dividing knowledge into four main headings (*Theologia* and *Physica*, two theoretical disciplines;<sup>47</sup> *Politia*<sup>48</sup> and *Prudence*, two practical disciplines), and mainly in positing *Theologia* in the first place, Locke is faithful to the Scholastic tradition, which elevates the latter to the role of the supreme theoretical science, clearly distinguished from practical sciences (ethics and politics) and *poietic* or productive sciences (*téchnaï*).<sup>49</sup> As regards the location of *Ethica* under *Theologia*, it appears motivated by the divine origin Locke attributed to natural law as one of the two parts of the divine law, the other being *Revelatio*<sup>50</sup>. The definition of ethics in terms of living in conformity with natural law was proper of Stoicism; Locke's preference for Stoic natural theology, as opposed to an Aristotelian variety, is mainly due to the Stoic derivation of natural law from divine reason and to the important role that the doctrine of natural law plays in his moral and political theory.<sup>51</sup> However, the location of natural law under the heading *Theologia* seemed to imply the complete independence of the *lex civilis*, located under *Politia*, from the first, which was contrary to Locke's thought.<sup>52</sup> As we shall see, he was conscious of this problem already in 1681 and attempted to solve it in his 1686 classification (*Scheme 4*). As emerges from this cursory introduction, Locke's main sources for the writing of *Scheme 1* were Scholastic in nature, though Stoics and Neo-stoics are also well represented; in this sense, the manuscript is evidence of those which were Locke's main readings at Christ Church.<sup>53</sup> A subsequent classification of knowledge, dating back to 1672 ("Sapientia 72"),<sup>54</sup> shares strong similarities with *Scheme 1*, though the different order in which the branches are written and the introduction of another branch, *Metaphysica* (which is numbered "1", though it is located under *Theologia*, numbered "2", and *Politia*, numbered "3")<sup>55</sup> are worth noting. The addition of *Metaphysica*<sup>56</sup> may be scarcely due to Bacon's influence<sup>57</sup> and has probably to be related to other sources. In the seventeenth century, the Jesuits' contribute to the development of metaphysics was decisive: an important case is the English edition of the *Manuductio ad logicam* of the Jesuit logician Philippe Du Trieu, published in Oxford in 1662 and reprinted in 1678. Its appendix, which Locke undoubtedly read, contributed to the dissemination of Aristotelian ideas among the empiricists;<sup>58</sup> besides

Du Trieu, Locke was familiar with the work of Franco Burgersdijck, one of the main texts on logic and metaphysics studied in Oxford. Du Trieu and Burgersdijck's works were both predominantly scholastic in nature.<sup>59</sup>

The outline of *Politia* in "Sapientia 72" remains unvaried; as for *Prudentia*, Locke adds the specification «Mundana» before *Tranquilitas*, in order to distinguish between eternal and earthly happiness; *In passiones suas imperium* becomes *Passionum suarum regimen*, after which a new sub-heading is introduced, «Morum rectitudo. Virtus Laus, Vitium vituperium». The term *rectitudo* had already been used by Locke in his *Essays on the Law of Nature*, in contraposition with *utile*.<sup>60</sup> This opposition was reminiscent of Cicero's lexicon in the second book of *De Officiis*, where the relationship between *honestum* (the set of the fundamental virtues, whose «natura esse laudabile») and *utile* was explored.<sup>61</sup> The idea of *honestum* in *De Officiis* incorporated wisdom, prudence, fortitude, *decorum* and an element concerning the conservation of organized society (justice); inside the notion of *decorum* there were temperance, moderation, but also courtesy or considerateness for others, a social virtue apt to promote *concordia socialis*. Likewise, Locke's use of the expression «morum rectitudo» is intended to refer to the sphere of public morality, which involves civil life;<sup>62</sup> its presence in "Sapientia 72" is worth noting, since it is exactly this aspect which Locke detracts from *Prudentia* in the 1677 outlines of a classification of the branches of knowledge.

As regards the other means listed under *Prudentia* in "Sapientia 72", *cognitio* after *Ingeniorum* is deleted and replaced by *observatio*, while *indagatio* after *Consiliorum* is followed by a variant, *penetratio*. A new item, *Logica*, is located under *Animorum Gubernatio*, after *Rethorica*; the only item listed under *Oeconomia* is *Mercatura*. The addition of *Logica* is an important innovation, already noted by Locke's scholarship;<sup>63</sup> it will remain unvaried in *Scheme 3*, which is still more articulated than "Sapientia 72". As for *Ingeniorum observatio* and *Consiliorum indagatio-penetratio*, clearly what Locke intended to stress was the reasoned examination of wits and deliberations; the term *penetratio* is reminiscent of Aquinas' lexicon, according to whom the task of *intellectus*, one of the integral parts of prudence, might be characterized as an «intima penetratio veritatis».<sup>64</sup>

*Theologia* is the most reworked branch in "Sapientia 72": under its subheadings, Locke adds several items,<sup>65</sup> one of which, *Indifferentia*, is worth noting. The term is introduced under *Ethica*, after *Virtutes* and *Vitia*, in conformity with the Stoic theory of value which divided things into good, bad and indifferent.<sup>66</sup> Significantly, in *Scheme 3* Locke will add *Indifferentia* also under one of the subheadings of *Prudentia*, «Morum rectitudo»: this doubling is perhaps a clue to the difficulties he began to encounter in keeping *Prudentia* and *Ethica* distinct, a point to which I will return later.

The outline of *Prudentia* in "Sapientia 72" like *Scheme 1* is Scholastic in nature: prudence is the intellectual virtue which rightly directs particular human acts, through rectitude of the appetite, towards a good end, and a moral virtue or habit that makes its possessor good. *Prudentia* determines the means to the ends of moral virtues and, at the same time, reaches out to the common end of the whole of human life. The relevance of Locke's strict adherence to this model may be properly appreciated, in

my opinion, when compared with the different meaning acquired by the virtue of *Prudentia* in the seventeenth century, as the result of a long process of erosion involving also the concept of *Politica*. The premises and outcomes of this process are the object of the following paragraph.

### ***Prudentia* and *Politica*. A short historical digression**

The use of the term *Prudentia* to identify the dominion of practical wisdom was not extraordinary in Locke's time:<sup>67</sup> it had the authority of a long-standing tradition, going back to Aristotle and transmitted through Alexandrine sources - mainly Ammonius- to Latin commentators such as Boetius and Cassiodorus. This same tradition was systematized by Scholastic philosophers, mainly Aquinas;<sup>68</sup> the latter distinguished among several habits of prudence, while as for its proper object he differentiated among *prudentia simpliciter*, aiming at the good of the individual, *prudentia oeconomica* and *prudentia politica*.<sup>69</sup> Commenting upon the sixth book of *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aquinas stated that politics and prudence are in their essence the same habit of mind, since they both consist in making sound judgments on practical matters,<sup>70</sup> though they differ insofar as prudence judges with reference to the individual's good or evil, while politics considers the city's good or evil. Following Aristotle, Aquinas distinguished between two aspects of politics, legislative and deliberative: the first is supreme and directive or architectural, because it defines what others should do, while *politica executiva* consists in deliberating, or rather applying the universal norms discovered by political prudence to particular circumstances. Political prudence consists then in counseling in legislative bodies and deliberating on particular issues, having always the common good in view; since it aims at the common good, which is superior to individual good, political prudence is superior to economic and individual prudence; legislation has priority over government and administration and is indeed the most excellent human activity.

The interpretation of Aristotle's idea of a close tie between politics and prudence was not an easy task: in *Nicomachean Ethics*, the Stagirite distinguished between four meanings of *phronesis* (wisdom of the individual; care of domestic affairs or *oeconomia*; making laws or *legispositiva*; care of the state or *politica*),<sup>71</sup> though he seemed to disclaim any identity of prudence and politics when, quoting Euripis, he affirmed that only those who take care of their domestic affairs should be called *phronimoi*.<sup>72</sup> Some medieval commentators stressed this latter point: in the eleventh century, one of the most influential commentators on Aristotle, Eustratius of Nicea, affirmed that *prudentia* and *politica* should be thought of as separate species belonging to the same generis, since they both relate to the same actions («bene consiliari» and «optimum homini operabilium coniectari»), though having different ends in view (the best for the individual, with reference to prudence; the good of the town, with reference to politics).<sup>73</sup> Two centuries later, Albertus Magnus<sup>74</sup> rejected Eustratius' idea of different species of prudence and preferred to characterize *politica*, *oeconomica*, *legispositiva*, as *partes* of the same virtue, sharing something in common; nonetheless, Albertus recognized *prudentia politica* a paramount role because of its end (the common good, the highest and most perfect one).

Aquinas seemed to follow Albertus Magnus when attributing a common substance to *prudentia* and *politica*, but his distinction between different habits of prudence results into something very near to Eustratius' species; though thwarted by many of his contemporaries, Aquinas' model exerted a wide influence<sup>75</sup> and represented an obligatory confrontation point in the many public disputes which took place at the end of the thirteenth century.<sup>76</sup> The topic of the debates was often the unity of prudence, which was questioned not only in reference to politics, but also to the other virtues: the theme of the *connexio virtutum* was one of the most relevant inside the medieval ethical debate.<sup>77</sup> One of the most representative participants in these debates, Godfrey of Fontaines, gave a positive answer in his *Quaestiones ordinariae* to both the question concerning the unity of prudence and that relating to the status of *prudentia* as a virtue («Utrum prudentia sit virtus»):<sup>78</sup> politics and prudence should be considered as the same thing as for their essence, being distinguished only by some accidental aspects.<sup>79</sup> In the same vein, Henry of Friemar<sup>80</sup> refused any specialization of prudence: *prudentia politica*, *oeconomica* and *monastica* (or “solitary” prudence, as Thomas named it) should not be considered as different species, but only as different degrees of perfection of the same virtue.

At the beginning of the fourteenth century, the refusal to admit any substantial distinction between the many *prudentiae particulares* represented a clear effort to maintain a unity inside practical reason: in his comment on Aristotle's *Ethics*, Gerard of Odo reaffirmed that prudence constitutes a unique habit or virtue,<sup>81</sup> and in the same vein John Buridan<sup>82</sup> claimed that, since only those actions which aim at the good of one's neighbors, friends and country can be said to be virtuous, *prudentia monastica* and *prudentia civilis* should be considered as the same habit in essence.

A major emphasis on the paramount role of civil prudence as the perfect political virtue emerges in Scholastic writers of the late thirteenth-fourteenth centuries such as Henry of Rimini;<sup>83</sup> working on Aristotelian and Thomistic sources, Henry elaborated an account of political prudence which combines the Ciceronian ideal of the political man as moderator with the notion of political prudence as the virtue that leads individual citizens to behave accordingly to the common good, abiding the law, the sovereign and respecting their fellow-citizens. Prudence is celebrated by Henry as the virtue most necessary to a good prince, and seen as a sort of knowledge that embraces the common good of all.

In the fifteenth century, the Ciceronian teaching on civil prudence exerted a paramount influence; the enormous blossoming of interest in the concept of prudence in the Quattrocento owes a great debt to the recovery of Cicero's *De Oratore*, which depicts prudence as being closely linked to an active participation in civil life.<sup>84</sup> In the language of Humanists, politics can be identified with civil philosophy; Gerolamo Savonarola, Pietro Pomponazzi and, later, Philip Melanchton celebrated Aristotle's ideal of political prudence as a means of religious and political renewal, interpreting his ethics as the source of those political virtues capable of promoting the birth of a Christian Republic.<sup>85</sup>

At the end of the fifteenth century the Ciceronian ideal of prudence underwent a process of radical transformation,<sup>86</sup> clearly apparent in the writings on courtly ethics: in the system of virtues elaborated by Baldassarre Castiglione,

prudence plays a fundamental role by granting survival inside the court, a world dominated by simulation. Prudence in *Cortegiano* is still one of the most important Ciceronian virtues, though it represents also an indispensable requisite in order to counteract the adverse effects of fortune;<sup>87</sup> in the same vein, Stephen Guazzo depicts prudence as a crucial means for the management of appearances.<sup>88</sup>

During the sixteenth century, the language of politics as civil philosophy gradually gave way to a conception of politics as *ratio status*;<sup>89</sup> a tradition of argument stemming from Machiavelli<sup>90</sup> and transmitted through widely read authors, such as the Italian polymath Gerolamo Cardano, searched to combine Machiavelli's insight about the inner working of state power to those of Tacitus in the light of conventional morality, insisting on the necessity for the wise man to adapt his external behavior to the conditions of stupidity and vice prevailing in the general population by different levels of wisdom, with the highest human level operating for the most part only internally. This attitude was very much in tune with Renaissance neo-Stoicism, of which Justus Lipsius was a leading exponent;<sup>91</sup> it was further developed by Pierre Charron, who combined elements of neo-Stoicism with a Montaignian sense of a disjunction between the public and private realms.<sup>92</sup> A similar pattern of thought, though with a more ambivalent attitude towards Stoicism and an evident debt to Lipsius, was displayed by Bacon, whose essay *On Simulation and Dissimulation* put forward an adaptation of Lipsius' "mixed prudence".<sup>93</sup>

Lipsius subscribed to some fundamental Machiavellian and Tacitist assumptions about the nature of politics but, unlike them, he did not believe it was possible to construct a perfectly virtuous reason of state, accepting instead that the art of ruling must make some compromises with vices. Lipsius' justification for this position was shaped, ultimately, on the common good: permitted frauds were tolerable only when they were instrumental to this supreme end.<sup>94</sup> Lipsius' term for reason of state was "mixed prudence", which he described in Ciceronian terms as a mixture of *honesta* and *utilia*;<sup>95</sup> clearly, this was an attempt to legitimate the concept morally, a strategy which prevailed in the following decades.

The ethical legitimization of reason of state and its acceptance inside political doctrine as a fundamental part of the theory of government<sup>96</sup> gradually led to a complete assimilation, in the second half of the seventeenth century, of politics to administration.

### Politics and Prudence in *Scheme 1*

As has emerged from the previous paragraph, Machiavellism and Neo-Stoicism represent the premises of a process of radical transformation, which remolds the role of prudence during the sixteenth century: this ceased to be understood as a superior moral activity (or meta-virtue), and was progressively identified with a practice finalized to the application of general rules. The Aristotelian ideal of a unitary moral activity was compromised: moral action was fragmented into a theoretical guiding principle and an executive praxis. The first was conceived as belonging to the realm of political science, the second as the object of prudence. The moral significance of the latter became problematic, given its close tie with the notion of reason of state.

What was Locke's understanding of this phenomenon? His library contained many volumes from the Renaissance (those of Machiavelli, Sarpi, Castiglione, Guazzo, Montaigne, Cardano *et al.*), and neo-Stoic writers (Lipsius, De Veer, Charron, Bacon); all these sources revealed a radical transformation of the concept of prudence, which was no longer the Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue. Besides, Locke was familiar with the works of the German Kaspar Schoppe, who identified prudence with reason of state, and of the Italian Scipione Ammirato, who attributed the role of a *jus politicum* to reason of state;<sup>97</sup> his library also included some writings by Gabriel Naudé, who assimilated politics to prudence and the latter to the art of the state (Aquinas' *politica executiva*), leaving the legislative or architectural aspect aside.<sup>98</sup> All these works were evidence of a process of decay of politics: surely Locke was aware of this phenomenon, which was apparent in the diminishing number of books concerning the general theory of politics.<sup>99</sup> His liberalism implied the unveiling of the *Arcana imperii*, the governing tools of absolute monarchs,<sup>100</sup> as well as a limitation of political power inside the borders of natural law, the supreme source of fundamental human rights and duties.<sup>101</sup> As a devout reader of Hooker's works, Locke shared with him an uncompromising condemnation of those «wise malignants» who recommended to resort to «plain rogueries», in order to secure the commonwealth;<sup>102</sup> besides, as an advocate of the doctrine of natural right, deeply influenced by Grotius and Pufendorf, Locke believed there were strict limits binding the right of the magistrate to interfere in matters of individual conscience and private morality.<sup>103</sup>

In positing, both in *Schema 1* and “Sapientia 72”, power and economy under the heading *Prudentia* rather than under *Politia*,<sup>104</sup> and mainly in characterizing the latter as both architectonic and deliberative, Locke rejected any assimilation of politics to the art of the state: politics is the Aristotelian-Thomistic science which consists both of fundamentals and administration. As regards *Prudentia*, Locke characterizes it as a universal principle governing all human actions, which requires both the knowledge of the supreme ends (that is, a theory of the good) and the possession of those moral habits necessary to act in accordance with them. *Prudentia* is separated from *Politia*, though connected with the latter with reference to the right administration of power (*Potestas*). In *Scheme 1* and “Sapientia 72”, prudence is an intellectual virtue as regards its end, and a moral virtue which allows one to do what is good *because it is good*. As we shall see in the following paragraph, this conception of *Prudentia* is reworked in some 1677 outlines of the branches of knowledge, which suggest a reinterpretation in terms of moral virtue.

### ***Scheme 2* and the other 1677 outlines of the branches of knowledge. “Study”.**

*Scheme 2* (Bodl. MS. Locke f. 2, pp. 247-52) is an extract from Locke's journal of September 4, 1677; as I shall argue, it probably represents the third of some classifications written by the philosopher in the year 1677. The first of these (Bodl. MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 110, 119-120), consists of two outlines of the branches of knowledge, each entitled “Adversaria”, in Locke's pocket memorandum book for June 1677-June 1678. The two outlines have been crossed out with diagonal lines, indicating they had been copied elsewhere.<sup>105</sup> As for the second classification (Bodl. MS. Locke c. 28, f. 50rv), it consists of an outline of the branches of knowledge

headed “In Legendis Authoris hæc mihi præcipue observanda videntur” and captioned “Adversaria 19 Aug 77”; this outline is identical to that on pp. 119-20 of MS. Locke f. 15, which was probably copied here with a very few additions and later revised on pp. 122-123 of MS. Locke f. 15, where another outline entitled “Adversaria” is to be found. *Scheme 2* is written in English, not in tabular form; it is less articulated than the outline on pp. 122-123 of MS. Locke f. 15, and more similar to “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”, so probably it was written before.<sup>106</sup> A fifth classification, captioned “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77” (MS Locke c. 28, f. 51), represents a reworking of MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 122-123.

In *Scheme 2*,<sup>107</sup> Locke adopts a way of classifying which is different from the one he had used in “Sapientia 72”. As he himself explains at the beginning of the outline, his aim is to find a method of classifying «the principall parts or heads of things to be taken notice of» in reading books; to this purpose, he lists four headings, “Adversaria philosophica”, “Adversaria Historica”, “Adversaria Immitanda”, “Adversaria Acquirenda”.<sup>108</sup> «prudentia sive Sapientia privata» is the name of one of the three branches of “Adversaria Immitanda” (things and actions to be imitated), a heading under which Locke collects «whatever wise practices are to be found either for governing of policies, or a man’s private conduct, or any beneficial arts employed on natural bodies for their improvement to our use». «prudentia sive Sapientia privata» appears in the second place, coming after «politica sive Sapientia civilis» and before «physica sive artes».

Significantly, in *Scheme 2* Locke uses the term *politica*, not *Politia*, to refer to the deliberative or executive aspect of politics, while the legislative aspect («Lege civili: Officia Civilia. Crimina. Licita») is located under the heading “Adversaria Historica”,<sup>109</sup> as for *prudentia*, its definition as private wisdom seems to combine the Aristotelian-Thomistic ideal of practical wisdom with the more modern idea of a private morality, distinguished from the public morality sanctioned by civil law. Perhaps, the use of the expressions «Sapientia civilis» and «Sapientia privata» was inspired by a reflection on Cicero’s notion of *sapientia*: in 1677, Locke was rereading *De Officiis*, as is confirmed by a note he took from the second book,<sup>110</sup> and in the following years he continued to devote special attention to Cicero’s work. Locke had first read *De Officiis* at Westminster Grammar School and had almost certainly used it and Cicero’s *Epistles* in his moral teaching at Oxford (1664);<sup>111</sup> probably, his attention in rereading *De Officiis* in 1677 had been caught by a chapter in the first book, where Cicero emphasized the superiority of *sophia* over the other virtues in practical terms: «that wisdom which I have given the foremost place is the knowledge of things humane and divine, which is concerned also with the bonds of union between gods and men and the relations of man to man. If wisdom is the most important of the virtues, as it certainly is, it necessarily follows that the duty which is connected with the social obligation is the most important duty». <sup>112</sup> At the very beginning of *De Officiis*, Cicero linked together *sapientia* and *prudentia*, locating them in the first part of *honestum* and assigning to both the task of an «indagatio atque inventio veri»; however, in the afore mentioned paragraph, he insisted on the priority of action on science and on the necessity to reinterpret wisdom in practical terms, as the source of the fundamental duty concerning the preservation of human society. The practical

dimension of *sapientia*, on which, as we shall see, Locke insisted also in subsequent years, is exactly what he seems to emphasize in *Scheme 2* naming politics as «Sapientia civilis» and prudence as «Sapientia privata». The first is the wisdom of man as a *civis*, the second the wisdom of man as an individual.

The *ratio* of *Scheme 2* is quite distinct from that of *Scheme 1* and “Sapientia 72”: in the first, the various items are grouped together with reference to human faculties and powers, not to their objective content.<sup>113</sup> Locke characterizes “Adversaria Philosophica” as the sphere of knowledge where judgment is the faculty chiefly exercised, while the disciplines collected under “Adversaria Historica” are those which require the use of memory; as for “Adversaria Immitanda”, Locke writes: «the third head is that of most use and that is what things we finde amongst other people fit for our imitation whether politique or private wisdom. Any artes conducing to the convenience of life». Both “Adversaria Immitanda” and “Adversaria Acquirenda” «concern practice or action», while the other headings concern thinking.

In the other 1677 outlines, the headings contain a more explicit reference to the faculties involved; in MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-120 and “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”, Locke lists three headings with their respective subheadings, “*Cognoscendorum*: philosophica”, “*Reminiscendorum*: Historica civilia; Historica physica”, “*Agendorum*: Immitanda; Acquirenda”. These headings and subheadings are the same as those listed on pp. 122-123 of MS. Locke f. 15, apart from the first subheading of “*Reminiscendorum*”, which in the latter is renamed as “Historica Moralia”, though the items listed under it are almost the same as those under “Historica civilia” on pp. 119-120 of MS. Locke f. 15 and “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”. However, they are located in a different order<sup>114</sup>, which resembles that of the same items in “Adversaria 11 Nov. 77”. Since *Scheme 2* follows the same order as MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-20 and “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”, probably it was written before pp. 122-123 of MS. Locke f. 15. In “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”, the heading “*Reminiscendorum*” is followed by three subheadings, “Historica Religiosa”, “Historica civilia” and “Historica Physica”<sup>115</sup>; the outline is more articulated than the previous ones.

“Ethica” is mentioned in “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”,<sup>116</sup> MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 122-23, and “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”, always under the heading “*Cognoscendorum*”; in the first two manuscripts, it is followed only by “Physica”, in the third also by “Metaphysica”. As regards *Prudentia*, in MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-20, under “*Agendorum*: Immitanda”, Locke writes: «Moralia, sive spectant a[d] rempublicam, ut politicam, sive rem mores q[uorumlibet] privatorum, ut prudentia». “Adversaria 19 Aug. 77” is identical to MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-120 with reference to this formulation, whereas on pp. 122-23 of MS. Locke f. 15 Locke adds “virtutes” above “mores” and *Oeconomica* between *Politica* and *Prudentia*. The formulation in “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77” is more articulated: «Moralia sive spectant 1° Rempublicam ut Politica, 2° Familiam-Oeconomica, 3° Quemlibet particularem- Virtutes, prudentia».

To sum up, all the definitions of *Prudentia* in the 1677 outlines characterize it in terms of private morality, in contrast to public morality (the dominion of *Politica*, sanctioned by civil law); in both MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 122-23 and “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”, there is a mention of *Oeconomica* (which is no longer a province of *Prudentia*) and virtues. Significantly, in this latter manuscript “Virtutes” (note the capital letter)

precedes “*prudentia*”, as the general does with the particular: this is an important clue, in my opinion, to Locke’s rethinking the concept and its extension.

*Scheme 2* is different from the other 1677 outlines with reference to the definition of *Prudentia*, and more similar to another classification (“*Adversaria 1661*”, p. 25):<sup>117</sup> also in the latter, Locke mentions *Prudentia* among the three branches of the «*Immitanda moralia Agendorum*» (*Politica, Prudentia, Physica*), naming it as «*sapientia privata*» in order to keep it distinct from «*politica sive sapientia civilis*». Both *Scheme 2* and this latter manuscript seem to have the same end in view, a classification of knowledge with reference to human faculties; however, “*Adversaria 1661*”, p. 25 contains only «*Historia physica*», «*Immitanda moralia Agendorum*» and «*Acquirenda Merces*».<sup>118</sup> Given the similarities between *Scheme 2* and p. 25 of “*Adversaria 1661*”, they might have been written in the same period.

In the afore mentioned journal entry written in France on March 6, 1677, entitled “*Study*”, Locke devised a different kind of classification, which may be useful to compare with the outlines mentioned above. The classification is based on the most important men’s duties and interests; in the first place, Locke posited the knowledge of Heaven, whose study «being our great business and interest [...] ought to take the first and chiefest place in our thoughts», whereas in the second place he highly recommended the study of prudence. «The next thing to happiness in the other world, -Locke wrote- is a quiet prosperous passage through this, which requires a discreet conduct and management of ourselves in the several occurrences of our lives. The study of prudence then seems to me to deserve the second place in our thoughts and studies. A man may be, perhaps, a good man, (which lives in truth and sincerity of heart towards God), with a small portion of prudence, but he will never be very happy in himself, nor useful to others without: these two are every man’s business».<sup>119</sup>

Clearly, Locke attributes a great relevance to prudence in this passage; the adjective “quiet” and the mention of happiness in the last line of the quotation («happy in himself») are reminiscent of one of the two ends of *Prudentia* in *Scheme 1* and “*Sapientia 72*” (*Tranquilitas* or mundane happiness), while «happiness in the other world» recalls the other end (*Felicitas aeterna*). Besides, the reference to usefulness is particularly illuminating: the recommendation of being «useful to others» recalls Cicero’s ideal of beneficence as an obligation of friendship advantageous to the preservation of society, one of the fundamental duties prescribed by *honestum*. As has already been noted, Cicero devoted the whole of the second book of *De Officiis* to the concept of *utile* and its relationship with *honestum*: his analysis made it clear that by services men gained each other’s help in creating and coming to possess the goods necessary to a comfortable life, and that expedience was the recognized result of the service of others which was undertaken because it was *honestum*.

The importance of beneficence and of an active engagement to the service of others was insisted on by Locke in a letter to one of his pupils, John Alford, dating 1677,<sup>120</sup> and will be reasserted in *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, where he strongly advocates service to the country by gentlemen.<sup>121</sup> Locke was not fully adherent to Cicero’s thought: the latter was unquestionably distant from his hedonistic views on moral motivation -which he formulated for the first time in 1676-<sup>122</sup> nonetheless

Locke could have come to perceive the gap as significantly narrowed by emphasis upon elements of Cicero's arguments such as his account of the duties of natural fellowship, his opposition to the pursuit of dishonorable individual terrestrial expedience, his contention that general terrestrial expedience was the result of service to others. Apart from his disagreement with Cicero over issues such as the divine basis of morality (the Christian's God is not the Stoics' immanent *ratio universalis*), and the reasons that motivated men to its practice, the fact that Locke strongly recommended Cicero's ethics in *Some Thoughts* surely suggests a general approval of his moral thinking and, more specifically, his ideal of beneficence. All the outlines of the branches of knowledge composed by Locke between 1670 and 1686 show Cicero was an important source of inspiration, though of course not the only one. This is clearly apparent also in "Study", where the list of subjects which Locke characterizes as fundamental (the study of God, prudence and matters concerning one's personal calling), is inspired by Aquinas' teaching. In his *Summa*, Aquinas had declared the three fundamental laws of nature to be the study of God, the preservation of oneself, and living in society;<sup>123</sup> in his *Essays on the Laws of Nature*,<sup>124</sup> Locke declared they «embrace[d] all that men owe to God, their neighbour, and themselves», and in "Study" he reaffirms a similar partition. The journal entry has a religious end in view, explicitly stated by Locke («to marshal the parts of knowledge, and allot to anyone its place and precedency, thereby to direct one's studies» in order to secure oneself «happiness in the other world»);<sup>125</sup> clearly, this was not the end of the more schematic 1677 outlines, which have a systematic outlook.

All the 1677 outlines separate public from private morality; in *Scheme 2*, this separation is attenuated by the use of the same term, *Sapientia*, both for politics and prudence. The use of the term *Prudentia* to identify the sphere of private morality seems to imply a restriction in its meaning with respect to "Sapientia 72", where «Morum rectitudo» was included among the means useful to acquire *Prudentia*. Besides, in the last of the 1677 outlines, "Adversaria 12 Nov. 77", Locke places "prudentia" after "Virtutes": perhaps, he was attempting to circumscribe the meaning and relevance of the virtue, though the Thomistic ideal of *Prudentia* was contrary to this specification and pushed him in another direction.

The familiarity with the Ciceronian lexicon, clearly apparent in "Study" and *Scheme 2*, re-emerges in another outline of a classification of knowledge dated 1679 (Bodl. MS. c. 42B, p.22), which is worth remembering before concluding this paragraph; it represents a *unicum* both for its conciseness and way of grouping, and looks more like a notice written for further rethinking than a complete outline. Locke lists six headings, which are located in two parallel lines at the top of the page with their subheadings («Religio: Officium, Peccatum, Indifferens; Lege civile: Mandatum, Crimen, Licitum; Virtus sive in opinione: Honestum, Turpe, Indifferens; In conversatione: Decorum, Indecorum; In Personam: Formosum, Deforme; In nascita et in ornamenta: Venustas, Invenustum»). On the second line there are two sets of words without heading, «Acquirenda, Commutanda, Redenda» and «Dicta, Facta, Responsa». The items listed under the first heading, "Religio", reappear in *Scheme 3* under the subheading "Moralia", which substitutes "Ethica" under *Theologia*. The Ciceronian lexicon of *De Officiis* is clearly Locke's main source of inspiration in this

manuscript, as the mention of *honestum* and *decourm* reveals.<sup>126</sup> As has already been touched on, Cicero's concept of *honestum* included four elements or duties, which are worth recalling: the search for and full perception of the truth, or wisdom and prudence; the «greatness and strength of a noble and invincible spirit» or fortitude; orderliness and moderation in action and speech, variously described as involving decorum, temperance and self control; an element concerning the conservation of organized society or justice, which involved both rendering to every man his due and faithfully discharging obligation assumed.<sup>127</sup> Probably Locke was exploring Cicero's notion of *honestum* in detail and analyzing the many aspects involved in his ideal of *decorum* («Virtus in opinione»; «in conversatione», «in personam», «in nascita et ornamenta»); perhaps the scheme was intended as a reminder for further analysis, anyway the concept of virtue sketched on p. 22 of MS. c. 42B seems already to prelude to that delineated in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, as determined by the «Law of Opinion or Reputation».<sup>128</sup>

### **Scheme 3 (Bodl. MS Locke c. 28, 157-58)**

Perhaps Locke was dissatisfied with the classifications written in 1677, as would seem to be confirmed by the many transcriptions and re-elaborations of the same model. In a subsequent outline (*Schema 3*),<sup>129</sup> Locke returned to the manner of classifying he had adopted in “Sapientia 72”, though the main headings here are seven (*Metaphysica*, *Theologia*, *Politia*, *Prudentia*, *Historia*, *Physica* and *Semiotica sive de signis*). The classification is undated and untitled, but there is a similar list in “Adversaria 1661”, pp. 290-91, dated 1681, so perhaps *Scheme 3* was written in the same period. The ends of *Prudentia* in *Scheme 3* are the same as those listed in “Sapientia 72” («Faelicitas Aeternae et Celestis v.[vide] Theologiam. [Faelicitas] Mundana: Tranquilitas; Sanitas v. Physicam; Opes v. Oeconomiam; Potestas v. Politiam; Gratia; Fama»). As regards the means, they are almost the same as in “Sapientia 72” («Sui cognitio; Passionum suarum regimen; Morum rectitudo: Virtus Laus, Vitium Vituperium, Indifferens; Ingeniorum discretio; Partium Discriminatio; Consiliorum Indagatio; Animorum Gubernatio: Rethorica, Logica; Oeconomia: Uxor, Liberi, Servi; Agricultura; Mercatura; Artis Exercitium»). The addition of a new item under «Morum rectitudo», *Indifferens*, which is also listed under the subheading “Moralia” of *Theologia*, is evidence of Locke's intention to emphasize the borders of public morality, which does not cover those actions which are not sanctioned either by natural or civil law.<sup>130</sup> «Ingeniorum discretio»<sup>131</sup> in *Scheme 3* substitutes «Ingeniorum observatio» in “Sapientia 72”: the expression implies a value judgment on the attitudes or wits worth being encouraged and those needing to be amended. The introduction of a new means, «partium discriminatio», also seems intended to emphasize the ability to discriminate between natural endowments; both «Ingeniorum discretio» and «partium discriminatio» recall one of the tasks Locke assigns to tutors in *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, to observe «the Child's natural Genius and Constitution» in order to «prevent the Vices and Faults to which such a Constitution is most inclined, and give it all the Advantages it is capable of».<sup>132</sup>

Some additions under *Metaphysica*<sup>133</sup> and, mainly, the introduction of two new headings, *Semiotica* and *Historia*, make *Scheme 3* far richer than “Sapientia 72”; as for

*Semiotica*, Bacon's theory of signs and John of Saint Thomas' *Tractatus de Signis* (1632) were surely two important sources of inspiration for Locke, not to mention more remote antecedents, such as the Stoics and Augustine.<sup>134</sup> *Historia* is divided into *Ecclesiastica* and *Civilis*, and the latter is further subdivided into «[historia] Civitatum; Hominum; Chronologica»; its introduction might be due to the influence of the Baconian model.

As for *Politia*, Locke maintains the same distinction between “Fundamenta”, “Forma” and “Administratio” as in “Sapientia 72”, though there is no longer mention of “Constitutiones”; instead, a new item, “Arma”, appears under “Fundamenta”, and some additional items are introduced under “Leges civiles”, in order to specify its object («Officium civile; Crimen; Licitum»). A new item, “Magistratus”, is listed under “Administratio”.<sup>135</sup> In June 1681, Locke was reading Pufendorf's *De Iure Naturae et Gentium*;<sup>136</sup> probably this reading provided him with some significant elements of the form of his argument on the state of nature as co-operative, and of the reasons for establishing political society, that he used in the second *Treatise of Government*. However, Pufendorf endorsed absolutism, while Locke defended mixed government (the addition of «Magistratus» in *Scheme 3* after «Leges Civiles» might be read as an allusion to the submission of the sovereign to the law).<sup>137</sup>

In *De Iure Naturae et Gentium*, civil law was firmly separated from natural law: the first depended upon the legislation of political society, the second on reason alone. Besides, Pufendorf distinguished his discussion of the precepts of natural law from the discussion of «moral theology»: natural law was based on reason alone, moral theology in contrast imposed its precepts of morality based upon revelation and backed them by rewards and punishments which depended upon a belief in the immortality of the soul, a belief that for Pufendorf could only be anchored by the information of revelation. Locke disagreed with Pufendorf also on this point: in a journal note written on June 26, 1681,<sup>138</sup> he declared that he «that has a true Idea of God of him self as a creature of the relation he stands in to god and his fellow creatures and of Justice goodness law happinesse etc. is capeable of knowing moral things or having a demonstrative certainty in them». Pufendorf's account of the vast content of *lex naturalis* was not adequate for Locke, since it made knowledge of the afterlife impossible to obtain by reason alone, while Locke clung tenaciously, at least until his *Reasonableness of Christianity* (1694), to the potential demonstrability of an afterlife and of morals.

The reading of Pufendorf might have lead Locke to rethink of the place he had assigned to the *lex naturalis* in “Sapientia 72”: the heading *Theologia* was the correct place for emphasizing the divine origin and accessibility to human reason of natural law, but it obscured the dependence of civil law from natural law. There is no longer mention of *lex naturalis* in *Scheme 3*; the items listed under *Theologia* are almost identical to those in “Sapientia 72”, apart from some additions (especially under the subheading “Cultus”), some simplification (the items under “Revelatio” are less numerous) and, mostly, the substitution of “Ethica” with “Moralia”. The objects of the latter are no longer virtues and vices, as in “Sapientia 72”, but «Officium religiosum. Peccatum. Indifferens», three items which were already collected under «Lege divina» in the 1677 outlines (MS Locke f. 15, pp. 110, 119-20, 122-23;

“Adversaria 19 Aug. 77”; *Scheme 2*; “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”). In *Scheme 3*, as well as in its twin “Adversaria 1661”, pp. 290-91, there is no longer mention of natural law; Locke was probably thinking of a new location for it, in order to emphasize its vast content and priority in respect to civil law. The task was difficult and involved a rethinking of his whole manner of classifying; this task was carried out in a subsequent classification, which deeply remolds the meaning of *Prudentia*.

#### **A Journal note for June 26, 1681, *Scheme 4* and the classification at the end of *An Essay concerning Human Understanding***

As has already been pointed out, during the seventeenth century prudence underwent a steady decline in favor: since the Renaissance, it had ceased to be an intellectual virtue and had become a moral virtue, but the process of erosion went still further in the following century, when prudence became descriptive in modern political thought of more mundane behavior and characteristics, such as self-preservation and circumspection.<sup>139</sup> The rise of the notion of *ratio status* weakened the connection between prudence and justice: the moral meaning of the first became problematic, progressively identifying itself with the ability of managing private affairs well, whatever the ultimate ends. Aquinas’ concept of *Prudentia* assumed a good will, or a will oriented to the *summum bonum*, as a fundamental ingredient for moral choice; choosing correctly was the act proper of a will enlightened by the intellect (*nous*), hence prudence presupposed rectitude of appetite. In the fourteenth century, Nominalism called the Thomistic assumption of good will into question and replaced it with the voluntaristic conception of freedom of will as “freedom of indifference”; late Scholasticism created a deep fracture between understanding and will.

Locke’s conception of will in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding* reflected and exasperated this fracture: in his opinion, it was improper to speak of freedom of will, since the latter represented only the material executor of the judgment of understanding.<sup>140</sup> Of course, this assumption implied a deep revision of the role of prudence, which could be no longer the Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue mediating between understanding and will: this point will not escape the attention of the Dutch Remonstrant theologian Philippus van Limborch, Locke’s intimate friend.<sup>141</sup> However, Locke’s conception of the fundamental moral and religious duties was deeply imbibed by Thomistic and Ciceronian ideals; this explains why he attributed such great relevance to *Prudentia* in his classifications. Nonetheless, the year 1681 seems marked by an important change: in the already mentioned journal entry for June 26, 1681,<sup>142</sup> Locke used the terms “politie” and “prudence” with a meaning different from that recorded in *Scheme 3*. The two disciplines were closely tied together, having the same end in view (the «well management» of public-private affairs, which depends «upon the various and unknowne humors interests and capacitys of men we have to doe with in the world and not upon any settled Ideas of things»). The knowledge of *politie* and prudence, Locke argued, should be fostered «by the history of matter of fact and a sagacity of enquireing into probable causes and findeing out an analogie in their operations and effects»; both *politie* and prudence would require the use of «sagacity», the ability to conjecture rapidly,<sup>143</sup> because they are not demonstrable, being not grounded in «right and true ideas» as morals, but on

matters of fact and opinions. Clearly, Locke referred only to the administrative aspect of politics, not to *Politia* as an architectonic science; indeed, the identification of politics with administration was common in the political lexicon of his time, and to this lexicon he seems to conform. Similarly, prudence is identified with the ability of managing private affairs well, an ability which requires anticipation, not wisdom.<sup>144</sup> This ability was named as «useful prudence» in *De Officiis*: according to Cicero, this was the meaning attributed to prudence by the majority of men, who praised those who have better insight into the future, and who, when an emergency arose and a crisis came, could clear away the difficulties and reach a safe decision, according to the exigencies of the occasion.<sup>145</sup> Locke records only this meaning of prudence in the 1681 journal note, conforming to the lexicon of his time; perhaps, this conformity was motivated by the topic of the note, which was an assessment of the possibility to reach a demonstrative certainty in morals. What Locke intended to stress was the distance between the moral norms of natural law and the practical rules concerning private life; prudence, or *praevidentia*, was commonly identified with this set of rules.<sup>146</sup>

Perhaps the ambiguous meaning of prudence, oscillating between two poles (prudence as a cardinal virtue, in religious language; prudence as foresight, in common language), was one of the reasons for Locke's rethinking the use of *Prudentia* as one of the headings in his schemes of the branches of knowledge, though not the most important reason: the more difficult task was to find a place adequate for natural law, which in *Scheme 3* was left out. In an undated outline of *Theologia* in the back endpage of "Adversaria 1661", there is no mention of natural law either: Locke lists "Ethica" as the last subheading, and «Virtutes. Vitia. Indifferentia. Licita» as its objects. The outline is more similar to *Scheme 3* than to "Sapientia 72" with respect to the items listed under the first subheading ("Deus Opt. Max.");<sup>147</sup> the location of "Ethica" at the very end of the outline is identical to that of "Moralia" in *Scheme 3*. Perhaps, the outline was written a short time before *Scheme 3*; in both, the absence of natural law is evidence of Locke's rethinking its location. In order to find a place suitable for it in his schemes, and emphasize its priority with respect to civil law,<sup>148</sup> Locke had to rework all his manner of classifying: in *Scheme 1*, "Sapientia 72" and *Scheme 3*, *Prudentia* covered all the dominion of practical philosophy apart from politics, but was completely detached from "Ethica" or natural law. Since the latter was the source of every moral duty and right, it was necessary to assign a priority to Ethics: this task could be afforded by going back to the Aristotelian model of practical sciences including both politics and ethics, and this is the strategy Locke adopted in his 1686 division of the sciences (*Scheme 4*).

Locke was rethinking the role of prudence already during 1684, as is attested by a note on his pocket memorandum book<sup>149</sup> where Cicero's definition of *Sapientia* is recorded. In one of the first chapters of *De Officiis*, Cicero declared that the more clearly one observed the most essential truths in any given case, and the more accurately and quickly he could give reasons for this, «the more prudent and wise he was esteemed»;<sup>150</sup> Locke commented that this was «a very loose definition of wisdom which takes in the speculative sciences where in a man may be very knowing without being wise, wisdom referring as I thinke to the conduct of a man's action in reference to his owne happiness or his great concernments as prudence does to those of lesse

moment». Hence, Locke rejects Cicero's definition of wisdom as a theoretical science and identifies it with practical wisdom, as he had already done in *Scheme 2* by using the captions «Sapientia civilis» and «Sapientia privata». However, this implied a redefinition of *Prudentia*, whose object in *Scheme 1*, «Sapientia 72» and *Scheme 3* was exactly the same Locke attributed to *sapientia* in the 1684 note («the conduct of a man's action in reference to his owne happiness or his great concernments»). Prudence seems to be identified with moral virtue; Locke may have been looking for a way to specify its meaning and relevance in order to keep it distinct from *sapientia*, a task he carried out in *Scheme 4*.

In this latter classification (ca.1686-1687),<sup>151</sup> Locke substitutes the heading *Prudentia* with the Greek Πραξις (Practica), inside a threefold classification which includes *Theologia* and *Physica*. The outline is incomplete (there is no subheading under *Theologia*); Πραξις is the last heading. *Prudentia* is divided into two branches, which represent the third and fourth items listed under *Practica*:

1° Ethica, vitae ratio secundum leges a deo omnibus hominibus datas Ejus finis Beatitudo 2° Politica. Sociandorum gubernandorumque hominum scientia ejus finis pax et felicitas societatis 3° Prudentia civilis. Ejus finis est ut alios homines sibi habeat amicos benignos utiles comes. Ad hanc necessaria est hominum cognitio, i.e. Temperamenti. Indolis. Cersilii [Consilii]. 4° Prudentia monastia. Ejus finis Tranquillitas media cognitio sui ipsius, i. e. Facultatum, Defectum. Inclinationum passionum. et horum remedia 5° Oeconomia cujus finis opes. Media artes quae duplices. primo quae consistunt in aliquo solum opere humano, ut scribendi pingendi tornandi Nendi Textoria. Secundo quae consistunt in opere rerum ipsarum, sed debito modo junctarum ut Ars fructoria chymica etc: Quibus addi possit artium altera species ex his duabus prioribus compositarum Ut. Agricultura Horticultura Fabrilis erravia [et varia].<sup>152</sup>

As is shown by the above quotation, *Prudentia* is divided into *Prudentia civilis*, concerning man as a member of a society, and *Prudentia monastia*, concerning man as a single individual; as has already been noted, this distinction was proper to seventeenth century natural law theorists, who emphasized the separation between public and private rights as well as that between public and private goods, making moral perfection an individual business. In his 1677 outlines, Locke had already introduced this separation, though there was no mention of *prudencia civilis*; perhaps he considered civil prudence as pertaining to *politica*, the sphere of public morality. In «Study», Locke had insisted on the importance of studying history in order to be acquainted with «the great and useful instructions of prudence»: it would be tempting to interpret this as a reference to civil prudence, though the way Locke characterized the most important teaching of history, to «be warned against the cheats and rogueries of the world», dissuades this interpretation.

The introduction of *prudencia civilis* in the 1686 outline might be motivated by Locke's desire to keep prudence distinct from politics,<sup>153</sup> though what Locke might have intended to emphasize was mostly the relevance of social virtues for the well

being and security of organized societies. *Prudentia civilis* precedes *prudentia monastia*: as we shall see, its priority is coherent with Locke's ideal of an ethics of service to others characterized by courtesy and humanity, an ideal fully expressed in *Some Thoughts*.

There are important elements of continuity between the 1686 outline and the previous ones: the use of *monastia* seems to echo the Scholastic lexicon, besides the means listed under *Prudentia monastia*, «sui cognitio, i.e. Facultatum etc.», groups together some of those listed in *Scheme 1*, “Sapientia 72” and *Scheme 3* («Sui cognitio»; «Passionum suarum regimen»; «Ingeniorum observatio-discretio»)<sup>154</sup>. However, *Oeconomia* stands on its own under the heading *Practica*, with a rich set of *artes* as its sub-headings, and there is no longer mention of *Logica* and *Rethorica*. As for the ends, eternal happiness pertains to *Ethica*, whereas *Tranquillitas* is the ultimate scope of *prudentia monastia*.

*Prudentia civilis* comes after *Politica*; Locke seems to refer to the legislative aspect of politics when he characterizes its first object as «sociandorum ... hominum»,<sup>155</sup> while the second object, «gubernandorum», seems an allusion to Administration. In substituting *Prudentia* with *Practica* and in grouping together ethics and politics under this latter heading, Locke goes back to Aristotle's original model of practical sciences; mostly, in positing ethics before politics, Locke affirms the priority of natural law with respect to civil law. The definition of ethics in the 1686 classification («Vitae ratio secundum leges a deo omnibus hominibus datas») is formulated in terms of the natural law theory: moral rules are founded on divine, universal and absolute laws, which are discernible as such by anyone. Since the law of nature is the ultimate source of human rights and duties, politics comes after ethics: the moral law represents the normative foundation and universal standard for positive law.

The meaning Locke attributes to *Prudentia* in the 1686 outline is more restricted with respect to that of the Scholastic notion introduced in *Scheme 1*, “Sapientia 72” and *Scheme 3*; however, none of these classifications contains an explicit reference to *prudentia civilis*. The mention of *Potestas* among the ends of *Prudentia* in those schemes seemed to relate to *prudentia regnativa* (prudence of governors),<sup>156</sup> not to civil prudence, so the introduction of the latter in the 1686 outline is worth noting. Locke's definition of *prudentia civilis* («Ejus finis est ut alios homines sibi habeat amicos benignos utiles comes») is quite different from that most in vogue in his time: it does not emphasize the need to pay strict obedience to governors<sup>157</sup> but the importance of service to others and *concordia socialis*. Locke's *prudentia civilis* corresponds to civility,<sup>158</sup> which in *Some Thoughts* is characterized as a social virtue necessary to a gentleman specifically as a social grace or «good breeding», and more broadly in order to prevent social discord, to facilitate persuasion and the doing of good to others, and to bring others to your own service. In Locke's terms, civility is «nothing but a care not to show any slighting, or contempt, of any one in Conversation»;<sup>159</sup> it was from a disposition of mind «not to offend» that men were called civil. Besides, civility is the «most taking of all the social virtues»: a man who aims to help others, but make them uneasy in doing so, «recommends himself ill to another as aiming at his Happiness».

Considerateness for others or courtesy was one of the aspects of Cicero's notion of *decorum*, which included also temperance, subjection of the passions, and moderation;<sup>160</sup> according to Cicero, if men possessed *decorum* this would shine forth in their conduct and meet with the approval of other men, and approbation was necessary in order to promote a pacific and useful living together. Considerateness for others (*comitas*)<sup>161</sup> meant considering the judgment of others<sup>162</sup> and avoiding doing what they did not approve of; it was the function of justice not to do wrong to other men, but of considerateness not to wound their feelings.

Locke's definition of *prudentia civilis* seems clearly inspired by Cicero's notion of *decorum* as a duty fundamental to the conservation of organized society; the other aspects of *decorum* (temperance, moderation) are conveyed by the notion of *prudentia monastia*. There is a symmetry between *prudentia monastia* and *prudentia civilis* with reference to the respective means («sui ipsius cognitio», «cognitio hominorum»), though the second comes before the first because of its link to politics; clearly, Locke was thinking of a single virtue, as in the Scholastic conception, though it was no longer a dianoetic virtue.

In spite of the strong similarities between the notion of *prudentia civilis* in the 1686 outline and the virtue of civility in *Some Thoughts*, there is no longer mention of the first in this latter work. Here Locke seems to identify prudence more with an individually oriented property (like industriousness) than with a social virtue (kindness, generosity, civility),<sup>163</sup> and to use the term mostly as a synonym for foresight.<sup>164</sup> Some aspects of the Scholastic notion of *Prudentia* are still visible in *Some Thoughts*,<sup>165</sup> though there seems to be also evidence of Locke's rethinking the location of prudence inside morals: as in the letter to Richard King of 1703, in *Some Thoughts* he lists «morality, prudence and breeding» as separate subjects.<sup>166</sup>

There was no mention of prudence anywhere in *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*: in my opinion, this was already a very important clue to Locke's rethinking the term and its proper significance. The substitution of *Prudentia* with *Practica* in the 1686 outline is confirmed by the *Division of the sciences* at the very end of the *Essay*,<sup>167</sup> where the second is placed between *Physica* and *Semeiotiké*. The definition of *Practica* («the Skill of Right applying our own Powers and Actions, for the Attainment of things good and useful») is reminiscent of that of *phronesis* in *Nicomachean Ethics*,<sup>168</sup> Locke mentions only one sub-heading under *Practica*, that is *Ethicks*, as «the most considerable under this Head». The object of ethics is «the seeking out of those Rules, and Measures of human Actions, which lead to Happiness, and the Means to Practice them»; its end is «not bare Speculation, and the Knowledge of Truth; but Right, and a Conduct suitable to it». As already in the classification of 1686, Locke in *Essay* gives precedence to ethics (politics is not mentioned); the practical dimension of the discipline, clearly apparent in the reference to the «Means to Practice» moral rules, contrasts with the theoretical dimension of *Physica* («the Knowledge of Things, as they are in their own proper Beings», whose end is «bare speculative Truth»), and *Morals*, which elsewhere in *Essay* is characterized as a science capable of demonstration, whose objects are the true «Foundations of our Duty and Rules of Actions».<sup>169</sup>

**Conclusion. Locke's letter to Richard King of August 25, 1703. Prudence outside morality**

The more specific meaning attributed by Locke to prudence in *Scheme 4* was perhaps already an attempt to preserve it from ambiguity and misunderstandings, though the reworking of his way of classifying was probably due mostly to the desire to attribute more relevance to natural law; nonetheless, the complete absence of the term "prudence" in *Essay* suggests Locke was anxious to avoid a word whose moral significance had become uncertain. Probably he was resigned to the evidence of the increasing ambiguity of the term, the same which afflicted, to a lesser extent, many other names of mixed modes.<sup>170</sup> In many writings of Locke's time, the appeal to prudence seemed constructed to legitimate whatever course of action and whatever means are fitting to the obtainment of success: this was what Locke was complaining about in his letter to Richard King of August 1703, where he affirmed that many who had written on the virtue of prudence had «their Eyes so fix'd on Convenience, that they sometimes lose the Sight of Virtue, and do not take care to keep themselves always clear from the Borders of Dishonesty, while they are tracing out what they take to be, sometimes, the securest way to Success». This complaint seemed to imply that prudence should be recognized as a moral virtue; however, in the letter Locke restricted its role to the avoidance of «inconveniences», a term which should now be examined carefully. In Locke's terminology,<sup>171</sup> the adjective "convenient" usually means 'adequate', or 'opportune';<sup>172</sup> "convenience" and its contrary identify with suitability or unsuitability to one's purpose<sup>173</sup>, or to the specific end of a practice (especially language, in *Essay*).<sup>174</sup> In particular, "convenience" denotes what is apt to procure relief in human life and to free men from distress and incommodities; in this sense, «Conveniences of life» are those goods for whose provision God has provided men with the necessary abilities,<sup>175</sup> whereas «inconvenience» is the privation of those goods, but also, more generally, the variety of evils which afflicts human life.<sup>176</sup> Since self-preservation is a duty prescribed by natural law, men are required to prefer the search for the conveniences of life to useless speculations.<sup>177</sup> The hedonist psychology underling the *Essay* makes «self interest and the conveniences of life» the main reasons why men conform to, or at least approve of, moral rules;<sup>178</sup> Hedonism is also the reason why Locke rejects the Ciceronian ideal of a «convenientia naturae cum extis» (the harmony between natural law and human nature),<sup>179</sup> and denies any «natural Convenience or Inconvenience» between the good or evil consequences deriving from whatever course of action and the action itself.<sup>180</sup>

In the letter to King, "inconvenience" seems clearly to refer to something unsuitable to the scope of an action; perhaps Locke's familiarity with Cicero's lexicon in *De Officiis*, according to which prudence could also be defined as «scientia opportunitatis idoneorum ad agendum temporum»,<sup>181</sup> plays a role here, though Locke's idea of prudence was no longer the Ciceronian one. Since what is convenient always depends on the context of an action, and not on its essence, an imprudence cannot make an action wrong: its rightness, this is the point of Locke's answer to King, always depends on its conformity to natural law, not on accidental, external circumstances. Hence, prudence does not belong to the realm of morals.

However, with reference to the teaching of prudence Locke recommended the book of Sirach to King, and in Sirach prudence shares some of those features which were proper to the Aristotelian-Thomistic virtue: it has a close relationship with wisdom (1.4: «Wisdom hath been created before all things, and the understanding of prudence from everlasting») and with understanding (6.32: «if thou wilt apply thy mind, thou shalt be prudent»); besides, prudence is necessary to governors (10.1 : «the government of a prudent man is well ordered»; 10.3: «An unwise king destroyeth his people; but through the prudence of them which are in authority the city shall be inhabited»), as well as for deliberating well (19.22: «The knowledge of wickedness is not wisdom, neither at any time the counsel of sinners prudence»).<sup>182</sup> Finally, prudence has a relationship with experience, especially with that acquired through travelling (34.10: «He that hath no experience knoweth little: but he that hath travelled is full of prudence»), a point on which Locke had insisted in *Some Thoughts*.<sup>183</sup>

The maxims of Sirach show a profound knowledge of the human heart, the disillusionment of experience, a fraternal sympathy with the poor and the oppressed, the faith in the morality of olden times and a more modern Epicureanism.<sup>184</sup> Locke's pessimism about mankind, his Stoicism but also his hedonistic views on moral motivation seem very much in tune with the teachings of Ben Sirach; surely Locke was familiar with all the Sapiential books, as his correspondence reveals.<sup>185</sup> However, the appeal to the authority of Sirach with reference to the teaching of prudence was probably motivated more by the peculiar office of his correspondent than by the desire to preserve a place for prudence inside morals; the Reverend King had addressed Locke a question on this topic and Locke did not intend to delude him, though he did not forbear pointing out his mistake concerning the object of prudence.

Locke had progressively abandoned the Scholastic concept of *Prudentia* as an intellectual virtue, which had been his main source of inspiration in *Scheme 1*, «Sapientia 72» and *Scheme 3*; in *Scheme 4*, he had remolded the role of prudence basing it on Cicero's concept of *decorum*. Subsequently, he had probably yielded to the evidence of the great ambiguity of the term, though in a religious context such as that of the *Paraphrase* there is still an echo of the relevance *Prudentia* had in his previous classifications.<sup>186</sup>

---

## References

<sup>1</sup>Locke, J., Letter to Richard King August 25, 1703, in *The Correspondence of John Locke*, ed. E. De Beer (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1976-1989), 8 vols., 1, no. 3328: 57.

<sup>2</sup>Richard King, Letter to Locke, October 9, 1703, in *Correspondence*, 8, 3346: 77. The correspondence between Locke and Richard King, a cousin of Peter King, amounts to seven letters dating back to the years 1701-3; their main topic is religion. In January 1701, King procured for Locke an account of the English Religious Societies (*Correspondence*, 7, 2843: 222-3; see also Locke's reply, January 20, 1701, *Correspondence*, 7, 2846: 225-6).

<sup>3</sup>King's letter is lost; at the beginning of his letter of August 25, 1703, Locke referred to «Yours of the Fourth instant».

<sup>4</sup>See Richard King to Locke, September 13, 1703, in *Correspondence*, 8, 3333: 63-4 («You have done me the honour to be very particular, to my great satisfaction, in your answer to every

Question I have made you, except the first concerning the Study of Religion. which you are pleased to resolve into the Study of the Scriptures alone [...]. But since there are Gain-sayers and Wrestlers of those Holy Writings, who are apt to deceive and delude the unskillful in Divine Truths, 'tis fitt to know how to make use of the succours that humane reason offers assisted by the knowledge of Theological Learning to attain the true sense and meaning of the Inspired Writers.» Writing to King on September 27, 1703 (*Correspondence*, 8, 3339: 69-70), Locke reluctantly agreed to his request, drawing up a list of books concerning the interpretation of the Bible; anyway, he admonished King not «to multiply Books of this kind».

<sup>5</sup>Cicero was the first to translate the Greek *φρόνησις* into the Latin *prudentia* (a contraction of *praevidentia*, 'foresight'): cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, trans. W. Miller (London: Woods and Sons, 1928, 3<sup>rd</sup>ed.), 1. 43: «the foremost of all virtues is wisdom-what the Greek call *σοφία*; for by prudence, which they call *φρόνησις*, we understand something else, namely, the practical knowledge of things to be sought for and of things to be avoided». See also Pellegrin, P., "Prudence", in *Dictionnaire d'éthique et de philosophie morale*, ed. M. Canto-Sperber (Paris: PUF, 1996), 1201-1206.

<sup>6</sup>The close tie between prudence and the experience acquired through age was a topic in the Stoic and Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition: cf. Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. W. D. Ross, 1142a 15-20 [Online] Available via [classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html](http://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.html) cited 25.09.2013; Cicero, *De Senectute*, trans. W. A. Falconer (London: W. Heinemann, 1927), 3; Aquinas, Th., *Summa Theologiae*, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 2a 2ae, q. 47, art.14, ad 3 [Online] Available via <http://www.logicmuseum.com/Summa> cited 25.09.13.

<sup>7</sup>Locke, J., "Study", in *The Life of John Locke: With Extracts from His Correspondence, Journals and Common-place Books*, ed. P. King (London: H. Colburn and R. Bentley, 1830, 2 vols.), 1, 171-203.

<sup>8</sup>Locke, J., "Study", 203.

<sup>9</sup>Locke, J., "Study", 178.

<sup>10</sup>In *De Oratore*, Cicero characterizes history as «magistra vitae», while Locke names it as «Mistress of Prudence», a definition which seems very much in tune with the philosophical lexicon of his time. The didactic value of history, based on the predictive power attributed to its teaching (*sc.* the capacity to promote foresight or *praevidentia*), had been emphasized by Machiavelli and Humanists: cf. Vernaglion, P., *Il Sovrano. L'Altro. La Storia* (Roma: Manifestolibri, 2006), 137. A work by Gabriel Naudé, *Bibliographia Politica* (Venice, 1633), is evidence of the persistence of this tradition, which characterizes political prudence in terms of what had been done in the past. Cf. Doodley, B. M., "Veritas Filia Temporis. Experience and Belief in Early Modern Culture", *Journal of the History of Ideas* 3 (1999): 499.

<sup>11</sup>Locke, J., *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*, eds. J. W. and J. S. Yolton (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2003<sup>2</sup>), 237 and 181.

<sup>12</sup>Locke, J., Letter to Richard King, in *Correspondence*, 57.

<sup>13</sup>Cf. Viroli, M., *From Politics to Reason of State: the Acquisition and Transformation of the Language of Politics 1250-1600* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 238-80.

<sup>14</sup>Huesca, 1647.

<sup>15</sup>Paris, 1685; see Harrison, J. and Laslett, P., *The Library of John Locke* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), no. 1304. Henceforth, references to *The Library* will be marked as LL. Amelot's book was published at least nine times before his death in 1706.

<sup>16</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *An Essay concerning Human Understanding*, ed. P. Nidditch (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 267, II, xxi, 52: «the inclination, and tendency of their [*sc.* men's] nature to happiness is an obligation, and motive to them, to take care not to mistake, or miss it; and so necessarily puts them upon *caution, deliberation, and wariness*, in the direction of their particular actions, which are the means to obtain it» (emphasis mine); see also *Essay*, 663,

IV, xvi, 10, where Locke speaks of the «Wisdom and caution to be used in our Enquiry after material Truths».

<sup>17</sup>Cf. Locke, J., “First Tract on Government”, in *Two Tracts on Government*, ed. Ph. Abrams (London-New York: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 130: «that monster [Nero] could have lawfully commanded the Christians either out of prudence of peevishness, either to distinguish or to expose the sect».

<sup>18</sup>See Locke, J., “Essays on the Law of Nature”, in *Essays on the Law of Nature and associated writings*, ed. W. Von Leyden (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2007<sup>3</sup>), 134 and 194; *Two Treatises of Government*, ed. P. Laslett (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1960), 256, 343, 370. In another two works of his, Locke uses the term ironically: see Locke, J., “Third Letter for Toleration”, in *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London: Rivington, 1824), 12<sup>th</sup> ed., 5: 139-545, where the many references to the magistrates’ «prudence and experience» are intended to ridicule Jonas Proast’s reliance on their ability to make sound judgments. See also “A Second Vindication of the Reasonableness of Christianity”, in *The Works*, 6: 191-424, 264, 266, etc., where “prudence” is used as a synonym for slyness when addressing John Edwards, who had charged the author of the *Reasonableness* with «blameable prudence».

<sup>19</sup>The dating of all but the last outline is that established by Milton, J. R., “The Dating of ‘Adversaria 1661’”, *The Locke’s Newsletter* 29 (1998): 105-117, 113, in note; as for MS. Locke c. 28, ff. 155-6, I follow the dating established by P. Schuurman (see note 151).

<sup>20</sup>The outline is untitled; it is in Locke’s hand, possibly for use in common-placing or note-taking. M. Goldie calls this outline “Adversaria A”, in order to distinguish it from the other classifications of knowledge: cf. Locke, J., *Political Essays*, ed. M. Goldie (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 215. According to Milton (“The Dating of ‘Adversaria 1661’”, 109), the table was written around 1670.

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Peuckert, W. E., *Pansophie. Ein Versuch zur Geschichte der weissen und schwarzen Magie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1936); Turnbull, G. H., *Hartlib, Dury and Comenius* (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1968); Webster, C., *The Great Instauration, science, medicine, and reform, 1626-1660* (London: Duckworth, 1975). Locke was familiar with Comenius’ didactic works, as is shown by his library (cf. LL 817-819b). The use of tables and diagrams, so frequent among the seventeenth century encyclopedists, was a legacy of the dichotomic technique typical of Ramist dialectic: cf. Vasoli, C., *L’enciclopedismo del Seicento* (Napoli: Bibliopolis, 2005), 7.

<sup>22</sup>Locke’s original tabular arrangement is reproduced in Abrams, *Two Tracts on Government*, 246-7; Goldie’s transcription of the same outline does not preserve this arrangement (1997, 215). There are some inaccuracies both in Abrams and Goldie’s transcriptions.

<sup>23</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 2a 2ae, q. 47, a. 3.

<sup>24</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, q. 47, a.8 co.

<sup>25</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, q. 47, a. 1 ad 3.

<sup>26</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, q. 47, a.5 ad 3.

<sup>27</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 2a 2ae, q. 48, co.

<sup>28</sup>On Locke’s Stoicism see Nuovo, V., “Aspects of Stoicism in Locke’s Philosophy”, in *Studies on Locke: Sources, Contemporaries, and Legacy*, eds. S. Hutton and P. Schuurman (Dordrecht: Springer, 2008), 1-25. Nuovo furnishes a list of the Stoic sources available to Locke (besides Cicero, Seneca, Epictetus, Diogenes Laertius, Plutarch, Galen, and Patristic transmitters of Stoic ideas such as Lactantius and Origen; among more contemporary sources, Guillaume Du Vair, Justus Lipsius and Hugo Grotius; I would add also Bacon and Charron).

<sup>29</sup>See Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. J. Jowett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1885), 1253b 16-20; as regards *venditio* and *computo*, see *ibi*, 1257b 25-30. According to Patrick Kelly, *Historia Mercatura* should be interpreted as another reference to Aristotle’s *Politics*: cf. *Locke on Money*, ed. P. Kelly (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 2 vols., 1, 94, note 2: «though it is

tempting to link *Historia Mercaturae cuiuslibet* with the 'History of Trades' project in which Boyle was actively engaged (...) it is almost certainly incorrect; these means are firmly rooted in Aristotle's *Politics*. Kelly's opinion is supported by Locke's mention, in *Scheme 3*, of the three Aristotelian sub-categories of household management (*uxor, liberi, servi* : cf. *Politics*, 1235b 3-9).

<sup>30</sup>A neat distinction between an Aristotelian-Thomistic and Stoic derivation is of course an over simplification: there are important elements of continuity between Aristotle and the Stoics' concept of *phronesis*. See Lories, D., *Le sens commun et le jugement du phronimos. Aristote et les Stoïciens* (Louvain –La Neuve: Peeters, 1998), 416-527.

<sup>31</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.*, 1140a 10-20.

<sup>32</sup>Cf. Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 2a 2ae, q. 48, art.1: «If, however, prudence be taken in a wide sense, as including also speculative knowledge, as stated above (...) then its parts include dialectics, rhetoric and physics, according to the three methods of prudence in the sciences [...]. The third method [that proper of rhetoric] is to employ conjectures in order to induce a certain suspicion, or to persuade somewhat, and this belongs to rhetoric».

<sup>33</sup>Cf. Cape, R. W., "Cicero and the Development of Prudential Practice at Rome", in *Prudence: Classical Virtue, Postmodern Practice*, ed. R. Hariman (Pennsylvania: Penn State Press, 2003), 36-44. The Renaissance attributed a fundamental moral value to rhetoric: see Vickers, B., *English Renaissance Literary Criticism* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 12-3. After a period of decline during the sixteenth century, rhetoric was reevaluated, mainly because of its practical relevance: cf. Rossi, P., *Francis Bacon: from Magic to Science*, trans. S. Rabinowitch (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968), 146-47. Following the Ciceronian-Humanistic tradition, Bacon attributed an ethical role to rhetoric: cf. *Of the Proficiency and Advancement of Learning, Divine and Human*, in *The Works of Francis Bacon*, eds. J. Spedding, R. L. Ellis, D.D. Heath (Boston: Houghton Mifflin and Company, 1901), 15 vols., 6, 296-97. By listing rhetoric among the means useful to acquire prudence, Locke seems to recognize it a moral value, though in *Essay* he will denounce the dangers of rhetorical education.

<sup>34</sup>In *De Legibus*, Cicero ties together knowledge of the self and wisdom: cf. *De re publica. De legibus*, trans. C. W. Keynes (London: W. Heinemann, 1928), 1.59. Regarding the relevance and meaning of the practice of *ars vivendi*, see Foucault, M., *The Hermeneutics of the Subject. Lectures at the Collège de France 1981-2*, trans. G. Burchell (New York: Picador 2005<sup>2</sup>); Nussbaum, M., *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: University Press, 1992).

<sup>35</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.* 1151a 15-20, where Aristotle links together *enkráteia* (self –mastery, continence) and *phronesis*; Aquinas Th., *Summa* 2a 2ae, q. 47, art.13, ad 2: «prudence implies a relation to a right appetite. First because its principles are the ends in matters of action; and of such ends one forms a right estimate through the habits of moral virtue, which rectify the appetite: wherefore without moral virtues there is no prudence».

<sup>36</sup>Cf. Devettere, R. J., *Introduction to Virtue Ethics. Insights of the Ancient Greeks* (Washington D. C.: Georgetown University Press 2002), 126-36. Besides *enkráteia*, the Stoic ideal of prudence included virtues such as discipline (*eutaxía*), decency (*kosmiótes*) and modesty (*aidemosyné*).

<sup>37</sup>Mastery over passions was a topic in neo-Stoic writings: Justus Lipsius' concept of *constantia* implied self-discipline, detachment from mundane things and ability to distinguish between truly important things and *adiaphora*: cf. Lipsius, *De Constantia libri duo, qui alloquium praecipue continent in publicis malis* (Leiden, 1583-4), 1. 1-2. In *De Dignitate et Augmentis scientiarum* (*The Works of Francis Bacon*, 3: 26), Bacon characterizes the «regimen et imperium uniuscujusque in seipsum» as a «Bonum communionis», which makes a man suitable to live in society. As for Locke, in *Some Thoughts concerning education*, 255, he recommends the teaching of self-control as one of the fundamental principles of education: «teach him [your son] to get a Mastery over his inclinations, and submit his Appetite to Reason. This being obtained, and by constant practice settled into Habit, the hardest part of the Task is over».

<sup>38</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.*, 1142b 1-5: «deliberation is inquiry into a particular kind of thing [...] *eubulia* is a kind of deliberation, and he who deliberates inquires and calculates»; Aquinas, *Summa*, 2a 2ae, q. 51, a.4, ad 2: «*eubulia*, ad quam pertinet inquisitio consilii»; see also *Summa*, q. 48 co., where Aquinas characterizes *eubulla* as a potential part of prudence.

<sup>39</sup>The term *ingenium* means the natural facility for judging something: cf. *Thesaurus linguae latinae* (Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1900-1906), 25 vols., 7, pt.1, 1522-1535, v. “ingenium”.

<sup>40</sup>Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.114: «Suarum quisque igitur noscat ingenium acremque se et honorum et vitiorum suorum iudicem praebeat, ne scaenici plus quem nos videantur habere prudentiae»

<sup>41</sup>See Huarte, J., *Examen de Ingenios para la scientia* (Leiden, 1591); Locke possessed both this edition and the English one (London, 1616): see L.L 1527-1528. As for Bacon, his *doctrina de cultura animi* (cf. Bacon, *De Augmentis*, 3,35) represents a part of ethics inquiring into human characters and vices and their most proper remedies: «in Cultura Animi, et morbis eius persanandis, tria [accidentia] in considerationem veniunt; [...] Characteres diversi Dispositionum; Affectus; et Remedia; quemadmodum et in corporibus medicandis proponuntur illa tria, Complexio sive Constitutio aegri; Morbus et Curatio». The importance given to the study of human individual and social characters in late Renaissance and in the seventeenth century was enormous, as is shown by the autobiographies of Cellini and Cardano, and, later, by the work of the French Jean de La Bruyère (*Le caractères ou les Moeurs de ce siècle*, Paris, 1688: LL 505; the reading of La Bruyère was recommended by Locke in “Some Thoughts concerning reading and Study for a Gentleman”, in Id., *Some Thoughts*, 325). Regarding this topic, see Dilthey, W., *Weltanschauung und Analyse des Menschen seit Renaissance und Reform* (Göttingen: Wandenhook, 1970, 9<sup>a</sup> ed.).

<sup>42</sup>In Cicero’s lexicon *gratia* means, according to the context, favor, political influence, popularity, friendship or simply gratitude: cf. Hellegouarc’h, J., *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la république* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1972<sup>2</sup>). In *De Legibus* 1. 49, Cicero affirms that *gratia* must be acquired, offered, or wielded via multilateral interpersonal activity; unlike the other generally approved Roman qualities, *gratia* cannot originate and conclude in the activity of one figure, it requires exchange. In *De Officiis*, 1. 47, Cicero characterized *gratia* as an imperative duty, especially binding with reference to those who show us a constant affection. Following Cicero, Aquinas affirmed that «gratitude consists in recollecting the friendship and kindness shown by others, and in desiring to pay them back» (*Summa*, 2a 2ae, q. 80 co.).

<sup>43</sup>A mention of *gratia* among the ends of *prudentia civilis* was in an author deeply influenced by Stoicism, Gerolamo Cardano, the Italian physician and philosopher whose works Locke was familiar with (see LL 587-590<sup>a</sup>). Cf. Cardano, *Arcana politica, sive De Prudentia civili liber singularis*, (Leiden 1635). On the first page of “Adversaria 1661”, Locke cites a work by Cardano, G., *De utilitate ex adversis capienda libri IIII* (Basle, 1561).

<sup>44</sup>Cicero was the first to translate the Greek *enthymia* into the Latin *tranquillitas*, in order to signify a stable disposition of the mind, freed from anxiety (*De finibus bonorum et malorum*, 5.8; *De Officiis*, 1. 69, 72, 102); Seneca follows Cicero’s use in his *De tranquillitate animi*. During his life, Locke was an avid collector of the various editions of Cicero’s works (cf. LL 711-721q); he also possessed Seneca’s *opera omnia* (LL 2612-2616a). Cicero’s works are those most represented in Locke’s library, after Boyle’s.

<sup>45</sup>Cf. Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 1a 2ae, q. 2, artt. 1-8, where Aquinas mentions wealth, honor, fame and glory, power, pleasure, goods of the soul and created goods.

<sup>46</sup>This substitution is motivated by Locke’s limited purpose, which is not to inquire into the nature of the ends supposed to be conducive to happiness, but to afford a list of those which should be recognized as such.

<sup>47</sup>In a journal entry written on June 26, 1681 (cf. Locke, J., *An Early Draft of Locke's Essay, together with Excerpts from his Journals*, eds. R. I. Aaron and J. Gibb (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 116-118), Locke denies physics the status of a science, and in the *Essay* he affirms that since physics pertains to material substances, and substances do not permit more than probable knowledge, the possibility of scientific knowledge in the field of experimental philosophy is dubious. Nonetheless, Locke mentions φυσική as the first of the three sciences listed in the general division in the last chapter of the *Essay*; this does not contradict his early point about the narrowness and scarcity of our knowledge of material substances, because he intends *Physica* as a speculative science, whose end is «bare speculative truth [...] whatsoever can afford the Mind of Man any such, falls under this branch, whether it be God himself, Angels, Spirits, Bodies, or any of their Affections, as Number, and Figure etc.» (*Essay*, 720, IV, xxi, 2). Cf. Anstey, P., *John Locke and Natural Philosophy* (Oxford- New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 26-8. The same is true for *Schema 1*; under *Physica* Locke lists «Materia; Universum; Caelestia; Terrestria; Fossilia; Vegetabilia; Animalia; Homo; Anima; Corpus Humanus; Sensus; Quantitas; Motus».

<sup>48</sup>Locke does not use the term *Politica* but *Politia*, which in Aristotle's lexicon sometimes denotes any form of government (cf. *Politics*, 1279a 38-39), sometimes a particular form of government (a mixed constitution between oligarchy and democracy, characterized by the lack of any excessive difference in wealth between the rich and the poor: cf. *Politics*, 1289a 36-37). In this second sense, *Politia* represents one of the best forms of government. Locke's preference for *Politia* instead of *Politica* may be due not only to his desire to conform to the Aristotelian lexicon, but also to the decline of the latter term, which in the seventeenth century was often used to denote only the administrative aspect (politics as the art of the State), not the architectonic one (politics as the supreme legislative science).

<sup>49</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, 6. 1.

<sup>50</sup>Locke, J., *Essays on the Law of Nature*, 111: «Hence, this law of nature can be described as being the decree of the divine will discernible by the light of nature and indicating what is and what is not in conformity with rational nature, and for this very reason commanding or prohibiting».

<sup>51</sup>Locke, J., *Essays*, 109-121; Nuovo, (2008), 4-5.

<sup>52</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essays*, 189: «If natural law is not binding on men, neither can any human positive law be binding. For the laws of the civil magistrate derive their whole force from the constraining power of natural law». See also *Essays*, 181-183, where Locke states that «all obligation leads back to God», since it can be imposed only by someone who has «right and power» over us, that is, by someone who possesses power «by that right which a creator has over his own creation»; since only the Creator has power, every other alleged authority can have power rightly only by donation (*Essays*, 185).

<sup>53</sup>Cf. Webster, Ch., «The Curriculum of the Grammar Schools and Universities, 1500-1660», *History of Education* 4 (1975): 51-68; *The History of the University of Oxford. IV. Seventeenth-Century Oxford*, ed. N. Tyacke (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 211-358. See also Ashcraft R., *John Locke. Critical Assessments* (London: Routledge, 1991), 241-2: «The main texts studied for logic and metaphysics (as for ethics, natural and political philosophy) were those of Aristotle, but in practice secondary sources were used. The leading metaphysics texts [...] were all predominantly scholastic in nature, by which I mean that they were highly organized, were heavily influenced by such medieval authors as Thomas Aquinas (who was undoubtedly more popular in the seventeenth century than in the thirteenth) and Duns Scotus».

<sup>54</sup>Cf. Locke, J., «Sapientia 72», Bodl. MS. Locke c. 28, f. 41rv.

<sup>55</sup>The five branches, in the order written, are *Prudentia*, *Physica* (f. 41r), *Theologia*, *Politia*, *Methaphysica* (f. 41v). According to James Buickerood, the numerals might have been added

later; since the three sciences on f. 41v are the same, and in the same order, as those listed in *Scheme 3*, Buickerood suggests the latter classification might be a deliberate reworking of the “Sapientia” scheme. See Buickerood, J. G., “The Natural History of Understanding: Locke and the Rise of Facultative Logic in the Eighteenth Century”, *History and Philosophy of Logic* 6 (1985): 173, in note.

<sup>56</sup>Under *Metaphisica*, Locke lists «Ens; Attributa trascendentalia et affectiones; Essentia; Existentia; Unitas; Duratio; Relatio».

<sup>57</sup>In *The Advancement*, 220-23, Bacon defines Metaphysics as the speculative science investigating «that which is abstracted and fixed» (the true forms of things or final causes); besides, he posits metaphysics at the summit of the pyramid of knowledge, as the science which refers to the laws of nature (the most general principles). Bacon’s concept of metaphysics is quite distinct from that of *philosophia prima*, which he employs elsewhere in order to mark the position in the system where general categories of a general theory of science are treated as universal categories of thought, relevant for all disciplines (cf. Bacon, *Novum Orbis Scientiarum*, in *The Works*, 6, 187: «*philosophia prima sive de axiomatibus scientiarum communibus*»). Locke’s concept of metaphysics in “Sapientia 72” is more similar to Bacon’s *philosophia prima*, which refers to the Scholastic categories or *predicamenta*.

<sup>58</sup>Cf. Kenney, W. J., *John Locke and the Oxford Training in Logic and Metaphysics*, Ph.D. thesis (Saint Louis: St. Louis University, 1959).

<sup>59</sup>Cf. Ashcraft, R., (1991), 242.

<sup>60</sup>See Locke, J., *Essays on the Law of Nature*, 212- 214, where he denies that expediency can be the source of rectitude: «Si enim rectitudo alicujus actionis nascatur ex utilitate et homines obligantur ad eam rectitudinem, nescio quo pacto liceret cuiquam aliquid amico largire, donare, impendere, vel quovis alio modo gratis beneficium conferre sine legis hujus violatione, quod quam absonum sit, quam a ratione et humana natura et vita honesta alienum aliorum judicium permitto».

<sup>61</sup>Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.14. As for *honestum* see *De Officiis*, 1. 10, 56, 62, 67, 79, 107, etc.

<sup>62</sup>See Locke, J., *Epistula de Tolerantia*, trans. J. W. Gough (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 122: «Morum rectitudo, in qua consistit non minima religionis et sinceræ pietatis pars etiam ad vitam civilem spectat et in ea versatura animarum simul et republicæ salutis».

<sup>63</sup>See Buickerood, J.G., (1985):171-173. Locke was deeply influenced by Oxford Aristotelians such as Robert Sanderson, who identified the end of logic with the provision of adequate instruments to direct the human mind to knowledge (cf. Sanderson, *Logicæ artis compendium*, London 1615; LL 2548). Sanderson’s compendium was the most successful English logic textbook of the early seventeenth century; the list of books which Locke wrote for his students around 1661-1666 (Bodl. MS. Locke f. 11) confirms that Sanderson was one of the most important sources for the teaching of Aristotle’s logic. See Howell, W. S., *Logic and Rhetoric in England 1500–1700* (New York: Russell & Russell, 1961), 307ff.; Schuurmann, P., *Ideas, Mental Faculties and Method. The Logic of Ideas of Descartes and Locke and Its Reception in the Dutch Republic 1630-1750* (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 12.

<sup>64</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 2a 2ae, q 49 a.5 ad 3.

<sup>65</sup>«Deus Opt. Max.: Dii factitii sive Idola; Dii inventi sive res naturales pro diis habita; Dii Adscitij sive homines in deos relati, Heroes. Spiritus: Angeli; Daemones; Spectra; Lemures; Exorcismus; Obsessio Divinatio; Incantatio Magia Praestigia Necromantis Magia. Anima separata: Mortalis; Immortalis; Praemium Caelum; Poena Tartara; Resurrectio Transmigratio; Psychopannuchia. Mundus Aeternus Creatus. Cultus: Ritus; Ceremonia; Sacerdotes; Sacrificia Oblationes; Preces; Laudes. Ethica Sive Lex naturæ: Virtutes; Vitiae; Indifferentia. Revelatio: Prophetia Miracula; Vaticinia; Oracula; Insomnia; Visiones; Enthusiasmus. Iudaica Creatio; Christiana».

<sup>66</sup>See Nuovo, (2008), 9. The issue of *adiaphora* (“things indifferent,” neither required nor forbidden by Scripture) is crucial in Locke’s doctrine of tolerance: cf. Locke, J., “First Tract on Government”, 123, 148-9; “Second Tract on Government”, 208; *An Essay Concerning Toleration*, eds. J.R. Milton and P. Milton (Oxford-New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 276-78, 286.

<sup>67</sup>In his *Art of Logic*, one of the most influential British Aristotelian logicians in Locke’s time, Zachary Coke, divides knowledge into *sapientia* (the realm of theoretical disciplines inquiring into first causes), and *prudentia* (the dominion of practical wisdom). Zachary Coke’s logic was the most complete logical handbook in English written before Locke’s *Essay (The art of Logick or the Entire Body of Logick in English*, London 1654). Some years later, in the sixth of his *Orationes Inaugurales* (1707), Giambattista Vico still uses the caption *prudentia* in classifying knowledge, though he extends its meaning to the whole field of practical philosophy: cf. Berti, E., *Filosofia pratica* (Napoli: Guida, 2004), 76.

<sup>68</sup>Regarding the different models of classifying knowledge during the Middle Ages see Gregory, T., “Forme di conoscenza e ideali di sapere nella cultura medievale”, in *Knowledge and the Sciences in Medieval Philosophy*, eds. M. Aszalos, J. E. Murdoch, I. Niinluoto (Helsinki: Luther Agricola Society, 1990), 10-71. The Scholastic *ordo scientiarum*, seen as representative of the *ordo mundi*, constituted a basic assumption in the Anglican liberal theological tradition, which had in Richard Hooker, James Usher and Robert Sanderson three of its main exponents; all of them influenced Locke’s thought considerably.

<sup>69</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa* 2a 2ae, q. 47, art. 1: «There are three kinds of prudence: solitary prudence directed to one’s own benefit; economic or domestic prudence directed to the good of a household or family and political prudence directed towards the common good of the State». Besides, Aquinas distinguished between the *prudentia regnativa* of rulers and the *prudentia politica* of their subjects: *Summa*, q. 48, co. On this topic, cf. Kempshall, M. S., *The Common Good in Late Medieval Political Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press 1999), 114-117.

<sup>70</sup>Cf. Aquinas, Th., *Sententia libri Ethicorum*, in *Opera Omnia iussu Leonis XIII edita* (Romae: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1969), tomus 47, vol. 2, 356.

<sup>71</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea. Translatio Roberti Grosseteste Lincolnensis sive Liber Ethicorum*. B. *Recensio Recognita*, Aristoteles Latinus 26, 1–3, fasc. 4, ed. R. A. Gauthier (Leiden-Bruxelles: Brill, 1973), 485.

<sup>72</sup>Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea*, 486. Aristotle quotes a verse of Euripides’s *Filottete*, a lost tragedy, where Odysseus charges himself with imprudence, having devoted his life to war instead of taking care of his domestic affairs.

<sup>73</sup>Eustratius, *In sextum Aristotelis moralium*, ms. Cambridge, Peterhouse 116, ff. 137ra- 138rb.

<sup>74</sup>Albertus Magnus, *Super Ethica, commentum et quaestiones*, in *Opera Omnia instruenda curavit Institutum Alberti Magni coloniense*, ed. W. Kübel (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff, 1987), tomus 14, b. 6, lectio 11, 467-70.

<sup>75</sup>Cf. Lottin, O. “La liberté chez trois maîtres dès arts de Paris au dernier quart du XIIIe siècle”, in *Psychologie et morale aux XIIe et XIII siècles. Volume 3: Problèmes de morale*, ed. O. Lottin (Louvain, Abbaye du Mont César: Duculot, 1957), part 2: 621-650.

<sup>76</sup> Cf. Lambertini, R. “*Est autem et politica et prudentia, idem quidem habitus*: appunti sul rapporto tra *prudentia* e politica in alcuni interpreti medievali del VI libro dell’*Etica nicomachea* (da Alberto Magno a Buridano)”, *Etica & Politica/ Ethics and Politics* 2 (2012) [Online] Available via <http://www.units.it/etica> cited 25.09.13.

<sup>77</sup>Cf. Lottin, O., “La connexion des vertus chez Saint Thomas d’Aquin et ses prédécesseurs”, in Lottin, O., (1957), part 1: 197-252.

<sup>78</sup>Cf. Lottin, O., ed., *Le Quodlibet XV et trois Questions ordinaires de Godefroid de Fontaines* (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1937), 119-138.

<sup>79</sup>Lottin, O., (1937), 135.

<sup>80</sup>*Sententia libri Ethicorum* (ca. 1340), ms. Bologna, Bibl. Univ. 1572, q. 14, f. 150ra; cf. Lines, D. A., *Aristotle's Ethics in the Italian Renaissance (ca. 1300-1650). The Universities and the Problem of Moral Education* (Leiden-Boston- Köln: Brill, 2002), 466-467.

<sup>81</sup>Odonis, Geraldus, *Sententia et expositio cum quaestionibus super libros Ethicorum Aristotelis*, b. 6, q. 14, Brixiae, 1482 (no pages).

<sup>82</sup>Buridan, J., *Quaestiones super decem libros Ethicorum Aristotelis ad Nicomachum*, b. 6, q. 14, Parisius 1518, f. 125vb.

<sup>83</sup>Henry of Rimini, *De Quattuor Virtutibus Cardinalibus*, Venice, 1481; cf. Viroli, (1992), 39-41.

<sup>84</sup>Cf. Hariman, (2003), 61: «The real heirs of Cicero's contribution to the idea of *prudentia* were not the Romans of the empire, but the Renaissance humanists. It was a double inheritance. First, they had received the notion that *prudentia* was the first of the four cardinal virtues from the rhetorical treatise *De inventione*. Second, after learning the calculus for *phrónesis* from Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, they discovered Cicero's practice of prudential reasoning in his dialogues, arguing *in utramque partem* [...] The rich texture of prudential practice in *De Oratore*, the *Somnium Scipionis* and *Brutus* interwove the calculative procedures of prudence in rhetoric, ethics and politics into a living tapestry of practical performance. Wisdom was embedded in political action; the great man of the state supported learning for its broader application to civic life».

<sup>85</sup>Cf. Cuttini, E., *Unità e pluralità nella tradizione europea della filosofia pratica di Aristotele. Girolamo Savonarola, Pietro Pomponazzi e Filippo Melantone* (Catanzaro: Rubbettino, 2005).

<sup>86</sup>According to Victoria Kahn, this change is apparent in the ends assigned to the teaching of rhetoric in the sixteenth century. Rhetorical education in 1500 aimed at prudence mainly as a way to achieve mastery over fortune: this ideal of self-sufficiency is at odds with Christian teaching, as well as with the civic import attributed to rhetoric by Cicero and early Humanism. Whereas the Italian Quattrocento put a great emphasis on the possibility of reaching a workable agreement through prudent deliberation and sought in the teaching of rhetoric the best means to achieve this end, the later Northern Renaissance (especially with Erasmus and Montaigne) is more skeptical about this possibility and has a more cognitive orientation. Cf. Kahn, V., *Rhetoric, Prudence and Skepticism in the Renaissance* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), 140.

<sup>87</sup>Castiglione, B., *Cortegiano*, Venice, 1528, 4. 32.

<sup>88</sup>Guazzo, S., *La civil conversazione*, Brescia, 1574, 2.A 49a.

<sup>89</sup>Cf. Viroli, M., (1992), 4-9: «The transition from politics to reason of state was a profound change in the manner of speaking about, and thinking of politics [...] when the transition was completed, the language of civil philosophy had ceased to be the conventional language of politics. It had become a sort of language of nostalgia or utopia». In the sixteenth-seventeenth centuries, reason of state gradually becomes synonym with political prudence; it is, however, a prudence separated from justice and the law, unlike the old notion of politics.

<sup>90</sup>Cf. Garver, E., *Machiavelli and the History of Prudence* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1987); Procacci, G., *Studi sulla fortuna di Machiavelli* (Roma: Carocci, 1965), 77-106.

<sup>91</sup>Cf. McCrea, A. A. N., *Constant Minds: Political Virtue and the Lipsian Paradigm in England, 1584-1650* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997), 87-96. Locke owned a copy of Lipsius' 1632 edition of *De Constantia* (LL 1763).

<sup>92</sup>Cf. Kogel, R., *Pierre Charron* (Geneva: Libraire Droz, 1972), 50-77, 127-33.

<sup>93</sup>In *De Augmentis*, 3, 31, Bacon appeals to the authority of Machiavelli when emphasizing the importance of acquiring a *serpentine prudence*: «Fieri enim nullo modo potest, ut conjugatur *serpentina illa prudentia cum innocentia columbina*, nisi quis mali ipsius naturam penitus pernoscat. Absque hoc enim deerunt virtuti sua praesidia et munimenta». Bacon seems to follow what

Charron had stated in *De la Sagesse* (Bordeaux, 1601), I, ii, 10: «Il faut temperer et marier l'innocence columbine en n'offensant personne avec la prudence et astuce serpentine en se tenant sur ses gardes et se preservant des finesses, trahisons, et ambûches d'autrui». Locke possessed an English translation of Charron's book (LL 630). Lipsius' concept of *prudentia mixta* was particularly influential on Grotius' development of international law, though the latter incorporates prudence into justice (*De iure belli ac pacis*, Amsterdam, 1625, 2. 24). Cf. Lindberg, B., "Stoicism in Political Humanism and Natural Law", in *(Un)Masking the Realities of Power: Justus Lipsius and the Dynamics of Political Writing in Early Modern Europe*, eds. E. De Bom, M. Jansens, T. Van Houdt, J. Papy (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 74.

<sup>94</sup>Lipsius, *Politiorum sive civili doctrina libri sex* (Leiden, 1589), 204-16; however, on p. 204 Lipsius seems to express his position in mere quantitative terms: «Vinum, vinum esse non desinit si aqua leviter temperatum; Prudentia, Prudentia si guttulae in ea fraudis».

<sup>95</sup>Lipsius, *Politiorum*, 203. Lipsius' concept of *prudentia* was thought to discipline both the ruler and those that he rules; in the form of *prudentia mixta*, it stresses how dignity, self-restraint and discipline must influence foreign policy, whereas in the form of *prudentia civilis*, it subordinates the individual to the purposes of the state and teaches him to control his own life by mastering his emotions.

<sup>96</sup>Advocates of the new politics looked for illustrious predecessors amongst ancient philosophers, in order to justify reason of state: the works of Federico Bonaventura (*Della ragion di stato e della prudenza politica*, Urbino, 1623), and Ludovico Zuccolo (*Della ragion di stato*, Venezia, 1621) are clear evidence of this strategy.

<sup>97</sup>Cf. Scioppus, G., *Collyrium Regium Serenissimo D. Jacobo Magnae Britanniae Regi...muneri missum...iam tertium ed.*, Ingolstadt, 1611, LL 2591; Scipione Ammirato, *Dissertationes Politicae sive Discursus in C. Cornelium Tacitum*, Frankfurt, 1609, LL 85<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. LL 2074<sup>a</sup>-2074h. In his *Bibliographia Politica* (Venice, 1633), Naudé characterized prudence chiefly in terms of what the Italian writers of his time called "segretezza", the ability to keep important matters secret (cf. Scipione Ammirato, *Della segretezza*, Venice, 1598).

<sup>99</sup>Cf. Locke, J., Some Thoughts concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman, in Id., *Some Thoughts concerning Education*, 321: «Politics contains two parts very different the one from the other. The one containing the Original of Societies, and the Rise and Extent of Political power, The Other, the Art of Governing men in Society. The first of these hath been so bandied amongst us for these sixty years backward, that one can hardly miss Books of this kind». As for the first part of politics, Locke recommends the reading of Hooker, Algernon Sidney and *Two Treatises of Government*.

<sup>100</sup>Cf. Locke, J., "First Treatise of Government", in *Two Treatises of Government*, P. Laslett ed. (Oxford: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 145, where Locke attributes to Robert Filmer a «complaisance» with the *Arcana Imperii* (secrets of state; the political strategy of deliberate misinformation, characterized by Machiavelli's *Prince* as an explicit part of prudence and elevated by advocates of reason of state to the rang of a fundamental principle of the political doctrine).

<sup>101</sup>Cf. Locke, J., Second Treatise of Government, 270.

<sup>102</sup>Cf. Hooker, R., *Of the Laws of Ecclesiastical Polity* (London: J. M. Dent, 1907), 2 vols., 2, b. 5, 20; Hooker implicitly refers to Machiavelli, who in his *Discourses* celebrated the prudence of the prince who takes care to honor religion and its ceremonies with every kind of means, in order to assure a solid foundation for the commonwealth.

<sup>103</sup> Cf. Locke, J., "Obligation of Penal Laws" (1676), in Goldie, (1997), 236: «in things in their own nature indifferent, the conscience is obliged only to active or passive obedience, and not by virtue of that human law which the man either practices or is punished by, but by that law of God which forbids disturbance or dissolution of governments».

<sup>104</sup>The German political tradition of Bodin, Melander, Matthiae, Liebenthal and Althusius assimilated economy to politics.

<sup>105</sup>The outline on page 110 contains only two captions, “[*Opiniones de*, deleted] *Credenda*” and “*Agenda*”; under the first Locke lists «Deo; Spiritus; Anima humana; Vita futura: Paradisus, Infernus», which are reminiscent of *Scheme 1*; under the second, he lists «Officia Religiosa; Peccata [both followed by a gloss, «They are proper to be answered for by their own worth»]; Indifferentia; Officia civilia; Crimina; Licita [the last three followed by a gloss, «Made so by the laws»]; Intercessoria or means to obtain Blessings; Expiatoria Attonments for sins». All the items listed under “*Agenda*” reappear on pp. 119-20 of MS. Locke f. 15, under the subheading “Historica civilia” of the heading “*Reminiscendorum*”.

<sup>106</sup>Evidence of this is on the following page.

<sup>107</sup>Goldie (1997), 265-67, names this scheme *Adversaria B*; it was first published by Peter King in *The Life of John Locke*, 1, 218-222, misdated.

<sup>108</sup>At the very end of the classification, Locke adds an “Historica Physica referenda secundum species”, whose scope is to collect «the history of natural causes and effects»; the addition was intended to be located under “Adversaria Historica”, as is shown by the outlines in MS. f. 15, pp. 119-20, 122-23, and MS. c. 28, ff. 50-51. The mention of “Historica Physica” sounds Baconian: in *The Advancement*, 221, Bacon affirms that knowledge can be compared to «pyramides, whereof history is the basis. So of Natural Philosophy, the basis is Natural History; the stage next to the basis is Physic; the stage next the vertical point is Metaphysic». In *The Advancement*, Bacon makes a particular use of the term “prudence”: he sub-divides natural philosophy into *natural science* and *natural prudence*, assigning to the latter the role of inquiring into «the production of effects». However, in translating *The Advancement* into Latin, Bacon omits *natural prudence* and divides the operative part of natural philosophy into Mechanic and Magic. Bacon’s idea of natural prudence seems to have exerted no influence on Locke, while his idea of natural history «describing the variety of things» has had a durable impact on Locke’s conception of natural philosophy. See Anstey, *John Locke and Natural Philosophy*, 46-69.

<sup>109</sup>The heading includes «1.the opiniones or traditions [which] are to be found amongst men, concerning God, Creation, Revelation, Prophecies, Miracles. 2. Their rules or Institutes concerning things that are Duties, sins, or indifferent in matters of Religion, Or things that are commanded forbidden or permitted by their Municipall laws in order to Civil Society, which I call Instituta». As regards the *Instituta*, Locke mentions «Officia religiosa, peccata, Indifferentia» as pertaining to «Lege divina et ad cultum divinum», and «Officia Civilia, Crimina, Licita», as pertaining to «Lege civili». After *Instituta*, Locke adds *Petitoria, Expiatoria* and «any Supernaturall things that are to be observed amongst them as any magicall art or reall praedictiones». The list of items under “Adversaria Historica” in *Scheme 2* is shorter than that in the other 1677 outlines, where also the names of the headings change, as we shall see.

<sup>110</sup>Cf. Bodl. MS. Locke f. 2, 361-2. The note concerns Cicero’s concept of *utile*; Locke declared that it was «a duty to make money, but only by honourable means, and a duty to save and increase it by care and thrift».

<sup>111</sup>Cf. Marshall, J., *John Locke. Resistance, Religion and Responsibility* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996<sup>2</sup>), 299-300.

<sup>112</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.43. As for the practical meaning Cicero attributes to *Sophia*, see Lories, D., *Le sens commun*, 465.

<sup>113</sup>The dependence of *Scheme 2* on faculty psychology has important precedents in the late Renaissance: see *The Shapes of Knowledge from the Renaissance to the Enlightenment*, eds. D. R. Kelly and R. H. Popkin (Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1991). An important precedent is Bacon: in *The Advancement*, he subdivides human learning into three main branches, *History*,

*Poesy* and *Philosophy*, which, as he explains in the Introduction, «have reference to three parts of man's understanding, which is the seat of learning: history to his memory, poesy to his imagination, and philosophy to his reason». See also Bacon, *De Augmentis*, 2, 87.

<sup>114</sup>Under “Adversaria Historica”, in *Scheme 2* Locke lists “Traditiones”, “Instituta lege divina-lege civili”, “Petitoria-Expiatoria”, “Supernaturalia”; the items listed under “Historica civilia” both in MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-120 and “Adversaria 19 Nov. 77” are the same, and in the same order; in MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 122-123, under “Historica moralia” Locke lists “Traditiones”, “Instituta lege divina”, “Petitoria-Epiatoria”, “Supernaturalia”, “Instituta lege humana”, “Populorum”, “Particularia”. The items and their order are the same as in “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”.

<sup>115</sup>Another “Historia physica” is listed in this manuscript as the third subheading of the heading “Agendorum”, after “Imitanda” and “Acquirenda”.

<sup>116</sup>There is no mention of “Ethica” in MS. Locke f. 15, pp. 119-120: this is another reason for thinking the latter was written before “Adversaria 19 Aug. 1677”.

<sup>117</sup>A transcription of this outline is to be found in Schuurman, P., *The Digital Locke Project* (Amsterdam: Digital Production Centre of the University Library of the University of Amsterdam, 2006 [Online] Available via <http://www.digitallockeproject.nl> cited 25.09.13.

<sup>118</sup>Under «Physica sive artes quae in usum nostrum transferri possunt circa», in “Adversaria 1661” p. 25, Locke lists «Potum; Cibus; Medicinam; Motus; Mechanica; Sensuum obiecta; adjutoria secundum speciem»; the list is longer than in *Scheme 2* (where the last item is missing), so perhaps p. 25 was written after *Scheme 2*.

<sup>119</sup>Locke, J., “Study”, 181.

<sup>120</sup>Cf. Locke to John Alford, June 12, 1666, *Correspondence*, 1, 200: 280. Significantly, in the letter Locke affirms that «In the right management of it [riches] lyes a great part of Prudence», and that it is good to be both «prudent and liberall, provident and good natured». Clearly, prudence here is synonym with ‘foresight’, as in the journal note for June 26, 1681, which will be examined in the following paragraph.

<sup>121</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, The Epistle Dedicatory, 79: «I think it every Man's indispensable Duty, to do all the Service he can to his Country: And I see not what difference he puts between himself and his Cattel, who lives without that Thought». See also *ibi*, § 187, 240, where Locke insists on the necessity for a young gentleman to study the laws of his country, in order to be serviceable to it. According to Locke, a «Gentleman's Calling» involved having «the knowledge of a Man's Business, a Carriage suitable to his Rank, and to be eminent and Useful in his Country according to his station» (*ibi*, § 94, 156).

<sup>122</sup>Cf. Locke, J., “Pleasure and Pains. The Passions”, in Von Leyden, (2007), 265-272.

<sup>123</sup>Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 1a 3ae, q. 94, art. 2.

<sup>124</sup>Locke, J., *Essays on the Law of Nature*, 110-13; 156-9.

<sup>125</sup>Locke, J., “Study”, 180.

<sup>126</sup>Already in the 1677 outlines Locke had introduced «Decora» and «Indecora» under “Historica civilia” (MS. Locke f. 15, 119-20; “Adversaria 19 Aug. 1677”, “Adversaria 12 Nov. 77”), or “Historica moralia” (MS. Locke f. 15, 122-23).

<sup>127</sup>Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 126-30.

<sup>128</sup>See Locke, J., *Essay*, II, xxviii, 10-11, 353-356. See also Locke, J., “Virtue A” (1678), in Goldie ed., (1997), 270-71: «That virtue is but the name of such actions as are most conducting to the good of a society and are therefore by the society recommended by all means to the practice of the people seems to me very plain».

<sup>129</sup>Bodl. MS. Locke c. 28, 157-58; the two pages consist of a tabular outline of a classification of the sciences, in the hand of Sylvester Brounower (Locke's servant). Goldie names this outline “Adversaria C”, (1997), 288; a transcription of *Scheme 3* is in Schuurman, P., (2006). See

also Attig, J., *John Locke Bibliography-John Locke Manuscripts* [Online] Available via <http://www.libraries.psu.edu/tas/locke/index.html#jca>, cited 25.09. 2013.

<sup>130</sup>Cf. Locke, J., “Obligation of Penal Laws”, 236; “Scrupulosity” (1678), in King, P., (1830), 1, 205-6: «sometimes our duty is so evident, and the rule and circumstance so determine it to the present performance, that there is no latitude left; [...]. But this I think happens seldom, at least I may confidently say it does not in the greatest part of the actions of our lives, wherein I think God, out of his infinite goodness, considering our ignorance and frailty, hath left us a great liberty».

<sup>131</sup>In Aquinas, Th., *Summa*, 1a 2ae, q. 61 a.4 co, prudence is characterized as «rectitudo discretionis in quibuscumque actibus vel materiis».

<sup>132</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 122.

<sup>133</sup>The subheadings of the branch are more numerous than in “Sapientia 72”: «Metaphysica; Ens; Affectiones transcendentales et attributa; Essentia; Existentia; Unitas; Identitas; Duratio; Relatio».

<sup>134</sup>Galen named *semeiotike tekne* or *semeiotikon* one of the six branches of medicine concerning the interpretation of symptoms; in 1670, the physician Henry Stubbe, Locke’s fellow student at Christ Church, used the term with this meaning in his *The Plus Ultra Reduced to a Non Plus* (London, 1670). As for the items listed by Locke under *Semiotica* («Ideae: Simples; Complexae; Generales; Particulares; Distinctae; Confusae. Vocculatae de quibus. Ars Loquendi recte: Grammatica; Logica; Ornate Rhetorica; Metrice Poetica»), it is worth noting that Logic and Rhetoric are also located under *Prudentia* in *Scheme 3*. Regarding Locke’s concept of semiotics, see Serjeantson, R., “Human Understanding and the Genre of Locke’s *Essay*”, *Intellectual History Review*, 18 (2008): 157-71.

<sup>135</sup>The definition of *lex civilis* in *Scheme 3* is reminiscent of that in the 1677 outlines. In a short note of 1678, entitled “Law”, Locke characterized the essence and role of civil law in similar terms: «A civil law is nothing but the agreement of a society of men either by themselves, or one or more authorized by them, determining the rights, and appointing rewards and punishments to certain actions of all within that society» (cf. Locke, J., *Political Essays*, 269-70).

<sup>136</sup>See Bodl. MS. Locke f. 5, fos. 62, 67. For further discussion on Locke’s reading of Pufendorf, see Marshall, J., (1996), 201-4. Locke had purchased Pufendorf’s works in France in the late 1670s, and may even have met Pufendorf in Paris in 1677-79; in *Some Thoughts*, Locke recommended that the sons of gentlemen should read Pufendorf’s *De Officiis Hominis et Civis* and in both *Some Thoughts* and “Some Thoughts Concerning Reading and Study for a Gentleman” he further recommended Pufendorf’s *De Iure Naturae et Gentium* as the best work for instruction «in the natural Rights of Men, and the Original and Foundations of Society, and the Duties resulting from thence» (cf. *Some Thoughts*, 239 and 322). However, it was Cicero and the Bible that Locke emphasized on teaching the precepts of morality, and Pufendorf only with careful restrictions; in *Some Thoughts* Locke recommended Pufendorf’s work for teaching the duties flowing from the foundation of society in a paragraph explicitly on politics (§ 186), rather than in a preceding paragraph on morality, where it was Cicero who was recommended.

<sup>137</sup>In the already cited MS. Locke c. 42B, p. 22 (1679), Locke used the term “Mandatam” instead of “Officium civile”, which was probably already an allusion to the limits of the power of the magistrate. Cf. Locke, J., “Second Treatise of Government, in *Two Treatises*, 283: «The Liberty of Man, in Society, is to be under no other Legislative Power, but that established, by consent, in the Common-wealth, nor under the Dominion of any Will, or Restraint of any Law, but what the Legislative shall enact, according to the Trust put in it».

<sup>138</sup>Aaron, R. I., and Gibb, J., (1936), 116-118. This note will be examined in the following paragraph.

<sup>139</sup>Cf. Den Uyl, D. J., *The Virtue of Prudence* (New York: Lang, 1991), 115-21.

<sup>140</sup>See Locke, J., *Essay*, 240, II, xxi, 14: «I leave it to be considered, whether it may not help to put an end to that long agitated, and, I think unreasonable, because unintelligible, Question, viz. *Whether Man's Will be free, or no*. For if I mistake not, it follows, from what I have said, that the question it self is altogether improper; and it is as insignificant to ask, whether Man's *Will* be free, as to ask, whether his Sleep be Swift, or his Vertue square: *Liberty* being as little applicable to the *Will*, as swiftness of Motion is to Sleep, or squareness to Vertue. [...] *Liberty*, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the *Will*, which is also but a Power ». See also *Essay*, 241, II, xxi, 15: «*Volition*, 'tis plain, is an Act of the Mind knowingly exerting that Dominion it takes it self to have over any part of the Man, by imploying it in, or withholding it from any particular Action. And what is the *Will*, but the Faculty to do this?».

<sup>141</sup>See Limborch to Locke, July 8, 1701, in *Correspondence*, 7, 2953: 366: «A prudent man will choose from many desirables, and set before himself as the end of all his actions, that one which is perfect in all respects and in which are joined all the reasons that make a thing desirable. But that choice is not made without a determination of the will by which a man decrees that he will set before himself this good, which he judges to be preferable to all the rest, as the end of all his actions». Clearly, Limborch referred to the Thomistic conception of will, which was incompatible with Locke's conception.

<sup>142</sup>Aaron, R. I., and Gibb, J., (1936), 116-118.

<sup>143</sup>Sagacity corresponds to Aristotle's *eustochia* (Aquinas' *solertia*, one of the integral parts of prudence). According to Aristotle (*Eth. Nicom.*, 1142b 3-4), *eustochia* represents a skill in conjecture and, as such, it does not require reasoning but wit, in order to deliberate rapidly on what has to be done. For the link between *eustochia* and *prudentia*, see Aquinas, *Summa*, 2a 2ae q. 49, a. 4, ad 2. The concept of *solertia* and its role in the acquisition of knowledge were explored by one of the most influential British Aristotelian logicians, Giulio Pace, in the context of an exposition of the different methods of prudence and science (*Institutiones Logicae*, Cambridge 1595, 73-74). Pace defined sagacity as the faculty of the mind (in particular of the intellect), by means of which it is easier to conjecture the cause.

<sup>144</sup>Locke makes a comparison between geometry, morals, on the one hand, and *politie*, prudence, physics, on the other: «For that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right ones is infallibly true whether there be any such figure as a triangle existing in the world or no and it is true that it is everyman's duty to be just whether there be any such man in the world or no. But whether this course in public or private affairs will succeed well, whether rhubarb will purge or Quinquina cure an ague is only known by experience and there is but probability grounded upon experience or analogicall reasoning but no certain knowledg or demonstration» (*An Early Draft*, 117-118).

<sup>145</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 2.53.

<sup>146</sup>A characterization of prudence as the ability to foresee events was in Hobbes' *Leviathan* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), 8th ed., 21: «As he that foresees what will become of a Criminal, recons what he has seen follow on the like Crime before; having this order of thoughts, The Crime, the Officer, the Prison, the Judge, and the Gallows. Which kind of thoughts is called *Foresight*, and *Prudence*, or *Providence*; and sometimes *Wisdom*; though such conjecture, through the difficulty of observing all circumstances, be very fallacious. But this is certain; by how much one man has more experience of things past, than another; by so much also he is more Prudent, and his expectations the seldomer faile him. [...] though it be called prudence when the event answereth our expectation; yet in its own nature it is but presumption». See also *ibi*, 38, where Hobbes contrasts the certainty of *sapientia* to the uncertainty of *prudentia*: «Signs of prudence are all uncertain; because to observe by experience, and remember all circumstances that may alter the success, is impossible».

<sup>147</sup>The three items listed under “Deus Opt. Max.” in “Adversaria 1661” back endpage, are written in a different order with respect to “Sapientia 72”, an order identical to that of the same items in *Scheme 3*.

<sup>148</sup>In the “Second Treatise of Government”, Locke states that positive laws «are only so far right, as they are founded on the Law of Nature, by which they are to be regulated and interpreted» (Locke, J., *Two Treatises*, 275). Legislation involves making the laws of nature more specific and determining how to apply them to particular circumstances (*Two Treatises*, 357).

<sup>149</sup>Bodl. MS Locke f. 8, p. 8.

<sup>150</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1.16.

<sup>151</sup>Bodl. MS. Locke c. 28, ff. 155-156. A reference to the *Essay*, IV, xxiii, 20, appears at the top of fol. 155r; the manuscript is in Locke’s hand. Schuurman argues – basing on similarities in size of sheets, layout, and content – that this paper is a continuation of ff. 145-152, containing “Of Ethick in General”, and probably also dates from ca. 1686-1687. Cf. Schuurman, P., *Digital Locke project*, text description.

<sup>152</sup>Schuurman proposes a tentative transcription of two unintelligible words, “Cersilii” and “Erravia”. In square brackets I report what I think may be the proper reading, “Consilii”, a term which was already in *Scheme 1*, “Sapientia 72” and *Scheme 3*, and “et varia”.

<sup>153</sup>The separation of *prudentia civilis* from *Politica* in the political writings of the seventeenth century attests that politics had ceased to be thought of as a virtue; cf. Scattola, M., *Scientia Iuris and Ius Naturae. The Jurisprudence of the Holy Roman Empire in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries*, in *A Treatise of Legal Philosophy and General Jurisprudence. Vol. 9. A History of the Philosophy of Law in the Civil Law World, 1600-1900*, eds. D. Canale, P. Grossi, H. Hoffmann (Dordrecht: Springer, 2009), 1-41.

<sup>154</sup>Locke’s definition of *prudentia monastia* is reminiscent of Bacon’s *doctrina de cultura animi* (cf. Bacon, *De Augmentis*, 3, 35).

<sup>155</sup>Cf. Locke, J., “Second Treatise of Government”, 212. According to Locke, political society comes into being when individual men, representing their families, come together in the State of Nature and agree to each give up executive power to punish those who transgress the Law of Nature, and hand over that power to the public power of a government. Having done this, they then become subject to the will of the majority. By making a compact to leave the State of Nature and form society, they make «one body politic under one government» and submit themselves to the will of that body.

<sup>156</sup>References to political prudence are to be found in Locke, J., “Second Treatise of Government”, 343, 366, 370.

<sup>157</sup>Cf. Oestreich, G., *Neostoicism and the Early Modern State*, trans. D. McLintock (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 162-65. According to Oestreich, *prudentia civilis* was the major concept in politics in the seventeenth century, embracing the training of princes, their advisers, the new standing army and emergent bureaucracy. The doctrine stressed obedience and discipline as conditions of a well-ordered state and taught the individual to regulate emotions and subordinate himself politically.

<sup>158</sup>Similarly, Cardano characterized *prudentia civilis* as the *ars bene vivendi et civiliter* which sums up all the most important virtues (*patientia, consilio, humanitas, civilitas, liberalitas, gratia* and *tranquillitas*): cf. Cardano, G., *Arcana politica, sive De Prudentia civili liber singularis*, chs. 16, 21.

<sup>159</sup>Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, §§ 67, 93, 109, 117, 143-5. A definition of considerateness for others, and the insistence on its importance are also to be found in Locke’s journal notes for 1684 (Bodl. MS. f. 8, 30-3).

<sup>160</sup>Cf. Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 93, 94, 102, 103, 126, 127, 142.

<sup>161</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 3. 24, 118.

<sup>162</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 147.

<sup>163</sup>Cf. Yolton, J. W. and J.S., (2003), Introduction, 1-2.

<sup>164</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 107, where Locke recommends prudence to parents as for the feeding of children; *ibi*, 139, where he praises the «prudent and kind mother» who whips her daughter in order to correct her stubbornness, and teaches her children to take care of their domestic animals (*ibi*, 180; see also *ibi*, 174); as regards tutors, Locke recommends they should be prudent and virtuous men (*ibi*, 234 and 253), and defines «prudent conduct» that of the tutor who takes care to arouse his pupil's love of reputation and ambition, in order to make study a pleasant occupation (*ibi*, 137).

<sup>165</sup>Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 255, where Locke quotes a verse by Juvenal, “Nullum numen abest si sit prudentia”, in order to stress the importance of teaching children to get a mastery over their inclinations; *ibi*, 120, where he characterizes memory and reflection as the «concomitant of prudence and age». Besides, Locke celebrates «Prudence and good breeding» as those «qualities which are of all other the most necessary to be taught», though the most neglected (*ibi*, 155). See also *ibi*, 262, where Locke links together «Wisdom and Prudence».

<sup>166</sup>Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 161.

<sup>167</sup>Locke, J., *Essay*, 720, IV, xxi, 1-4.

<sup>168</sup>Cf. Aristotle, *Eth. Nicom.* 1140a 25-7: «it is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient for himself».

<sup>169</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essay*, 549, IV, iii, 18; as for the demonstrability of morals, see *Essay*, 516, III, xi, 16; 549, IV, iii, 18; 643, IV, xii, 8.

<sup>170</sup>In *Essay*, 387, II, xxiii, 11, Locke mentions “justice”, “glory” and “gratitude” (to which he adds “wisdom” on p. 491), as examples of «Words frequent enough in every Man's Mouth» often used without having clear and definite ideas on their meanings. Locke does not mention prudence: probably he thought the meaning of the term had become so ambiguous that it was impossible to use it without creating doubts and perplexities, which was exactly what he intended to avoid in *Essay*. On the contrary, in *Some Thoughts* he uses the term more freely, given the different context, though sometimes he seems to prefer synonyms like *discretion* and its derivatives (cf. §§ 29, 37, 39, 59, 74, 83, 88, 90, 94, 95, 108, 116, 138, 147, 198, 212). The adjective “discreet” is well attested as a synonym for “prudent” in Locke's time: cf. Chamber, R. and W., *Etymological Dictionary of the English Language* (London: J. Donald 1872), s. v. “prudent”.

<sup>171</sup>*Convenientia* comes from the Latin *cum-venire*, which conveys the idea of a concordance or correspondence between two things.

<sup>172</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essay*, 187, II, xiv, 18; 303, II, xxiii, 12; 329, II, xxvii, 2; 399, II, xxxiii, 15; *etc.* See also Locke, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest, and Raising the Value of Money”, in Kelly, P., (1991), 1, 244: «The Vent of any Thing depends upon its Necessity or Usefulness; as Convenience, or Opinion guided by Fancy or Fashion, shall determine».

<sup>173</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essay*, 148, II, ix, 13: «And would not quickness of Sensation, be an Inconvenience to an Animal, that must lie still, where Chance has once placed it».

<sup>174</sup>Regarding language, see Locke, J., *Essay*, 432, III, v, 7: «the convenience of Communication, which is the first end of Language [...] the convenience of expressing under one name, and reckoning of one Species, such unclean mixtures»; *ibi*, 435, III, v, 11: «the convenience of Discourse, and Communication»; *etc.* As for the moral language, see *ibi*, 550, IV, iii, 19, where the uncertainty of significance of the terms due to the complexity of moral ideas is named as «inconvenience».

<sup>175</sup>See Locke, J., *Essay*, 45, I, i, 5: «Men have reason to be well satisfied with what God hath thought fit for them, since he has given them [...] Whatsoever is necessary for the Conveniences of Life, and Information of Vertue»; *ibi*, 302, II, xxiii, 12; *etc.* See also “Second

Treatise of Government”, 286: «God, who hath given the World to Men in common, hath also given them reason to make use of it to the best advantage of Life, and convenience»; Locke, “Reply to the Bishop of Worchester”, in *The Works of John Locke in Nine Volumes* (London: Rivington, 1824), 3, 496: «Nature has so richly provided for their convenience in this life, that they have drowned all sense of the God of it»; Locke, “Some Considerations of the Consequences of the Lowering of Interest”, in Kelly, P., (1991), 1, 221, 222, 244; Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 114; etc.

<sup>176</sup>See Locke, J., *Essay*, 481, III, xi, 10: «those [Writings] that contain either Truths we are required to believe, or Laws we are to obey, and draw inconveniences on us, when we mistake or transgress»; *ibi*, 490, III, ix, 23: «his Son, whilst cloathed in Flesh, was subject to all the Frailties and Inconveniences of humane Nature, Sin excepted». In the “Second Treatise of Government”, 326, the many «inconveniences of the State of Nature» are the chief motif for men to abandon it.

<sup>177</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essay*, 389, II, xxxii, 15: « the contrary Supposition [the same Object should produce in several Men’s Minds different Ideas at the same time] if it could be proved, is of little use, either for the Improvement of our Knowledge, or Conveniency of Life; and so we need not trouble our selves to examine it»; *ibi*, 390, II, xxxii, 17: «Meat, Drink, and Cloathing, and other Conveniences of Life». See also *ibi*, 645, IV, xii, 10: «Experiments and Historical Observations we may have, from which we may draw Advantages of Ease and Health, and thereby increase our stock of Conveniencies for this Life; but beyond this I fear our Talents reach not, nor are our Faculties, as I guess, able to advance».

<sup>178</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Essay*, 66, I, iii, 2, where Locke characterizes as «rules of convenience» those principles of loyalty and justice which men usually follow within their own communities, though having not received them as innate moral truths; *ibi*, 69 (I, iii, 6), where he affirms that «self interest and the Conveniences of this Life, make many Men, own an outward Profession and Approbation of them [moral rules] whose Actions sufficiently prove, that they very little consider the Law-giver, that prescribed these Rules».

<sup>179</sup>Cicero, *De Divinatione*, 2. 34.

<sup>180</sup>Locke, J., *Essay*, 352, II, xxviii, 6. In Locke’s opinion, the rules of moral law need the reinforcement of punishments and prizes in order to be binding, because human nature is motivated to act uniquely by the search for pleasure and the avoidance of pain.

<sup>181</sup>Cicero, *De Officiis*, 1. 40.

<sup>182</sup>Cf. *Sirach, from the Holy Bible, King James version* [Online] Available via <http://etext.lib.virginia.edu/relig/browse.html> cited 25.09.2013.

<sup>183</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *Some Thoughts*, 262, where Locke speaks of the improvement in «wisdom and prudence» and «prudence and experience» which a young gentleman can obtain through travelling.

<sup>184</sup>Cf. Winston, D., *The Wisdom of Solomon: a New Translation with Introduction and Commentary* (New York: Doubleday, 1979).

<sup>185</sup>Cf. Locke’s letter of good-bye to Anthony Collins of 28 October 1704 (*Correspondence*, 8, 419), where his words seem to echo those of the *Ecclesiastes*: «this life is a scene of vanity that soon passes away and affords no solid satisfaction but in the consciousness of doing well and in the hopes of another life».

<sup>186</sup>Cf. Locke, J., *A Paraphrase and Notes on the Epistles of St. Paul*, 2 vols., ed. A. W. Wainwright (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Oxford 2003<sup>3</sup>), 2, 616, where Locke affirms that God has given men the possibility to understand the Gospel together with the «prudence to comply with it».