

**THE *RECENTIOR NOMINALIS* OF LEIBNIZ'S  
*DISPUTATIO METAPHYSICA DE PRINCIPIO  
INDIVIDUI*: FULGENTIUS SCHAUTHEET AND HIS  
*CONTROVERSID* AGAINST THE THOMISTIC  
DOCTRINE ON THE PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION**

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**Abstract.** In his *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui* (1663), Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) supports his own account of the principle of individuation on the basis of the authority of many Nominalistic (the *nominales*) theologians and philosophers. Among them he quotes a *recentior nominalis*, Fulgentius Schautheet (1623-1708), the author of the *Controversiae philosophicae inter scholasticorum principes D. Thomam, Ioannem Scotum et Gregorium Ariminensem nominalium antesignanum* (1660). Indeed, in the Preface of his work, Schautheet points out that he aims at reconstruct the Scholastic controversies by following in the footsteps of Gregory of Rimini (1300-1358), which is considered by him the *antesignanus* of the *nominales*. Leibniz refers to the Fifth Controversy of the second book, where Schautheet addresses his criticism against the Thomistic account of the principle of individuation. In this article I analyze Schautheet's *Controversia* in order both to reconstruct the theory of the author and to compare it with Leibniz's one.

**Keywords:** Schautheet, Leibniz, individuation, designated matter, *nominales*

### Introduction

The *quaestio* on the principle of individuation is one of the most controversial topics in the history of Western philosophy. Its origins have to be traced in the commentaries on Aristotle's and Porphyry's logical works. However, its implications do not concern only logic, but also metaphysics, physics, and theology. As it is well known, the medieval discussion begins with Boethius (c. 480-c. 524) and, particularly, with his translations and commentaries of Aristotle's *Categoriae* and Porphyry's *Isagoge* and his theological *tractatus* (*De trinitate, Utrum pater et filius, Quomodo substantiae, De fide catholica, Contra Eutychen*).<sup>1</sup> The debate develops in the Middle Age, particularly, in the Scholastic period, and it is still central in Second Scholasticism, as it is well shown by Francisco Suárez (1548-1617). The fifth of his *Metaphysicae Disputationes* (1597), entitled *De unitate individuali eiusque principio*,<sup>2</sup> constitutes an exhaustive *mise au point* of the long

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medieval and Renaissance debate on this topic.

However, it would be incorrect to narrow the context of this controversy to the Scholastic tradition. In the early modern philosophy, the question of the principle of individuation, far from disappearing, is often debated by the most important thinkers of the time. The case of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716), whose first work is a *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui* (1663)<sup>3</sup> – and who will deal with the problem of the individuation all his life long –, constitutes one of the most significant examples of the persistence of a medieval question in the Early Modern Age.<sup>4</sup> As it is well known, the *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui* is the bachelor's thesis, defended in Leipzig on 30<sup>th</sup> May 1663, and it is written under the direction and the influence of Jakob Thomasius (1622-1684), who is the author of its Preface, entitled *Origo controversiae de principio individuationis*.<sup>5</sup> Some scholars stressed the importance of Thomasius's influence on the *Disputatio* and the Nominalistic solution endorsed by Leibniz. Stefano Di Bella invites cautiously to keep more attention to “the wider context, so far rather neglected, which is constituted by his teacher Jakob Thomasius's Preface and by the Corollaries Leibniz himself draws from his own thesis.”<sup>6</sup> Roger Ariew goes so far as to argue that if Thomasius had preferred the Scotist solution, Leibniz would have done the same.<sup>7</sup> This point must be taken into account in analysing the *Disputatio*. I will deal with it and Thomasius's influence below (§ 4).

However, many details of this long history are still not very well known. This is true of an author that Leibniz quoted in his *Disputatio*: Fulgentius Schautheet (1623-1708),<sup>8</sup> a Bachelor in theology and Augustinian Father (O.E.S.A.), who devoted two of his *Controversiae philosophicae inter scholasticorum principes D. Thomam, Ioannem Scotum et Gregorium Ariminensem Nominalium antesignanum*,<sup>9</sup> published three years before Leibniz's disputation, to the question of the principle of individuation.

Indeed, in spite of Leibniz's reference,<sup>10</sup> scholars have never paid attention to Schautheet, with few exceptions. In 1990, Jean-François Courtine observed that this author has remained unknown to all editors and translators of Leibniz's *Disputatio*.<sup>11</sup>

Following Courtine's suggestion, this article will address Schautheet's account of the principle of individuation. However, before analysing this account, let's give some information concerning Schautheet and his work.

### Schautheet's *Controversiae philosophicae*

Schautheet's *Controversiae* are composed of five books containing eighty *controversiae* on different Scholastic topics. The first book deals with logic (*Controversiae logicarum*); the second, the third and the fourth book with physics (the second with the natural body: *Controversiae de corpore naturali*; the third with the generation and the corruption: *Controversiae de generatione et corruptione*; the fourth with the soul: *De anima*), the fifth with metaphysics (*Controversiae metaphysicarum*).

As Schautheet claims in the *Praefatio*, the eighty controversies of the work concern three *excellentissimi scholarum principes*: Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274), John Duns Scotus (1265/66–1308) and Gregory of Rimini (1300-1358). Therefore, Schautheet's work is a sort of comparison among these three authors, whose sentences are related and discussed by Schautheet.

This comparison always ends with the endorsement, more or less explicit, of

the authority of Gregory. In this sense, Schautheet's *Controversiae* constitute a sort of *summa* of philosophy *ad mentem Gregorii*. This is made explicit by Schautheet in the *Praefatio*, where he declares that in his controversies he will follow (*inhaerescere*) in Gregory's footsteps (*vestigia*). Schautheet points out that he has not been compelled in his choice by any necessity (*haud necessitate*). This is just an act of free will (*libera voluntas*).<sup>12</sup>

As one can notice, according to Schautheet's point of view, the fact that he pursues Gregory's authority means to endorse a Nominalistic position. Indeed, according to Schautheet, Gregory grounded all his doctrines on two axioms:

To God it is possible whatever does not imply any contradiction: and when there is no necessity of putting more things, it is the paucity that must be embraced.<sup>13</sup>

Gregory is called, since the very title of the work, "nominalium antesignanum"; and in the Preface, "dux classis nominalium". According to Schautheet, what distinguishes the *nominales* is the fact that

This genus of philosophers does not dispute on the names (as, namely, the ignorant grammarians describe it), but they put together the paucity of the things with the plurality of the names, they assert and preserve it.<sup>14</sup>

Contemporary scholars have shown how problematic is to characterize Gregory strictly as a Nominalist theologian (and, more in general, the Ockhamism and the Nominalism as an uniform doctrinal body);<sup>15</sup> it is clear, indeed, that his theological and philosophical doctrines cannot be classified without distinction under the label of the 'Nominalism'. However, this was the manner in which Gregory was considered at the age of Schautheet, and even before: Johann Georg Turmair 'Aventinus' (1477-1534), in his *Annales ducum Boiariae* (written between 1517 and 1521, later published in the edition of all the writings between 1881 and 1908),<sup>16</sup> attributed to Gregory the appellation of *antesignanus nominalium*.<sup>17</sup>

Let's turn to Schautheet. His choice to endorse the authority of Gregory is intended to express the superiority of the Nominalistic perspective with respect to Aquinas on the one side and to Scotus on the other side. The aim of the *Controversiae*, as well as the structure, is very well illustrated by Schautheet's discussion of the principle of individuation, which is collocated in the physical section of the work (second book). Indeed, the two controversies devoted to the question of the principle of individuation, *An quantitas aut materia signata quantitate sit principium individuationis*,<sup>18</sup> and *An Scoti haecceitas sit principium individuationis*<sup>19</sup> are addressed, respectively, against Aquinas (Fifth Controversy) and Scotus (Sixth Controversy). And it is exactly as a follower of Nominalism – as a *recentior nominalis* – that Leibniz will present Schautheet in his *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*.<sup>20</sup>

This article will focus on the Fifth Controversy, aiming both to expose in its general lines Schautheet's criticism against the Thomistic doctrine and to make a comparison between Schautheet's and Leibniz's account of individuation.<sup>21</sup>

The Controversy is composed of three articles: the first exposes the arguments (*rationes*) addressed against the Thomistic thesis holding the designated matter as principle of individuation;<sup>22</sup> the second presents the arguments in support of that thesis;<sup>23</sup> the third contains Schautheet's own evaluation of Thomistic doctrine with his replies to the arguments of the second article.<sup>24</sup>

Here I will follow Schautheet's exposition, analyzing in sequence the three articles of the Fifth Controversy (§§ 2-3); at the end of the article I will sketch the comparison between Schautheet and Leibniz (§ 4).

### **Controversia V, art. 1: the traditional arguments against the Thomistic doctrine**

In the first article Schautheet discusses two questions:

1. Whether the principle of individuation is the quantity;
2. Whether the principle of individuation is the matter designated by quantity (*materia signata*).<sup>25</sup>

The main thesis of the article is that the principle of individuation is nor the quantity,<sup>26</sup> nor the designated matter.<sup>27</sup> Schautheet exposes ten arguments referring to the first conclusion, and other ten arguments to the second conclusion. All these arguments are traditional; in formulating them, Schautheet appeals to the authority of Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel (c. 1415-1495), Durandus of Saint-Pourçain (c. 1270-1334) and Benet Perera (1535-1610)<sup>28</sup>. These are the same authors (and they are quoted in the very same order) that will be listed by Leibniz in his *Disputatio*.<sup>29</sup> Consequently, it seems quite possible that Leibniz is following in his work Schautheet.<sup>30</sup>

At beginning of the first article, after formulating the question of the Fifth Controversy and its first *conclusio*, Schautheet refers to Gregory and, in particular, to the first article of his *Lectura super primum Sententiarum*, dist. 17, q. 4 (*Utrum forma corporalis intendatur per acquisitionem novae formae vel partis seu gradus formae eiusdem rationis*).<sup>31</sup> However, Schautheet's reference to Gregory is puzzling, because the *quaestio* 4 does not deal strictly with the problem of individuation.

Schautheet's account seems to be independent from Gregory's *quaestio*. This is confirmed by the fact that no one of the arguments alleged by Schautheet in what follows refers particularly to texts taken from Gregory and, moreover, in the whole *Controversia* the very name of Gregory occurs only two times.

But let's now sum up the arguments alleged by Schautheet in support of the first *conclusio*. The first argument runs as follows: individual substances are prior to the quantity (indeed, the *subiectum* precedes the form, and the individual substance is the subject of the quantity); but, what is posterior cannot be the principle of individuation, neither can be the *principium constitutum* of what precedes it.<sup>32</sup> Indeed, the distinctive and constitutive principles of a thing are one and the same thing. This premise is here in order to prove that the quantity cannot individuate the substance, and, as we can see, Schautheet will use it also in the fifth argument for the first *conclusio* and in the second argument for the second *conclusio*.

The second argument claims that the individual substance is directly included within the predicament of substance. Indeed, the predicamental substance can be differentiated in first substance (the singular one) and in second substance (the

universal one); as a consequence, the quantity is not required as principle of individuation.<sup>33</sup> Moreover, the individual substance is a being *per se* and the species is predicated of the substance *in quid*. Therefore, the quantity cannot be the principle of individuation because, in this case, the first substance would be an accidental composite and the second substance would not be predicated *in quid* of the first substance, given that a physical part cannot be predicated *in quid* of its whole.<sup>34</sup>

The third asserts that, even if the quantity is removed, the substance is still a singular being, in so far as it continues to be distinguished from another substance;<sup>35</sup> for example, once subtracted to John his quantity, John continues to be different from Peter and, consequently, to be a singular substance.<sup>36</sup>

The fourth argument is grounded on the assumption that the individuals are different substantially. Now, if the quantity was the principle of individuation, once destroyed their quantity, the individuals would differ only accidentally and they could not be distinguished.<sup>37</sup>

The fifth argument claims that, if separated from the body, the rational souls would differ only numerically. Indeed, the rational souls are devoid of quantity and what distinguishes one thing from another (i.e., the distinctive principle) must exist in the thing that it makes be different from all other things, namely it must be also a constitutive principle. Consequently, the quantity cannot be the principle of individuation.<sup>38</sup>

As the sixth argument refers, what is convertible with the being and can be predicated of all the same things does not add anything to the things to which it is attributed; but the individual is convertible with the being really (*a parte rei*) existent and it is predicated of all the things to which the being is attributed. Therefore, the individual is not distinguished from the singular things. It follows that the quantity cannot be the principle of individuation: otherwise, the individual would be composed of the quantity and the substance. Consequently, it would be only inadequately distinguished from the singular substance.<sup>39</sup>

The seventh maintains that the final term of every substantial generation is a singular substance, which is a being that is really one. Accordingly, if the quantity was the principle of individuation, it would constitute the term of the substantial generation; but this is impossible, because, in that case, the individual substance will be an accidental being, which is a nonsense.<sup>40</sup>

The eighth supposes that the quantity may cease to exist; indeed, as the Mystery of the Eucharist shows, the quality can exist without the quantity; but it is impossible that something that may cease to exist constitutes a principle of individuation. As a consequence, the quantity cannot be the principle of individuation.<sup>41</sup>

The ninth is grounded on the following premise: it is in virtue of its own essence that a thing constitutes an individual. Indeed, it is the same principle that makes a thing to be both individual and existing; and a thing exists in virtue of its essence, because this is identical with the existence. Therefore, in so far as it is an accident, the quantity cannot be the principle of individuation.<sup>42</sup>

The tenth claims that two accidents that are numerically distinct can inhere in virtue of God's power in the same substance. However, if the quantity was the

principle of individuation, two accidents inhering in it would constitute, at the same time, both a plurality of beings and an individual being: a plurality, because it has been assumed that they are two; an individual, because from the same formal principle follows the same formal effect. And this is impossible.<sup>43</sup>

Let's turn to the second conclusion,<sup>44</sup> addressed against the thesis that the principle of individuation is the designated matter. To support this sentence, Schauthet refers here, among others (*alii*), to Gregory of Rimini,<sup>45</sup> but, once again, he does not mention any particular text.

Schauthet's first argument is grounded on the proofs of the first conclusion: indeed, all the reasons demonstrating that the quantity cannot constitute the principle of individuation also prove that neither the designated matter can constitute it.<sup>46</sup>

The second argument is more articulated and it is grounded on the assumption, which Schauthet had used above<sup>47</sup>, that the distinctive and constitutive principles of a thing are one and the same thing<sup>48</sup>. If God destroyed the designated matter of two rational souls, these would be still numerically distinct; but, as the principle of an actual distinction has to be in act, the distinction of the souls cannot depend on the designated matter, which, consequently, cannot be the principle of individuation. Moreover, the designated matter is extrinsic to the intellectual souls and it is impossible that a distinction is grounded on something extrinsic: indeed, the constitutive principle is identical with the distinctive principle and a thing cannot be constituted by something extrinsic. Again, as two rational souls are in themselves two different entities, they are not specifically, but numerically distinguished. Now, the souls are devoid of any matter designated, which, consequently, cannot constitute the principle of their numerical distinction.<sup>49</sup>

The third argument runs as follows. Every intellectual soul is able to inform whatever matter apt to be informed. Therefore, the designated matter does not distinguish the souls. Indeed, if the diversity of the souls had to be explained by the matter, every soul could inform only one matter.<sup>50</sup>

The fourth argument is the following. Two rational souls are numerically different or because of the matter that they inform or because of the instrument by which they inform the matter. In the first case, once the matter is destroyed, the distinction ceases too, because *cessante causa cessat effectus*; as a consequence, the souls are not distinguished by the matter only. In the second case, the principle of individuation cannot be the designated matter, as the souls inform different matters by themselves or by something intrinsic.<sup>51</sup>

The fifth argument is grounded on the premise that two intellectual souls inform progressively the same matter endowed with the same quantity. It follows that the designated matter cannot be the principle of individuation, because different individuals cannot be constituted by a same principle. To support his argument, Schauthet relates the biblical episode of the siege of Samaria by the Syrians,<sup>52</sup> when the mothers ate their own children because of hunger. What happened, in that case, is that the souls of the children and the mothers were progressively informed by a matter designated by the same quantity.<sup>53</sup>

The sixth argument starts from the premise that God created the souls before the bodies; this, indeed, is not a contradictory possibility. Hence Schauthet argues

that the matter designated by quantity cannot be the principle of individuation: indeed, on the one side, the souls created before the body could be apt to be united to whatever body and the will of God could breathe whatever soul into whatever body; and, on the other side, the principle of distinction is not common to the things that it distinguishes. Moreover, in the same way that God ordered freely that the rational soul that is in John is jointed to the matter A, he could have also decided to join it to the matter B. Therefore, the soul is not individuated for the fact that it exists in a singular matter, because it could have been put by God in another matter.<sup>54</sup>

The seventh argument is grounded on the premise that it is possible that many angels are under the same species:<sup>55</sup> this would not be possible if the matter was the principle of individuation. The same conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the doctrine that God cannot produce many individuals of a same species without matter was condemned more than three century before in Paris.<sup>56</sup>

The eighth argument is the following. A plurality of heats numerically distinguished inheres, in different times, in the same matter of water designated by the same quantity: indeed, once lost the heat it was previously endowed with, the water can be warmed up again. It follows, again, that the designated matter cannot be the principle of individuation: otherwise, two heats that inhere in a different time in the same water would not differ numerically, because they would have the same principle of individuation.<sup>57</sup>

The example of the heat occurs in the ninth argument, too. A plurality of degrees of heats of the same species inheres at the same time in boiling water, and a plurality of parts, numerically different, of the grace inheres at the same time in the same soul of the just man; but, the addition of parts of the same nature to a pre-existent form can be explained by the predicament of quality; consequently, the designated matter is not the principle of individuation.<sup>58</sup>

According to the tenth argument, every single thing is *a parte rei* formally and intrinsically one by number for the very fact that it exists in act; but a thing is in act not by the designated matter, because the forms (both substantial and accidental) can exist by divine virtue without it. It follows again that the designated matter cannot be the principle of individuation.<sup>59</sup>

After these ten arguments, Schauthet finally exposes his opinion concerning the principle of individuation and formulates a definition of it. He writes:

Do you ask which is the principle of individuation? I answer that the principle of individuation is twofold: one is external and other is internal. The external one is the sensible accident, which is a kind of sign through which we acknowledge the diversity of the individuals. The internal one is twofold: one is logical and the other is physical. The physical one is the whole nature of whatever thing existing. The logical one is the individual difference by which the species is contracted up (according to our way of conceiving) to the individual, as well as the genus is contracted up to the species by the common difference.<sup>60</sup>

**Controversia V art. 2-3: the *status quaestionis* and Schautheet's solution**

The second article relates eight arguments supporting Thomas Aquinas's thesis that the principle of individuation is the designated matter, which Schautheet traces back in *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 77, a. 2.<sup>61</sup> In addition to the authority of Aquinas, Schautheet also refers to Giles of Rome (1243-1316),<sup>62</sup> John Capreolus (1380-1444),<sup>63</sup> Paul Soncinas († 1494)<sup>64</sup> and Thomas Cajetan (1469-1534)<sup>65</sup>.

In reconstructing the Thomistic position, Schautheet states that the principle of individuation is the matter (see below the first, third and fourth arguments), the accident (see the second argument) and the quantity (see the fifth, sixth, seventh and eight arguments).

Let's move more precisely to the arguments.

1. The first argument is grounded on Aristotle's claim in *Metaphysics* that the unity and the distinction come from the matter;<sup>66</sup> therefore it is necessary that the principle of individuation is the matter. The same conclusion follows from Aristotle's statement in the *Physics* that the prime mover can be only one, in so far as it exists without matter.<sup>67</sup>
2. According to Porphyry, the individual is defined by the accidents; indeed, all the individuals belonging to the same species are not differentiated by their nature, but by the accidents only. Therefore, it is clear that the accidents are the principle of individuation.<sup>68</sup> This is confirmed as follows: the principle of individuation is what distinguishes all the individuals of a same species; now, such a principle of distinction can be only an accident; consequently, the principle of individuation can be only an accident.<sup>69</sup>
3. The things that are distinguished numerically do not differ formally; now, every difference coming from the form concerns the species; consequently, the numerical difference can depend on the matter only, which constitutes, therefore, the principle of individuation.<sup>70</sup>
4. In the spiritual and incorruptible things there is no individual distinction; this proves that every individual distinction comes from the matter. The major premise of the argument is demonstrated as follows: the multiplication of the individuals belonging to a same species is in order to the preservation of the species itself; now, one single individual is enough to conserve the species of the spiritual and incorruptible things; consequently, there is no individual distinction in them.<sup>71</sup>
5. As Aristotle argues in *Metaphysics*, every distinction is by the form or by the quantity;<sup>72</sup> now, in the things belonging to the same species there are no different forms; therefore, the only principle of individuation is here the quantity. This is confirmed by the other Aristotle's claim that the form is in order to distinguish;<sup>73</sup> indeed, from this follows that the principle of individuation cannot be nor the matter, nor the specific form. Therefore, it is the quantity. The same conclusion is confirmed by Boethius,<sup>74</sup> who writes that the individual difference is caused by the accidents; from this, indeed, follows that the principle of individuation is the quantity, because it constitutes the first accident.<sup>75</sup>
6. There is no distinction among the individuals of a same species that is



caused by the essential difference; as a consequence, every distinction should depend on an accidental difference; now, the first accident is the quantity, which is, therefore, the principle of individuation.<sup>76</sup>

7. The specific form is multiplied in so far as it is received in different matters; now, every material difference is originated by the quantity; therefore, the quantity constitutes the root (*radix*) of every individual distinction.<sup>77</sup>
8. The parts of the water that are separated from each other are numerically distinct; but, this distinction arises from the quantity; therefore, the quantity is the principle both of the multiplicity and the distinction of the individuals belonging to the same species.<sup>78</sup>

Let's come to Schautheet's replies.

His answer to the first argument is grounded on a distinction: the matter is not an adequate, but only an inadequate principle of individuation<sup>79</sup>. The fact that the matter is a principle of individuation, though an inadequate one, stems from the following statement:

an individual material substance (in so far as it is composed of matter and form) receives its complete being from the matter and the form. Consequently, its unity and its distinction are not caused only by the form, but also by the matter.<sup>80</sup>

This is what explains why, according to Aristotle, the individuation depends more on the matter than on the form. Indeed, the matter is the last and the adequate subject of the sensible accidents, which are a kind of signs through which we acknowledge the unity and the individual distinction of the substances.<sup>81</sup> However, in spite of this, matter is not an adequate principle of individuation. This becomes clear if one considers that the rational souls differ each other only numerically;<sup>82</sup> but, given that the generic and specific differences come from the form, why should not the individual difference be grounded on the form, too?<sup>83</sup> As regards the argument alleged by Aristotle in his *Physics* to prove that there is only one first mover, it is not rooted on the thesis that the matter is required in order to multiply the first movers. It is only a probable argument aiming to argue that the first mover, in so far as it is devoid of matter, cannot be subjected, unlike the bodies, to corruption, and, as a consequence, can move for the eternity.<sup>84</sup>

To the second argument, grounded on the authority of Porphyry, Schautheet objects that the accidents cannot be an intrinsic principle of individuation. If God destroyed the accidents of a substance, this substance would still be an individual.<sup>85</sup> Therefore, they can only be an extrinsic principle of individuation; to put the same things differently, the accidents can be a principle of individuation not in themselves, but with respect to us only, in so far as we are used to distinguish the individual things by their accidents.<sup>86</sup> As regards, finally, the confirmation of the argument, Schautheet argues that the individuals of the same species do not differ in their common nature only if this is considered as an individualized nature; nevertheless, they differ in their common nature *absolute considerata*.<sup>87</sup>

Schautheet formulates a similar answer in his reply to the third argument. The

fact that the things distinguished only numerically do not differ formally is true only if we speak about the *forma absolute considerata*. On the contrary, if we consider the form as individualized, this is false: indeed, the soul of John is numerically distinguished from the soul of Peter by its own entity, which is the form.<sup>88</sup>

Against the fourth argument, Schautheet objects that the rational souls are numerically distinct. And it is false to argue that the multiplication of the individuals of a same species is in order to conserve the species; on the contrary, the preservation of the species is only a partial cause, not an adequate one, of the plurality of the individuals belonging to a same species.<sup>89</sup>

As regards the fifth argument, Schautheet explains that the formal distinction of the individuals of the same species is twofold: the first comes from the form simply and specifically considered; the second is grounded on the form in so far as it is a singular thing and exists in act. The first is called simply formal (*formalis citra additum*), the second is called formal in some respects (*formalis secundum quid*). Now, the first distinction, unlike the second, does not concern the individuals of the same species.<sup>90</sup> Against the confirmation of the fifth argument, Schautheet objects that the *radix* of the individual distinction is to be identified both with the form (as singular one) and the matter. And, as regards the accidents, they are only an extrinsic principle of the individuation; Boethius's claim that the individual difference comes from the accidents must therefore be understood only in the sense that the accidents manifest the distinction of the individual substance, whose intrinsic principle remains, nevertheless, unknown.<sup>91</sup>

In line with this, Schautheet argues, in his reply to the sixth argument, that the individuals of the same nature are distinguished by the essential differences belonging to each individual; now, that this difference is an essential and not an accidental one follows from the fact that the substantial individuals, unlike the accidental composites, are directly included within the predicament of the substance.<sup>92</sup>

Concerning the seventh argument, Schautheet claims that the numerical distinction of the souls cannot be explained by their reception in the matter: indeed, when separated from their own bodies, the rational souls continue to be numerically distinguished. On the contrary, their distinction depends on the intrinsic perfection of the souls.<sup>93</sup>

Finally, as regards the eighth argument, the parts of the water separated from each other would continue to be distinguished numerically even if their quantities are destroyed. As a consequence, an intrinsic principle is required in order to explain their individuation.<sup>94</sup>

If one examines all the arguments and the counterarguments formulated by Schautheet, it is clear that the principle of individuation is taken in three senses: [1] as the constitutive principle; [2] as the distinctive principle (i.e., what distinguishes a thing from another one); [3] as the numerical difference (or individual one). According to Schautheet, the distinctive principle and the constitutive one are identical, in so far as what distinguishes a thing from another one must be an internal and, at the same time, constitutive principle; on this premise are grounded, in the first article, the fifth argument of the first *conclusio* and the second and the sixth of the second conclusion.<sup>95</sup> The principle of individuation means here something substantial, that belongs to the

individual substance and is not added to it; a principle that constitutes and differentiates substantially one thing from another one, as it is clear, for example, in the second, in the fourth and in the ninth arguments for the first conclusion.<sup>96</sup>

The third sense of the principle of individuation is the numerical difference. According to Schautheet, this is the “root of numerical distinction” (see the first argument for the first conclusion in the first article and the reply to first argument supporting Thomistic position in the third article)<sup>97</sup> and the “root of individual distinction” (see the seventh argument supporting Thomistic position in the second article and the reply to fifth argument supporting Thomistic position in third article).<sup>98</sup>

### Schautheet and Leibniz

As we have seen, Leibniz's *Disputatio* is influenced by the account of Jakob Thomasius, who is also the author of the introduction. In his Preface Thomasius asserts he wants to give an historical presentation of the problem of individuation – or, more precisely, a brief narration (*brevis narratio*).<sup>99</sup> However, his point of view seems to be not a neutral one at all.<sup>100</sup> In fact, he goes so far as to criticize the Aristotelian-Thomistic doctrine of individuation.<sup>101</sup> He shows a preference for the Scotist one, and finally he supports only the Nominalistic solution.<sup>102</sup>

Though endorsing, as his teacher did, the Nominalistic solution, differently from Thomasius, Leibniz does not focus on the Thomistic thesis that distinguishes between two principles of individuation, one for the bodies and the other for the Angels. In spite of Thomasius's account, Leibniz addresses (and criticizes) the Scotist solution, which according to him is an “hypothesis applicable to all individuals”, both material and non-material. In doing so, Leibniz abstracts “from the material and non-material substance” and deals only with the “general” opinions.<sup>103</sup>

Despite the difference between these two accounts, nevertheless, it is clear that Thomasius and Leibniz share a common strategy<sup>104</sup> aiming at dissolve the intricate problems that arise from the Scholastic disputes on the individuation.<sup>105</sup> This explains why they endorse the Nominalistic solution: it allows to solve the *quaestio* on the individuation by means of a very simple (*simplicissima*) and correct solution (*verissima decisio*) that they oppose as such to the Thomists and Scotists.<sup>106</sup>

Let's turn now, more precisely, to Leibniz's text, in order to make a comparison between Leibniz's and Schautheet's solutions. As we can see, Leibniz distinguishes four sentences concerning the principle of individuation, according to which the principle of individuation is: 1) The *tota entitas* (“whole entity”); 2) A negation;<sup>107</sup> 3) The existence;<sup>108</sup> 4) The *haecceitas*.<sup>109</sup>

According to the first opinion, the principle of individuation is the *tota entitas*. Now, it is precisely this opinion that Leibniz endorses:

the first opinion [...] will be adopted by us [...]. Therefore, I maintain: every individual is individuated by its whole entity.<sup>110</sup>

In doing so, he claims to agree with other *gravissimi* men:

it is held by the most distinguished men.<sup>111</sup>

The list of the authorities referred by Leibniz is impressive. He appeals to Peter Auriol (1280-1322) – whose thesis, as Leibniz remembers, is criticized by John Capreolus – and Hervé de Nédellec († 1323). Leibniz observes that Soncinas († 1494) qualifies these authors as *terministae* or *nominales*. And indeed, as Leibniz claims, this opinion is held by Gregory of Rimini, Gabriel Biel, and, in addition, by a *recentior nominalis*, Schautheet, who quotes all these authors. However, Leibniz also refers to other authorities: Durandus of Saint-Pourçain and Francisco Murcia de la Llana († 1639), but also Francisco Suárez, Marcantonio Zimara (1475-1532), Benet Perera, Abraham Calov (1612-1686), Daniel Stahl (1585-1654).<sup>112</sup>

In spite of Leibniz's reference to the authority of Schautheet in support of his own account on the individuation, the analysis I proposed above both of the arguments discussed by Schautheet and his final answers shows a substantial analogy with Leibniz's position, with few exceptions. Indeed, if Leibniz agrees with Schautheet in claiming that the entity or nature of a thing (that Schautheet calls the "whole nature" and Leibniz the "whole entity") is the cause and the reason of its actual existence and individuality, nevertheless his approach is slightly different from the one proposed by Schautheet.

This is clear if one considers Leibniz's preliminary remarks concerning the *status quaestionis*. According to Leibniz, the principle of individuation is basically a physical principle. This is the definition that he reaches after distinguishing the different meanings of the terms 'individual', 'principle' and 'principle of individuation'.<sup>113</sup> Firstly, he defines the *individuum* as a universal having either a logical sense (as it is *in ordine ad praedicationem*) or a metaphysical one (as it is *in ordine ad rem*), pointing out that the individual may be according to the thing (*in re*) or according to the concept (*in conceptu*), namely *fundamentaliter* (i.e., *in re*) or *formaliter* (i.e., *in conceptu*). He distinguishes different ways in which the individual can be understood *formaliter*, i.e., [1] "in terms of every individual, or [2] in terms of only created substances, or [3] in terms of substance, or [4] in terms of just material substance."<sup>114</sup> Secondly, he deals with the principle and he differentiates the principle of being from the principle of knowledge and divides the principle of being in an internal and an external one.<sup>115</sup> Thirdly, he points out he is going to deal only with the physical principle of individuation.<sup>116</sup> After considering the different meanings of the terms 'individual', 'principle' and 'principle of individuation', Leibniz provides the following definition of the principle of individuation:

Wherefore, to summarize the foregoing, we treat of something real and what is called a "physical principle", which would serve as the foundation in the mind of the formal notion of 'individual', understood either as individuation or numerical difference. We shall treat primarily of the principle in the case of created and substantial individuals.<sup>117</sup>

Leibniz qualifies the individual as "something real". In this way, he does not consider the logical sense of individual, since he deals especially with the physical principle of individuation *fundamentaliter* (not *formaliter*) taken, i.e., understood as the *fundamentum*, in our mind, of the formal notion of 'individual'. In addition, he keeps

into account only the second and third of the four senses in which the individual may be considered *formaliter*, i.e., as created substance and as individual substance.

Leibniz's preliminary remarks show some differences with respect to Schautheet's account. Indeed, as we have seen, Schautheet acknowledges the existence of two principles of individuation: one internal, which is twofold and consists in the "whole nature of whatever thing existing" and in "the individual difference", and one external consisting in the "sensible accidents". Moreover, he intends to address primarily the internal (i.e., logical and physical) principle of individuation.<sup>118</sup>

Therefore, if Schautheet considers both the logical and the physical principles, Leibniz speaks of one principle only (the physical one). Indeed, leaving aside the logical principle of individuation, he focuses only on 'general solutions' (namely, the Scotist ones) considering all the individuals as really existing, independently from the difference between material and non-material substances.

### Conclusion

In this article, I have analysed the Fifth Controversy of Schautheet's second book, containing his criticism to the Thomistic position on the principle of individuation. My purpose has been to address Schautheet's criticism of the Thomistic thesis of the *materia signata*. Even though Schautheet is not very famous nowadays, he was not so unknown in the second half of the Seventeenth Century. In his *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, Leibniz claims to accept the Nominalistic account of the individuation and appeals, among others, to Schautheet's authority, presenting him as a *recentior nominalis*.

It is Schautheet himself, in the Preface of his work, who makes explicit his endorsement of the doctrines of the *nominales* and, particularly, of Gregory of Rimini (the *antesignanus* of *nominales*). Schautheet's criticism of the Thomistic thesis that the principle of individuation is the designated matter constitutes an essential step of his Nominalistic strategy, together with his criticism of Scotus's thesis (developed by Schautheet in the Sixth Controversy). Indeed, like Leibniz, he endorses a Nominalistic approach in simplifying the terms of the question; this is particularly clear in his reduction of the principle of individuation, strictly considered, to the whole nature – or to the individual difference.

However, Schautheet's debt to Gregory seems to be actually negligible: as we have seen above (§ 2), there are no quotations from Gregory's work. In spite of the declarations of the Preface, the doctrine of Gregory does not seem to play a significant role in Schautheet's Fifth Controversy.

In this article, I have only focused on Schautheet's criticism against Thomas and his followers and this is the only one passage of the *Controversiae* to which Leibniz refers. In doing so, I have followed in my *exposé* the articulation of Schautheet's Fifth Controversy; then, I have proposed a comparison with Leibniz's account on the individuation.

My analysis has shown a substantial convergence between Schautheet's and Leibniz's account. Indeed, both Schautheet and Leibniz think that the principle of individuation, strictly considered, constitutes a physical and intrinsic principle. Nevertheless, unlike Schautheet, who distinguishes two principles (one logical and the

other physical) and takes them into account by defining the principle of individuation, Leibniz recognizes only an intrinsic and physical principle of individuation, leaving aside the external and logical principle of individuation.

## References

- <sup>1</sup> See Gracia, J. J. E., “The Legacy of the Early Middle Ages”, in *Individuation in Scholasticism. The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation 1150-1650*, ed. J. J. E. Gracia (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 21-38.
- <sup>2</sup> The fifth (*De unitate individuali eiusque principio*) of the fifty-four Suárez’s *Metaphysicae Disputationes* (1597) is composed of nine sections. Suárez’s solutio is given in the sixth section. See Suárez, F., *Metaphysicae Disputationes*, disp. V, sec. VI, §1, in *Opera omnia* (Paris: Vivès, 1861), vol. 25, 180a: “Ex hactenus dictis contra superiores sententias videtur quasi a sufficienti partium enumeratione relinqui omnem substantiam singularem [se ipsa, seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem] neque alio indigere individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia intrinseca quibus eius entitas constat. Nam, si talis substantia, physice considerata, simplex sit, ex se et sua simplici entitate est individua; si vero sit composita, verbi gratia, ex materia et forma unitis, sicut principia entitatis eius sunt materia, forma et unio earum, ita eadem in individuo sumpta sunt principia individuationis eius; illa vero, cum sint simplicia, seipsis individua erunt”.
- <sup>3</sup> For a detailed analysis of Leibniz’s *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, see McCullough, L. B., *Leibniz on Individuals and Individuation. The Persistence of Premodern Ideas in Modern Philosophy* (Dordrecht: Springer, 1996); Cover, J. A.- O’Leary-Hawthorne, J., *Substance and Individuation in Leibniz* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), esp. 26-50; Ariew, R., “Leibniz’s Metaphysical Disputation on the Principle of Individuation: A Scholastic Exercise”, in *‘Nil sine ratione’. Akten des VII Leibniz-Kongress*, ed. H. Poser (Berlin: Leibniz-Gesellschaft, 2001), 33-40; Ariew, R., “Descartes, Leibniz, and Some Scholastics on The Principle of Individuation”, in *Branching off. The Early Moderns in Quest for the Unity of Knowledge*, ed. V. Alexandrescu (Bucharest: Zeta Books, 2009), 95-115, esp. 98-108.
- <sup>4</sup> On the persistence of medieval terminology and concepts in Early Modern Age, see Gregory, T., *Origini della terminologia filosofica moderna. Linee di ricerca*, (Florence: Olschki, 2006).
- <sup>5</sup> Thomasius, J., *Origo controversiae de principio individuationis* (1663), A VI-1, 5-8.
- <sup>6</sup> Di Bella, S., *The Science of the Individual: Leibniz’s Ontology of Individual Substance* (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), 25.
- <sup>7</sup> Ariew, R., (2009), 100: “It should be emphasized that, in this process, no premium would be given for originality, especially on the part of the degree candidate. Another way of putting the point is that if Thomasius had preferred the Scotist position over that of the Nominalists, Leibniz would surely have done the same”.
- <sup>8</sup> Born in Dendermonde on 3th December 1623 and dead on 25th September 1708, Schautheet studied in the College of the Augustinians Fathers. He took vows under the name Fulgentius. He obtained the licentiate in theology and he taught in Antwerp. From 1676 to 1678 he was prior at Dendermonde, at Bruges and at Louvain. When he died, he was a jubilaire. See *Biographie nationale, publiée par l’Académie Royale des sciences, des lettres et des beaux-arts de Belgique* (Bruxelles: Établissement Émile Bruylant, 1911-1913), vol. 21, 602.
- <sup>9</sup> Schautheet, F., *Controversiae philosophicae inter scholasticorum principes D. Thomam, Ioannem Scotum et Gregorium Ariminensem Nominalium antesignanum* (Antverpiae: apud Iacobum Mesium, 1660).
- <sup>10</sup> Leibniz, G.W., *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, § 4, A VI-1, 11, l. 32-12, l. 1: “Quos adducit recentior Nominalis Schautheet l. 2 Contr. 5 artic. 1””; transl. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 100.
- <sup>11</sup> Courtine, J.-F., (1990), *Suarez et le système de la métaphysique*, Paris, Vrin, 1990, (ch. 5 : “Le

problème de l'individuation de Suarez à Leibniz") 498, n. 9: "Cet auteur est resté inconnu de tous les éditeurs et traducteurs du texte qui le passent pudiquement sous silence. Il s'agit en réalité de Fulgentius Schauthet, augustinien belge – assez obscur au demeurant – qui publie à Anvers en 1660 des *Controversiae inter scholasticorum principes D. Thomam, Scotum et Gregorium Ariminensem*". But see, now, Caroti, S., "Leibniz e i modi", in *Cristianesimo, teologia, filosofia. Studi in onore di Alberto Siclari*, ed. F. Rossi (Milano: Franco Angeli, 2010), 63-76, esp. 75-76; "Leibniz und einige Quellen aus dem Mittelalter und der Renaissance", in *Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese sum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet*, ed. A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2008), 392-417, esp. 415.

<sup>12</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), *Praefatio*: "Complectitur hoc opus octoginta Controversias inter Excellentissimos Scholarum Principes D. Thomam, Ioannem Scotum, et Gregorium Ariminensem, cuius vestigiis passim inhaesimus, haud necessitate aliqua: sed libera voluntate, quod is omnem suam doctrinam duobus potissimum axiomatibus [...] firmissimis velut basibus stabiliverit ac roborarit".

<sup>13</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), *Praefatio*: "Deo est possibile, quidquid non involvit contradictionem: et amplectenda est paucitas, quando non occurrit plura ponendi necessitas". In this article the translations from Latin are mine, except specified passages.

<sup>14</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), *Praefatio*: "Quod genus Philosophorum non de nominis rixatur (id enim imperiti assuevere Grammatici) ast rerum paucitatem cum pluralitate nominum componit, asseverat, tueturque".

<sup>15</sup> See, for instance, as regards Gregory of Rimini and his 'Nominalism', Trapp, D., "Augustinian Theology of the 14th Century. Notes on Editions, Marginalia, opinions and Book-Lore", *Augustiniana* 6 (1956), 146-274, esp. 182-90; "Gregorio de Rimini y el nominalismo", *Augustinianum* 4/1 (March 1964), 5-20. More in general, as regards Nominalism, see Vignaux, P., "Nominalisme", in *Dictionnaire de théologie catholique* (Paris: Letouzey et Ané, 1931), t. 11, 717-784; "La problématique du nominalisme médiéval peut-elle éclairer des problèmes philosophiques actuels?", *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. Quatrième série, 75/26 (1977), 293-331; Oberman, H. A., "Some Notes on the Theology of Nominalism with Attention to its Relation to the Renaissance", *Harvard Theological Review*, 53 (1960), 47-76; *The Harvest of Medieval Theology. Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval Nominalism*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963), and, more recently, Courtenay, W. J., *Ockham and Ockhamism: Studies in the Dissemination and Impact of His Thought*, (Boston, MA.: Brill Academic Publishers, 2008).

<sup>16</sup> Riezler, S. (ed.), *Johannes Turmair's genannt Aventinus Sämtliche Werke* (Munich: Kaiser, 1881-1908), vols. 6 (vols. 2-3: Aventinus, J., *Annales ducum Boiariae*).

<sup>17</sup> Denifle, H.,-Chatelain, A. (eds.), *Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis* II, 1, nr. 1097, n. 1 (Paris: Delalain, 1891), 557: "Notum est Gregorium partes Nominales tenuisse; imo eorum antesignanus una cum Marsilio de Inghen et Johanne Buridano ab Aventino designatur (*Ann. ducum Boiariae*, lib. 6 c. 3, ed. Riezler, II, 200)". See, Aventinus, J., *Annales ducum Boiariae*, book VI, ch. 3, in Riezler, S. (ed.), *Johannes Turmair's genannt Aventinus Sämtliche Werke*, (Munich: Kaiser, 1884), vol. 2, 200.

<sup>18</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, 261-275.

<sup>19</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 6, 275-289.

<sup>20</sup> Leibniz, G.W., *Disputatio metaphysica de principio individui*, § 4, A VI-1, 11, l. 32-12, l. 1. See supra, n. 10.

<sup>21</sup> For Aquinas's doctrine on the principle of individuation as matter designated by quantity (*materia signata quantitate*), see: Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 77 a. 2 co., in *Opera omnia, iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum*, (Rome: 1882-), t. 12 (1906), 196b; *De ente et essentia*, c. 2, in *Opera omnia, iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, t. 43 (Rome: 1976), 371a, ll. 67-84; *Super libros Boethii De Trinitate*, c. 4, a. 2, in *Opera omnia, iussu*

*impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita*, t. 50 (Rome: 1992), 122a-126b. The bibliography is immense: see, at least, Bobik, J., “La doctrine de saint Thomas sur l’individuation des substances corporelles”, in *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, 51 (1953), 5-41; Klinger, I., *Das Prinzip der Individuation bei Thomas von Aquin: Versuch einer Interpretation und Vergleich mit zwei umstrittenen Opuscula*, (Münsterschwarzach : Vier-Türme-Verlag, 1964); Degl’Innocenti, U., *Il principio d’individuazione nella scuola tomistica*, (Roma: Libreria Ed. PUL, 1971); Owens, J., “Thomas Aquinas: Dimensive Quantity as Individuating Principle”, in *Medieval Studies*, 50 (1988), 279-310; Brown, M., “St. Thomas Aquinas and the Individuation of Persons”, in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 65 (1991), 29-44; Caspar, P., “Thomas d’Aquin a-t-il tenté d’exprimer le principe d’individuation à l’intérieur des propriétés transcendentales de l’être?”, in *Aquinas*, 34 (1991), 41-50; Coulter, G.J., “St. Thomas Aquinas on Explaining Individuality”, in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 65 (1991), Ann. Suppl., 169-78; White, K., “Individuation in Aquinas’s *Super Boetium De Trinitate* Q. 4”, in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly*, 69 (1995), 543-56; Aertsen, J.A., *Die Thesen zur Individuation in der Verurteilung von 1277, Heinrich von Gent und Thomas von Aquin*, in Aertsen, J. A.-Speer, A. (eds.), *Individuum und Individualität im Mittelalter*, (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1995), 249-265; Hughes, C.T., “Matter and Individuation in Aquinas”, in *History of Philosophy Quarterly*, 13 (1996), 1-13.

<sup>22</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1: 261-269.

<sup>23</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2: 269-271.

<sup>24</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3: 271-275.

<sup>25</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 261-62: “An principium individuationis et distinctionis, qua unum singulare differt ab alio eiusdem secum speciei, sit quantitas, aut materia signata quantitate?”

<sup>26</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5 (*Conclusio* 1: 262-265), a. 1, 262: “Quantitas non est principium individuationis”.

<sup>27</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5 (*Conclusio* 2: 262-269), a. 1, 262: “Materia signata quantitate non est principium individuationis”.

<sup>28</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262: “Ita Greg. Arim. l. 1 sent. dist. 17 q. 4, art. 1, Gabriel Biel in 2 dist. 3, q. 1, Durandus ibidem q. 3, Pererius l. 6, Physic. c. 9 et 11 ac communiter recentiores confirm.”. See Gregorius Ariminensis, *Super primum*, dist. 17, q. 4, in *Lectura super primum et secundum Sententiarium*, ed. A.D Trapp, V. Marcolino, M. Santos-Noya (Berlin-New-York: De Gruyter, 1982), t. II, 367-387; Biel, G., *Collectorium circa quattuor libros Sententiarum*, ed. W. Werbeck, U. Hofmann (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1984), book 2, 114-117; Durandus a Sancto Porciano, *In Petri Lombardi Sententias Theologicas Commentariorum Libri IV* (Venetiis: 1571), book 2, dist. 3, q. 2-3, 136v-138r; Benedictus Pererius, *De communibus omnium rerum naturalium principiis et affectionibus Libri quindecim*, (Coloniae: Sumptibus Lazari Zetzneri, 1595), book 6, ch. 9 and 11, 365-367, 369-371.

<sup>29</sup> Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4, A VI-1, 11, l. 32-12, l. 10.

<sup>30</sup> See, esp., Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262. Like Schauthet, also Leibniz refers to the fourth quaestio in Gregorius Ariminensis, *Super primum*, dist. 17 and to the first quaestio in Gabriel Biel, *Super secundum*, dist. 3. See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4, A VI-1, 11, l. 31-32. See *supra*, n. 28.

<sup>31</sup> See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4, A VI-1, 11, l. 31-32. See *supra*, n. 28 and 30.

<sup>32</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262: “Substantia singularis est prior quantitate: ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Patet conseq. posterius nequit esse principium constitutum, et distinctivum prioris. Prob. antec. subiectum est prius forma: atqui substantia singularis est subiectum quantitatis”.

<sup>33</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262: “Substantia individua ponitur directe in praedicamento: et enim substantia praedicamentalis distribuitur in primam et secundam: ergo



quantitas non est principium individuationis”.

<sup>34</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262: “Si datur oppositum, substantia individua erit compositum per accidens, et consequenter non ponetur directe in categoria substantiae. Confirm. substantia individua est ens per se, et species praedicatur de illa in quid: ergo quantitas non est principium individuae substantiae. Prob. conseq. si quantitas esset principium substantiae individuae: substantia prima erit compositum per accidens, et secunda non praedicabitur in quid de prima: nam pars Physica nequit praedicari in quid de suo toto”.

<sup>35</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263: “Id quo ablato manet individuum, non est principium individuationis: atqui Ioannes v.g. destructa (per Deum) sola quantitate maneret individuum: ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Prob. mi. impossibile est aliquam substantiam immutatam substantialiter desinere esse hanc et singularem”.

<sup>36</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263: “Ioannes destructa quantitate esset substantia, non secunda et universalis: ergo prima et singularis [...]. Confir. 2 Ioannes destructa quantitate esset sub specie hominis, et differret realiter a Petro: ergo Ioannes destructa quantitate maneret individuum”.

<sup>37</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263: “Si quantitas foret principium individuationis, Joannes et Petrus solum different accidentaliter, et destructa quantitate non distinguerentur: quod manifeste falsum est”.

<sup>38</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263: “Animae rationales separatae a corpore distinguuntur solo numero: atqui in illis non est quantitas: ergo quantitas non est principium unitatis et distinctionis individualis. Patet conseq. principium distinctionis debet inesse illi rei, quam facit ab aliis differre: uti constat inductione. Confir. Idem est principium constitutivum rei in suo esse, et distinctivum ab aliis: atqui anima rationalis non constituitur in suo esse per quantitatem: ergo etiam per eam non distinguitur”.

<sup>39</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263-264: “Quod convertitur cum ente et de omnibus eisdem praedicatur, non dicit quid rebus, quibus tribuitur superadditum: atqui individuum convertitur cum ente a parte rei existente, et praedicatur de omnibus, quibus ens tribuitur: ergo individuum non differt a rebus singularibus: ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Patet ult. conseq. si datur oppositum, individuum erit compositum ex quantitate et substantia: et consequenter distingueretur inadaequate a substantia singulari”.

<sup>40</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 264: “Generatio substantialis terminatur per se ad substantiam singularem, quae est ens re unum: ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Prob. conseq. si quantitas est principium individuationis, generatio substantialis terminabitur ad quantitatem, et substantia individua erit ens per accidens: quod non potest non esse absurdum”.

<sup>41</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 264: “Qualitas potest divina virtute existere sine quantitate: uti de facto in Vener. Euchar. Existit quantitas sine substantia”; “illud nequit esse principium individui, quo non existente potest esse individuum: quemadmodum illud nequit esse principium hominis, quo non existente est homo”.

<sup>42</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 264: “Per idem res est individua et existens: atqui res existit per suam essentiam: nam essentia et existentia a parte rei non differunt [...] ergo etiam est individua per suam essentiam: ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Patet ma. res per suam entitatem est actu in rerum natura, et diversa ab aliis eiusdem secum speciei”.

<sup>43</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 265: “Duo accidentia solo numero distincta possunt divinitus eidem simul inesse quemadmodum probatum est l. 5. contro. 10 a. 1, ergo quantitas non est principium individuationis. Prob. conseq. si quantitas est principium individuationis, duo accidentia illi inexistencia erunt plura: ut supponitur, et simul unum individuum: nam ab eodem principio formali promanat idem effectus formalis”. In supporting

this claim, Schautheet refers to article 1 of the Tenth Controversy of the fifth book: see, for instance, Schautheet, F., (1660), book 5, cont. 10, a. 1, 901: “Plures calores insunt successive eidem aquae, ergo et simul possunt eidem inesse divinitus”.

<sup>44</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, (*Conclusio 2*) 265-269.

<sup>45</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 265: “Ita Greg. Arim. et alii Authores, quos prima conclusione adduximus. Roboratur”. See supra, n. 28.

<sup>46</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 265: “Quantitas non est principium individuationis: ergo nec materia signata quantitate, antec. supra probatum est. Patet conseq. rationes quibus prima conclusione ostensum est, quantitatem non esse principium individuationis: etiam valent ad probandum radicem distinctionis numericae non esse materiam signatam quantitate”.

<sup>47</sup> See (above) the first and the fifth arguments of the first conclusion: Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262-263.

<sup>48</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263: “Idem est principium constitutivum rei in suo esse, et distinctivum ab aliis”.

<sup>49</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 265-266: “Duae animae rationales destructis (divina virtute) suis materiis signatis quantitate distinguerentur solo numero: atqui harum distinctio non oriretur ex materia signata quantitate: ergo principium individuationis non est materia signata quantitate. [...] Confir. 1. Distinctio non potest fundari in aliquo extrinseco: atqui materia signata quantitate est extrinseca animis intellectivis ergo etc. Prob. ma. idem est principium constitutivum et distinctivum: atqui res nequit constitui in suo esse per aliquid extrinsecum. Confir. 2 duae animae sunt in se ipsis distinctae, non specie: ergo numero: ergo principium distinctionis numericae non est materia signata quantitate. Patet conseq. animae non habent in se ipsis materiam signatam quantitate”.

<sup>50</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 266: “Omnes animae intellectivae sunt aptae informare quamlibet materiam sufficienter dispositam: ergo distinctio animarum non fundatur in materia signata quantitate. Patet conseq. si diversitas animarum desumeretur a materia: quaelibet anima tantum posse informare unam materiam”.

<sup>51</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 266: “Duae animae rationales differunt numero per materias, quas respiciunt: vel per id quo respiciunt diversas materias: si primum: ergo destructis materiis desinit distinctio: nam cessantem causam cessat effectus: ergo animae secundum se non distinguuntur: nam tantum differunt per materias, quae sunt extra essentiam animarum: si secundum: ergo principium individuationis non est materia signata quantitate: nam animae se ipsis, vel per quid sibi intrinsecum respiciunt diversas materias”.

<sup>52</sup> See, in the *Biblia sacra: quid in hac editione a theologis Lovaniensibus praestitum sit, eorum praefatio indicat*, (Antverpiae: Ex officina Christophori Plantini, 1583), IV *Regum* 6, 28: “Mulier ista dixit mihi, Da filium tuum, ut comedamus eum hodie, et filium meum comedemus cras”.

<sup>53</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 266-267: “Duae animae intellectivae informant successive eandem materiam eadem quantitate sigillatam: ergo materia quantitate non est principium individuationis. Patet conseq. eodem principio individuationis nequeunt constitui diversa individua. Prob. antec. Dum Samaria obsideretur a Syris, matres comederunt suas proles: ut dicitur I. 4 regum c. 6, ergo materia signata eadem quantitate fuit successive informata anima prolis et matris”.

<sup>54</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 267: “Deus potuit creare animas ante corpora: id enim non involuit contradictionem: ergo materia signata quantitate non est principium individuationis. Prob. conseq. animae creatae ante corpora essent aptae corpora essent aptae uniri cuilibet corpori disposito, et Deus pro suo arbitrio posset quamlibet animam cuilibet corpori infundere: ergo principium individuationis animarum non est materia. Patet conseq. principium distinctionis non est commune rebus, quae distinguuntur: nam distinctio est per

propria, uti constat inductione: ergo etc. Confir. sicuti Deus libere ordinavit, ut anima rationalis, quae est in Ioanne, uniretur materiae A. Ita etiam statuere potuit, ut eadem illa anima uniretur materiae B, ergo anima quae est in Ioanne, non est haec et individua: quia est in hac materia: potuit enim infundi alteri: et consequenter materia non est principium individuationis”.

<sup>55</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 267-268: “Possunt esse plures angeli sub eadem specie [...]: ergo materia signata quantitate non est principium individuationis. Patet conseq. si materia esset principium individuationis, non possent esse plures angeli sub eadem specie. Confir. hic articulus: Deus non potest individua multiplicare sub eadem specie sine materia: est condemnatus ante annos 340 a Doctoribus Parisiensibus: ergo etc.”. Schautheet refers to the Sixth Controversy of the fifth book, whereas he demonstrates this sentence. See Schautheet, F., (1660), book 5, cont. 6 (*An possit esse plures sub eadem specie?*), a. 1, 869: “Deus potest produce plures Angelos sub eadem specie infima”.

<sup>56</sup> It constitutes the article 96 – Piché, D. (ed.), *La condamnation parisienne de 1277*, (Paris: Vrin, 1999), 108: “Quod deus non potest multiplicare individua sub una specie sine materia” – of the Condemnation of 1277 by the Bishop of Paris, Étienne Tempier. On this subject, see Hissette, R. (ed.), *Enquête sur les 219 articles condamnés à Paris le 7 mars 1277* (Louvain-Paris: Publications Universitaires- Vander-Oyez, 1977); Piché, D. (ed.), (1999).

<sup>57</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 268: “Eidem materiae aquae eadem quantitate signatae insunt diverso tempore calores numero distincti: aqua enim destructo calore quem modo habet, potest rursus calefieri: ergo materia signata quantitate, non est principium individuationis. Patet conseq. si materia esset principium individuationis, duo calores diverso tempore inexistentis eidem aquae non differrent numero: quia haberent idem individuationis principium”.

<sup>58</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 268: “Aquae ebullienti insunt simul plures gradus caloris eiusdem speciei: animae hominis iusti inexistent simul plures partes gratiae solo numero diversae: nam qualitas intenditur per additionem partis eiusdem rationis cum forma praesistente. Quemadmodum probatum est l. 3 contro. 7 art. 4, ergo materia signata quantitate non est principium individuationis”. Here Schautheet refers to the Seventh Controversy, art. 4 of the third book. See Schautheet, F., (1660), book 3, cont. 5, a. 4, 606-612; at 606 (conclusio 1): “Qualitas tam spiritualis quam materialis intenditur per additionem gradus seu partis eiusdem rationis et speciei cum forma praesistente”.

<sup>59</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 268: “Unaquaeque res per illud idem a parte rei est formaliter et intrinsece una numero, per quod est ens actu, et in rerum natura: atqui res est actu, non per materiam signatam quantitate: nam sine hac possunt (divina virtute) existere formae, tam substantiales, quam accidentales: ergo materia signata quantitate non est principium individuationis”.

<sup>60</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 268-269: “Petes quid sit individuationis principium? Resp. individuationis principium esse duplex externum scilicet et internum: externum sunt accidentia sensibilia, quibus veluti signis diversitatem individuorum solemus cognoscere internum aliud Logicum aliud Physicum, hoc est tota cuiuslibet rei existentis natura: illud est differentia individualis, qua species sic contrahitur (modo nostro concipiendi) ad individuum: uti genus per differentiam communem ad speciem”.

<sup>61</sup> Thomas de Aquino, *Summa theologiae*, III, q. 77 a. 2 co., in *Opera omnia, iussu impensaue Leonis XIII P.M. edita, cura et studio fratrum praedicatorum*, (Rome: 1882–), t. 12 (1906), 196b: “Quantum igitur ad primum, materia est individuationis principium omnibus formis inhaerentibus, quia, cum huiusmodi formae, quantum est de se, sint natae in aliquo esse sicut in subiecto, ex quo aliqua earum recipitur in materia, quae non est in alio, iam nec ipsa forma sic existens potest in alio esse. Quantum autem ad secundum, dicendum est quod individuationis principium est

quantitas dimensiva”.

<sup>62</sup> Aegidius Romanus, *Quodlibeta*, (Lovanii: Typis Hieronymi Nempaei, 1646), quod. I, dist. IV, q. 11, 23b-25a.

<sup>63</sup> Ioannes Capreolus, *Defensiones theologiae Divi Thomae Aquinatis* (1484), dist. III, q. 1, a. 1 (concl. 2) in Caban, C.-Pègus, T. (eds.), (Tours: Cattier, 1900-1909, 7 vols.), vol. 3, 200b-202b.

<sup>64</sup> Paulus Soncinas, *Quaestiones metaphysicales acutissime*, (Lugduni: Apud Carolum Pesnot, 1579), book VII, qq. 34-35, 151a-153b.

<sup>65</sup> Thomas de Vio, *In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentaria*, ed. M.-H. Laurent (Turin: Marietti, 1934), q. 5, 50-60.

<sup>66</sup> See Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* V, t. 12, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), (anastatic printing: Frankfurt a.M.: Minerva, 1962), vol. 8, 114va: “Et illa, quae sunt unum numero, sunt illa, quorum materia est una”; Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, t. 18, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, 167-168; Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* XII, t. 49, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, 333r-v.

<sup>67</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 269: “Arist. [...] Docet unitatem et distinctionem individualement esse a materia: ergo principium individuationis est materia. Confir. Philosophus l. 8 Phys. inquit primum motorem tantum posse esse unum, quia est expers materiae: ergo principium individuationis est materia”. See Aristoteles, *Physica* IV, t. 53, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 6, 395ra.

<sup>68</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 269-270: “Porphyrius definit individuum per accidentia: ergo accidentia sunt principium individuationis [...] Prob. mi. Individua eiusdem speciei non differunt in natura: ergo solo accidente”.

<sup>69</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 269: “Confir. Principium individuationis est id, quo individua eiusdem speciei distinguuntur: atqui illud non potest esse aliud quam accidens: ergo accidens est principium individuationis”.

<sup>70</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 270: “Quae distinguuntur solo numero, non differunt in forma: et enim differentia secundum formam est specifica: ergo penes materiam: ergo materia est principium individuationis”.

<sup>71</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 270: “In rebus spiritualibus et incorruptilibus non reperitur distinctio individualis: atqui hoc non oritur nisi defectu materiae: ergo principium individuationis est materia. Prob. ma. Multiplicatio individuorum sub eadem specie non intenditur per se a natura: sed solum ordinatur ad speciei conservationem: atqui in rebus spiritualibus et incorruptilibus sufficienter conservatur species in uno individuo: ergo in illis non reperitur distinctio individualis”.

<sup>72</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* III, t. 10, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, 49va.

<sup>73</sup> Aristoteles, *Metaphysica* VII, t. 49, in *Opera cum Averrois commentariis*, (Venetiis: apud Junctas, 1562), vol. 8, 199-200.

<sup>74</sup> See Boethius, *De trinitate* ch. 1, in Stewart, H.F.-Rand, E.K. (eds.), *The Theological Tractates and The Consolation of Philosophy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1968), 6, ll. 24-31. See also PL 64, 1249D.

<sup>75</sup> Schauthet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 270: “Omnis distinctio secundum Arist. l. 3 Metaph. c. 11 est aut secundum formam, aut secundum quantitatem: atqui inter ea quae sunt eiusdem speciei, non est diversitas secundum formam (ea enim specifica ergo secundum quantitatem: ergo quantitas est principium individuationis. Confir. 1. Formae proprium est distinguere, ut dicitur l. 7 Metaph. t. 49 ergo principium individuationis non est materia, aut forma specifica: ergo quantitas. Confir. 2 Boetius affirmat l. de Trinitate differentiam individualement fieri per accidentia: atqui primum accidentium est quantitas: ergo quantitas est principium individuationis”.

<sup>76</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 270: “Individua eiusdem speciei non distinguuntur differentia essentialis: ergo accidentali: ergo principium individuationis est accidens, quod non potest esse aliud quam quantitas”.

<sup>77</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 271: “Forma specifica multiplicatur, quia recipitur in diversas materias: atqui diversitas materiae oritur ex quantitate: ergo quantitas est radix distinctionis individualis”.

<sup>78</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 271: “Partes aquae a se mutuo divisae distinguuntur numero: atqui haec distinctio proficiscitur ex quantitate: ergo quantitas est principium multitudinis, et distinctionis individuorum eiusdem speciei”.

<sup>79</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 271: “Ad 1 argum. Resp. distinguendo consequens: ergo materia est principium individuationis adaequatum, n. conseq. inadaequatum”.

<sup>80</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 271: “individuum substantiae materialis (cum sit compositum ex materia et forma) habet suum esse completum a materia et forma: et consequenter obtinet unitatem et distinctionem, non tantum a forma: sed etiam a materia”.

<sup>81</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 271: “Philosophus adscribit distinctionem individualem potius materiae quam formae: quia materia manifestius cognoscitur quam forma: est enim subiectum proximum et adaequatum accidentium sensibilium, quibus veluti signis unitatem et distinctionem individualem deprehendimus.”.

<sup>82</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 271: “Caeterum materiam non esse adaequatam radicem distinctionis numericae, vel ex hoc manifestum: quod animae rationales in se differant solo numero”.

<sup>83</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272: “Si distinctio generica et specifica desumuntur a forma: cur etiam diversitas individualis non potest fundari in forma?”.

<sup>84</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272: “Philosophus 8 Phys. probat non posse esse plures primos motores, non fundatur in eo: quod requiratur materia ad multiplicationem individualem primorum motorum: sed tantum est probabilis ratio, qua ostendit primum motorem, quia expers materiae, non esse obnoxium defatigationi uti corpora: ideoque per totam aeternitatem movere posse, nec requirere alium qui defatigato aliquando succedat”.

<sup>85</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272: “Principium individuationis intrinsecum (de quo hic est quaestio) nequeunt esse accidentia: quia iis divina virtute sublatis potest manere individuum.”.

<sup>86</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272: “Ad 2 Resp. distinguendo consequens: ergo accidentia sunt principium individuationis intrinsecum, n. conseq. sunt extrinsecum, quoad nos, nostramque notitiam, conc. conseq. Porphy. describens individuorum per accidentia, tradit notas et vestigia distinctionis individualis: et enim per accidentia sensibilia, individua materialia solemus distinguere”.

<sup>87</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272-273: “individua eiusdem e specie non differunt in natura communi abstracta a differentiis individualibus, conc. antec. non differunt in natura: ut est a parte rei haec numero, et singularis, n. antec. licet Joannes et Petrus non distinguantur in natura humana absolute considerata: nihilominus tamen Joannes est a parte rei homo singularis diversus a Petro”.

<sup>88</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 273: “Ad 3 Resp. distinguendo antec. quae distinguuntur solo numero, non differunt in forma secundum absolutam rationem formae. Conc. antec. non differunt in forma, quatenus est haec numero et singularis, n. antec. anima Ioannis per suam entitatem quae est forma, distinguitur solo numero ab anima Petri”.

<sup>89</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 273: “Ad 4 Resp. n. ma. animae rationales, et characteres baptismales differunt solo numero ma. probationis. Etiam est falsa: nam licet propagatio et conservatio speciei sit causa partialis, ob quam multiplicantur individua eiusdem

speciei: non tamen est causa adaequata”.

<sup>90</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 274: “Distinctio formalis est duplex, una desumitur a forma simpliciter et specificè considerata, et appellatur formalis citra additum: haec non reperitur inter singularia eiusdem speciei: altera fundatur in forma: ut est singularis et actu existens in rerum natura, et nuncupatur formalis secundum quid: hac distinguì possunt individua eiusdem naturae”.

<sup>91</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 274: “Ad 2 confir. Resp. distinguendo ma. Differentia individualis extrinseca fit per accidentia, conc. ma. intrinseca (de qua solum hic est quaestio) fit per accidentia, n. ma. Boetius dumtaxat significat accidentia sensibilia nobis manifestare distinctionem individualem substantiae, cuius intrinsecum principium non cadit sub sensum”.

<sup>92</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 274-275: “Ad 6 Resp. n. antec. individua eiusdem naturae differunt per differentiam essentialem individuo: uti diversae species distinguuntur per differentias essentielles speciebus. [...] Huiusmodi differentiam non esse accidentalem: vel ex hoc patet, quod individuum substantiale ponatur in categoria substantiae, in qua composita per accidens directe collocari nequeunt”.

<sup>93</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 275: “Ad 7 Resp. n. ma. quod animae Ioannis et Petri numero distinguantur: non provenit ex eo, quod recipiantur in diversas materias: nam separatae a corpore obtinent diversitatem numericam: sed ex extrinseca earum perfectione”.

<sup>94</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 275: “Ad 8 Resp. n. mi. partes aquae a se mutuo divisae (destructis propriis quantitibus) distinguerentur numero: ergo necesse est agnoscere in partibus aquae a se invicem divisae principium individuationis intrinsecum diversus a quantitate”.

<sup>95</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 263, 265-266, 267.

<sup>96</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 262, 263, 264-265.

<sup>97</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 1, 265: “radicem distinctionis numericae non esse materiam signatam quantitate”; Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 271: “Caeterum materiam non esse adaequatam radicem distinctionis numericae”.

<sup>98</sup> Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 2, 271: “ergo quantitas est radix distinctionis individualis”; Schauthheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 274: “esse vero radicem distinctionis individualis”.

<sup>99</sup> Thomasius, J., (1663), A VI-1, 5, ll. 16-19: “Ego, cum verborum aliquid faciendum mihi, antequam in conflictum descendatur, videam, nihil aliud nunc Vobis, quam brevem illius controversiae, quae tot contentiones in Scholis Latinorum peperit, narrationem dabo, non tam philosophi supernaturalis, quam historici officio functurus”.

<sup>100</sup> About Thomasius’s historical Preface Di Bella writes: “Thomasius’s reconstruction is far from being historically tenable”, Di Bella, S. (2005), 28; Ariew qualifies Thomasius’s style as an “eclectic” one. Ariew, R. (2009), 100: “Thomasius, in good eclectic style, sketched some historical options and set out his preferences among them; he defined the problems and revealed their proper solution”.

<sup>101</sup> Thomasius, J., (1663), A VI-1, 7, ll. 22-25: “Ego vero valde, ne nimium hic Thomas Aquinas, sive splendori dederit, sive amori Aristotelici nominis. Nam hunc e sectarum Scholasticarum principibus maxime fuisse constat, qui cum de principio individuationis disceptanda lis esset, ad materiam signatam recurreret, non aliunde haustam, quam ex lacunis gentilitiae metaphysicae”.

<sup>102</sup> Thomasius, J., (1663), A VI-1, 8, l. 1-6: “Quo magis vel haecceitatem Scoti, licet ea displiceat Grammaticis, laudaverim, ut quae incorporeis etiam substantiis applicari queat. Sed maxime placet hic Nominalium Entitas, quae simplicissima, sed eadem simul, uti iudico, verissima decisione totum hunc nodum, et in eo spinosissimas tricas dissecat. Deduxit, uti video, narratio

mea inopitantiem ad illam ipsam sententiam, quam, si Deo visum fuerit, pro viribus cum Respondente meo defensurus in hunc locum concessi”.

<sup>103</sup> Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 3, A VI-1, 11, l. 18-22: “Sunt autem duo genera opinionum; alii hypotheses habuere ad omnia individua applicabiles, ut Scotus; alii secus, ut Thomas, qui in corporibus materiam signatam, in Angelis eorum entitatem principium posuit. Nos quoniam hic abstrahemus a substantia materiali et immateriali, speciales opiniones alio tempore consideraturi, nunc generales tantum excutiemus”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 23.

<sup>104</sup> Di Bella writes in this regard: “In the 1663 disputation, one can guess a sort of division of labor between teacher and student: whereas Thomasius’s criticism concentrates itself on the Aristotelian-Thomistic individuation through matter, Leibniz’s discussion leaves aside this solution, precisely on the ground that is not a general one, and devotes most effort to the criticism of Scotist haecceity”. See Di Bella, S., (2005), 28-29.

<sup>105</sup> Thomasius, J., (1663), A VI-1, 5, l. 10-12: “De Principio Individuationis, quanta Scholasticis mutuae intercesserint lites, Spectabilis Domine Prodecane, tu unus omnium optime nosti; Vos vero caeteri, Auditores lectissimi, si ignoratis, affirmanti mihi credite, fuisse longe maximas”.

<sup>106</sup> See *supra*, n. 102.

<sup>107</sup> According to the second opinion, the principle of individuation is the negation. This opinion is attributed to “some obscure Nominalist” (“aliquem Nominalium obscuriorem”), that could be identified with Henry of Ghent (c. 1217-1293), see Courtine, J.-F., (1990), 505 and n. 14; Ariew, R., (2009), 102, n. 4. See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), §§ 11-12, A VI-1, 14, ll. 3-28; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 37-38.

<sup>108</sup> The third opinion asserts that the existence is the principle of individuation. Following Fonseca, Leibniz attributes this thesis to Nicholas Bonetus († 1360), while Leibniz disagrees with Francisco Murcia who attributes this thesis to “some Carthusian” (“cuidam Carthusiano”), namely Dionysius von Ricke (1402-1471). See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), §§ 13-15, A VI-1, 14, l. 29-15, l. 29; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 46-47.

<sup>109</sup> The fourth opinion, defended by the Scotists, asserts that the principle of individuation is the haecceity. Leibniz dwells especially on this solution. He analyzes the position of John of Bassolis († 1347) – who he qualifies as “a well-established one” among the Scotists and who was previously a follower of Ockham and subsequently of Scotus, too – and of Petrus Posnaniensis († 1658). However, there are many other supporters cited by Leibniz, such as Benet Perera, Mercenarius († 1585), Jacopo Zabarella (1533-1589), Pedro Fonseca (1528-1599) and Eustachius a Sancto Paulo (1573-1640). See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), §§ 16-26, A VI-1, 14, l. 29-15, l. 29; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 54-69.

<sup>110</sup> Trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 100. See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4 A VI-1, 11, l. 26-28. According to Leibniz, the “whole entity” consists in matter and form united: “For what is matter and form united except the whole entity of the composite? Add we here abstract from bodily substances and angels, so that we preferably employ the term, ‘whole entity’, rather than ‘matter and form’”. Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4, A VI-1, 12, l. 5-7: “Quid enim est materia et forma unitae, nisi tota Entitas compositi? Adde quod nos hic abstrahimus a corporibus et angelis, potius igitur termino totius Entitatis quam materiae et formae utimur”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 101. In this sense, Leibniz’s position is close to Suárez’s one. See Suárez, F., *Metaphysicae disputationes*, disp. V, sec. 6, §1 (cit. above n. 2). On the question of the individuation in Suárez and Leibniz, see, at least, Courtine, J.-F., “Le principe d’individuation chez Suárez et chez Leibniz”, *Studia Leibnitiana Supplementa*, 23 (1983), 174-190; Courtine, J.-F., (1990), 496-519. However, it is controversial that Suárez actually constitutes a first-hand reading for Leibniz: see Courtine, (1990), 499: “La multiplicité des auteurs cités, la diversité des doctrines qu’ils défendent, la difficulté même d’assigner précisément la position de tel ou tel

(Pierre d'Auriolle, Hervé, Durand, etc.) quant à l'individuation, tout cela suffit à souligner le caractère très relatif de la référence – qui plus est, seulement nominale – à Suárez”.

<sup>111</sup> Trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 100; Leibniz, G.W., § 4, A VI-1,11, l. 26: “Prima opinio [...] a gravissimis viris defenditur”.

<sup>112</sup> See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 4, A VI-1, 11, 26-12, 10; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 100-101.

<sup>113</sup> See Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 2, A VI-1, 11, l. 7: “et Principium et Individuum varie accipitur”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 22.

<sup>114</sup> Trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 22-23. See Leibniz, G.W., (1663) § 2, A VI-1, 11, l. 7-12: “Et quod Individuum attinet, quemadmodum Universale, sic ipsum quoque vel Logicum est in ordine ad praedicationem; vel Metaphysicum in ordine ad rem. Atque sic rursum aut prout in re est, aut prout in conceptu, seu ut alii exprimunt formaliter aut fundamentaliter: Et formaliter vel de individuo omni vel creato tantum vel substantia tantum vel substantia materiali”.

<sup>115</sup> Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 2, A VI-1, 11, l. 12-13: “Principi quoque vox notat tum cognoscendi principium, tum essendi. Essendi internum et externum”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 23.

<sup>116</sup> Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 2, A VI-1, 11, l. 13-16: “Quare ut haec colligam, agemus de aliquo reali, et, ut loquuntur principio Physico”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 23.

<sup>117</sup> Leibniz, G.W., (1663), § 2, A VI-1, 11, l. 13-16: “Quare ut haec colligam, agemus de aliquo reali, et, ut loquuntur principio Physico, quod rationis individui formalis seu individuationis, seu differentiae numericae in intellectu sit fundamentum, idque in individuis praecipue creatis substantialibus”; trans. McCullough, L. B., (1996), 23, modified.

<sup>118</sup> Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 272: “Principium individuationis intrinsecum (de quo hic est quaestio)” (cit., *supra*, n. 84). See Schautheet, F., (1660), book 2, cont. 5, a. 3, 275 (arg. 8).