

POWER FROM CHURCH TO STATE. HISTORIOGRAPHY BETWEEN POLITICS AND DIPLOMACY - CASE STUDY

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Abstract. This study does not intend to change the perspective on the publication it refers to, namely Marx's *Notes about Romanians*, published by the Romanian Academy Publishing-House, in which the famous author - quoting a 19th century French source - records the abuses suffered by the Romanian located within the extra-Carpathian principalities (due to the Tsarist interventionism), as well as in Transylvania (under the pressure of the Hungarian nobility). The publishing of these notes during strained times between the Romanian Labor Party and the other parties in the communist block-generated by the more and more apparent orientation of Romanian leaders towards a national politics - was seen, especially by the Soviet and Hungarian communists, as a gesture of defiance of the "friendly countries" and even of revisionism. Consequently, the diplomatic resonances became apparent. The Soviet and the Hungarian responses are the most renown, and both are worthy of the consideration that this study will give it.

Keywords: Notes about Romanians, Karl Marx, Central Committee of Romanian Labor Party, historiography, politics, diplomacy

The current study isn't trying to convey a fresh perspective on the relationship dynamics between the political field, the history field and historiography. History's ideological capabilities are notorious and extensively covered, thus it would be extremely difficult to refer to them differently. Therefore, we are merely striving to provide additional information - more or less significant - to confirm the historical narrative according to certain objectives, of political nature or so. Sadly, this tendency is dictated by two unquestionable attributes of history: on one hand, there is the social-human nature of our discipline - that requires analytical accuracy, critical thinking, unbiased objectivity, and neutral processing of any interpretable data; on the other hand, there is history's educational responsibility, as it depicts and supports defintory discourses, while having a decisive word in constructing ethnic consciousness.

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Few things could be as rewarding to a country-loving citizen than a glorious narrative that supports their origins and the origins of their home community, always amongst the very best. From this standpoint, a heroic past fuels everyday life while maintaining the hopes of a quality future, devoid of major existential uncertainties. This dual-sided mission of historiography – built on the science-conscience dependability – causes inherent tensions within the popularisation specialty literature and hinders communication between historians and the general public.

It goes without saying that the above-mentioned attributes of the study of the past - often contradictory - are not only specific to the historical writings in the Romanian area, but they exist worldwide - to some extent. Even societies that are well-known for their democratic practices - such as the American society - have developed history teaching standards that require a certain degree of accuracy when processing different data provided by recent research that fuels the educational circuit. Often times caught in the middle, the specialist finds himself in the predicament of outlining a story as accurate as possible while having to satisfy the expectations of both his readers and those of the investigators in his field of study, thus being torn between his duties as a researcher and those of him as an educator. Admittedly, such a task is challenging to say the least, so much so that historical writing is still abundant with partisanships, polemics and over-enthusiasm. Having outlined a few theoretical considerations, let us return to the subject in question, a subject that doesn't directly address the ideological instrumentalization of history, but the way in which such action, stemming from political roots, can lead to diplomatic tensions.

To make things clear, our narrative takes place in the sixth decade of the previous century, namely at the meeting of the Propaganda and Agitation Section of the Central Committee (C.C.) within the Romanian Labor Party (P.R.M.), where there were summoned – so to speak - most of the Romanian historian representatives of that time. It was the autumn of 1954, more than a year and a half after Stalin's death, a time when the attacks on Roller became increasingly more intense. The attacks were aimed at his poor work ethics, the malfunctioning of research institutions, the precarious quality of ongoing projects, the low condition of specialty publications, the methodology operating errors, and many other negative aspects, expressed more or less directly to Leonte Rautu, the head of the office. At the event, the cat was let out of the bag, and Roller – who reportedly became cornered by direct accusations on several levels – suffered such angst that he began to refer to himself in the third person¹.

Unwrapping the event is not the primary intent of the present study, however it acknowledges its role in the early stages of a historiographic trend with more and more noticeable nationalist and anti-Soviet tendencies, and an obvious political course that includes the moment captured here. Let's make a note of the fact that Roller's fate was already sealed, as he had thus far been deemed as having failed as the adjunct of director Constantin Pârvulescu at the Party's Institute of History.

Less than a year after the stream of changes begins, the desire for renewal gains momentum. Competence-based researchers are brought back, high academic merits are acknowledged, truly capable heads of institutes and universities are instated and reinstated as leaders, harsh criticism upon authors still marked by the old

ideological imprint intensifies, major past events are reconsidered from a national perspective and, lastly but not least, the work on drafting The Romanian History Treatise begins, with perspectives that at that time may have been considered daring. Reputed specialists are active again within their fields of research, which, among other things, causes a relative but real separation from the mentality and interests of the political and ideological space of the great eastern neighbour. By 1963, the institutions that marked the Romanian-Soviet alliance, namely the Romanian-Russian Museum, the Russian Book, and the Institute of Romanian-Soviet Studies, disappear from the cultural-scientific space of our state. Not even social segregation - a "healthy" social origin of the students, so important for university admission - can be maintained under the avalanche of changes. All of this basically reflects the desire of P.M.R. to seek a way of reconciliation with the population through the inclusion of the national component in the public discourse².

This is the context of 1964, a year when another event occurs – less spectacular, but interesting and highly relevant to observing the ways in which historical writings tend to align themselves with state interests – along with the April Declaration adopted by the enlarged Plenary of the C.C. of the P.M.R. The publishing of Karl Marx's Manuscripts About Romanians (*novel manuscripts*)³ takes place.

The book was edited by academic Andrei Oțetea⁴ and by Stanislaw Schwann - a Polish professor from Szczecin University and an established specialist in Marxist texts editing - who had acknowledged the existence of Marx's documents in the deposits of International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam, within the archival files *Marx and Engels*. Oțetea assimilated the information and went to Amsterdam in person, where he managed not only to discuss the collecting and processing of the texts and to finally get permission to publish them, but he also received steady support of the Dutch Institute Director, who put his own associates at Oțetea's service for certain operations that the planned edition required (such as photographic reproductions, comparison of printed texts with manuscripts etc.)⁵

A confidential note to the C.C. of the P.M.R. reportedly announces the "discovery"⁶ of the manuscripts in 1959. However, the information seems to have not been concealed efficiently, as an official of the Polish Embassy in Bucharest, in the spring of the following year brought to his Hungarian correspondents' attention the fact that Schwann had signalled the documents in Amsterdam to the Romanian historians⁷.

In regards to the paper's structure, the most reliable sources when it comes to the historical framing of its contents, as well as the challenges faced with documents processing and editing techniques, are the people who had been recruited to finalize the book along with Andrei Oțetea, that is Gheorghe Zane and, to a lesser degree, Cornelia Bodea⁸.

The general presentation of these matters and the political context of their occurrence, of political and propagandist agenda that served as a background for printing Marx's *Notes* are not emphasized in this paper. Nonetheless, it is important to mention that the historiographic event took place at a time when the Romanian-Soviet relations, although not in obvious conflict, were growing more and more strained. Khrushchev's visits to Romania dating back in the early stages of the seventh decade

of the past century had the opposite effect to his desire of tempering the situation and of gaining control within P.M.R. For instance, after his second visit from June 1962, the Romanian communists of the party's superior core were criticizing in their meetings the Soviet leader's arrogant demeanor, as well as his tendency to informationally supervise Romania's leadership activity, the army's chiefs' actions and the several clerks' and high-ranking diplomats' business. The criticism - aimed at the great Eastern neighbour external policy - became increasingly harsh and intense. The Romanian leaders didn't welcome with open arms the idea the U.S.S.R. advanced in the sense of outlining a unitary common market, in which, obviously, the tutorship would go to the state that proposed such a structure. In this economic interstate complex, the coordinating part - that the authors and the promoters of the project assumed - would have been more powerful than that in the C.A.E.R.

The dissatisfaction was not only on the count of Romania, who had already decided to carve itself a new path based on national interests, but Khrushchev himself - pressured by the more or less ideological, but powerful conflicts with the dissident Chinese and Albanian communist parties - was doubting Romania's loyalty to the Soviet block. Naturally, these major issues of domestic and international politics are well known not only to specialists in contemporary history, but also to everyone interested in the study of the past and the evolution of international relations. Nonetheless, the events are worth revisiting, for they provide a better contextualization for Marx's *Notes* publication motives and define a clearer perspective on their political, diplomatic, social and cultural resonances.

As a matter of fact, Marx's manuscripts from the Oțetea-Schwann edition - a count of four - are copies of other authors' texts, probably made with the intention of being used as references in future writings by Marx. Three of them are from Elias Regnault's paper *Histoire politique et sociale des Principautés Danubiennes*⁹, a severe indictment, or a true ledger of immense abuse committed by the Tsarist Empire along its relations in the modern age with the Romanian Principalities¹⁰. Such attitude of the above mentioned French author in the well-known context of the Crimean war is merely reasonable.

Marx's *Notes* were written in accordance with original papers' language, predominantly in French. The German language is typically used in his personal interventions within the copied content (summarized parts from Regnault's narrative, personal considerations of read material etc.). English is rarely used with the exception of the fourth manuscript, which - considering the author of the material he copied from - is obviously entirely written in this language¹¹.

Given the political circumstances of 1964, publishing this type of material was, as one would expect, considered a major defiance of the Soviet political supervision. Within the Socialist block, Hungary as well appeared to be outraged by the publishing of Marx's *Notes*, as Regnault, in his writings about Transylvania, was extremely critical towards the Hungarian nobility and used harsh words to describe the situation of the Romanians in the area. Consequently, the publishing of the book did not simply represent a historiographical gesture, but more so a political, even revisionist one, with high potential to destabilize the common belief system meant to maintain stability of the Socialist block. The publishing of a paper with such critical

accents on the Russians' abusive political strategies in the 19th century signed by Marx was almost unthinkable in the states on this side of the Iron Curtain. The event emphasized the obvious – the dreams of freedom of the Romanian communists, as Marx's critical ideas were in perfect tune with their liberation desire¹². As expected, the diplomatic reactions of the "friend states" were quick to show. The specialists interested in the subjects mainly focused on the way the Soviet state expressed its discontent¹³. In the following paragraphs, our narrative will focus on the Hungarian communists' opinion, as it is reflected in the diplomatic correspondence.

The instauration of the popular regimes in Hungaria and Romania did not manage to abolish the frictions between the two countries parties. Beginning 1949, after the meeting of their deputies, the Hungarians expressed great concern in regards to the promoted politics of P.M.R. within the cultural space, which they poignantly considered anti-Hungarian. At their request, the leaders in Bucharest did nothing but give ambiguous answers¹⁴. Even more so, the Plenary of November-December 1961 of the C.C. inside the P.M.R. proposed solving of the ethnic issues through the national communism, giving Budapest a new cause for concern¹⁵.

Behind the illusory veil of a seemingly amicable relationship – that was in reality marked by the tensions and suspicions that had had arisen throughout history – the Hungarian government was troubled again by the news of the publication of Marx's *Notes*. The diplomatic reactions targeting this event are covered in secret correspondence between the Hungarian Embassy in Romania and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Budapest. It is noticeably a question of detail of the relationship between the two socialist states, but it is about unheard-of documents, that are worth mentioning and recording in the historiographical field.

As the case may be, at the suggestion of the Hungarian specialists, the comparison of Marx's *Notes* in the Oțetea-Schwann edition with the text of Regnault's book and with the original manuscripts was requested, in order to demonstrate that the *Notes* did not represent by any means the anti-Russian and anti-Hungarian views of the one who had made the copies, but that they are simple imprints made to sustain a future valorisation, with the same weight as a reading chart. On this subject, an undated and unsigned note that arrived at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, described the *Notes'* edition and summarized its subject, mentioning that the manuscripts are in Amsterdam, Regnault's book might be in the fund of Ervin Szabo's Library - the former manager of the Metropolitan Library¹⁶ - and that the comparison of the texts might take longer than expected. It was equally shown that Marx did not research Regnault's work altogether, but lingered only on some facts happened between 1777-1848 described by the French author, a convenient time to emphasise the abuses of the Tsarist Empire¹⁷.

The publishing of the *Notes* in Romania had been within the Hungarian diplomacy's attention from the very beginning, and it had always tried to give consistency to the information sent to Budapest. In one of the letters, it was stated that the Oțetea-Schwann edition was difficult for embassies to obtain, that its appearance was motivated by political reasons, that the project was completed without the knowledge of the "Soviet comrades", that the U.S.S.R. ambassador in Bucharest, I.K. Jegalin¹⁸ , after having overcome his surprise, pointed out to the Romanian

leaders the tendentious nature of the book and the fact that the publishers implied that Marx shared the views of the French author.

The letter also states that, following the intervention of the friend parties in the Soviet and Hungarian spaces, P.M.R. agreed to withdraw the work from the bookshops, at the same time expressing doubts about it. As for the large edition of the published books, the letter said the paper was still in the publishing phase and that no approval had been given to sell it, although a second edition was apparently being prepared. Bookshop 17 in Bucharest, with which someone in the embassy's organisation may have had a closer connection, is quoted as a source for the news of the possible reissue of the *Notes*¹⁹.

In addition - and simultaneously- the Hungarian Embassy in our capital was sharing other interesting details about the circulation of the book with Budapest. At the time of the exchange, the Bulgarian Embassy had not managed to obtain a copy of the book, the German Democratic Republic Embassy had recently acquired it, and the French diplomats had heard about it a while back and were also interested in procuring it. However, this correspondence as well expresses some degree of uneasiness stemming from the fear that Marx's *Notes* were being used to cultivate anti-Soviet and anti-Hungarian attitudes, especially amongst the Romanian intelligentsia. It was advised that a debate on the *Notes* should be held at a future conference of Romanian and Hungarian historians²⁰.

A classified report sent by the Hungarian Embassy on January 12th, 1965 to the Foreign Ministry detailed the events, pointing out the appearance of the volume, the story of the discovery of the manuscripts, Oțetea's trip to Amsterdam, his dealings with the management of the International Institute of Social History etc.²¹. The document warned of the publishers' strategy to cultivate an intentional confusion, giving the impression that the *Notes* reflect Marx's opinion. By publishing them, the aim of P.M.R. was in fact to strengthen anti-Russian and anti-Hungarian sentiments in the consciousness of the Romanian people. It is also criticised that instead of the phrase "Tsarist Empire" the text uses the word "Russian/Russians", which implies a historical continuity of abuses in the Romanian-Russian relations, by relatively associating the Tsarist Empire with the Soviet state. From the perspective of those informing from Bucharest, it is noted that the manuscripts have nothing to do with the style of Marx's writings, but are rather reflections of the hostile position of Romanian leaders towards the Soviet Communist Party. Marx's *Notes* do not represent, but only record the French author's conceptions, clearly influenced by the political context of the times when they were written.

The report also states that the *Notes* are bearers of an anti-Hungarian spirit, since, when referring to the 1848 Revolution in Transylvania, they insist above all on Kossuth's strategic errors regarding the national question and on the beneficial nature of the alliance between Avram Iancu's troops and the interventionist troops of the Habsburgs and Russians. In the end, it is again suggested to compare Regnault's text with Marx's *Notes*, in order to discern the originality of the latter. Interestingly, at the end of the document, someone noted that the subject was known to specialists and that, at the time, it did not require any diplomatic or scientific reaction, thus distancing the suggestion from the general sphere of political and diplomatic concerns²².

Another handwritten note sent by the Hungarian diplomatic representation in Bucharest informed the Foreign Ministry that the Yugoslav ambassador to Romania, Milatovici, spoke to the Hungarian ambassador about a discussion with the director of the P.M.R.'s Institute of History, Popescu-Puțuri. Regarding the *Notes*, the latter said that even if the manuscripts did not reflect Marx's views, the Tsarist terror could still not be challenged. He reportedly said, "...the Turks came and went, they plundered, but the main plunderers, also considered by the chroniclers as such, were the Russians. Why should Regnault's work have aroused so much interest on Marx's part? Obviously because he agreed with the French author"²³.

A few days later, Marx's *Notes* are discussed again in a new report sent to Budapest by the staff of the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest. This report states that the work is very difficult to acquire, that it can only be procured "under the counter", that there is high demand for it, and that a reprint of the first edition is planned instead of a new edition. Therefore, there is no legitimate intention to withdraw the book. The Yugoslav ambassador's statement in the previous handwritten note is here repeated with the addition that the *Notes* reveal a certain nervousness of the Romanian leaders in regards to the territorial integrity of their state. The document also mentions that the Hungarian ambassador tried to relieve tensions, saying bluntly that the Romanians' worries are unjustified, that Hungary had no revisionist interest in the area, and that it is pursuing an open foreign policy, even if there still are glimmers of nationalist feelings, ideas and principles in the socialist block on all sides.

The report shows that the Hungarian embassy had also tried other sources. One of them – within the Publishing House of the Romanian Academy – confessed that the project of publishing Marx's *Notes* had been talked about long before it had been implemented, but no one truly believed it would be completed. The source was wondering why, if the Hungarians, in times like these, were allowed to publish documents about Horthy²⁴, the Romanians would not be allowed to do the same with Marx's *Notes*. Another source - a counsellor at the Yugoslav Embassy - when approached by a Hungarian diplomatic staff member with a question on the appropriateness of the publication of the *Notes* with their substantial references to Bessarabia and Transylvania - responded by saying that "the Romanian comrades" had strongly reaffirmed their desire to keep their country's borders within the established limits forever with the publishing of this book, a matter that had also been discussed at a recent meeting between Tito and Dej. And finally, the third source - counsellor Fidler at the Polish Embassy - knew that Professor Schwann had been informing the Romanians about the Amsterdam manuscripts since 1960.

The report also provided bibliographical sources, pointing out that the *Notes* were cited in Romanian historical writings even before their publication, hence the suspicion that they circulated in the form of a manuscript, at least within the narrow circle of specialists²⁵.

The appeal for the Oțetea-Schwann edition was not limited to the diplomatic circle of states that were historically "affected" by its publishing in a direct way. For example, the Embassy of the German Democratic Republic in Sofia sent out a communication to the Embassy of the Hungarian People's Republic - forwarded by them to the Hungarian Foreign Ministry - that pointed out some new achievements of

Romanian historical writing. The document rightfully devoted substantial space to the *Notes*, recalling the story of their discovery and publication, summarizing their subject, and making some considerations on them. The description of the volume was ample, and it contained matters already well known at the time. The considerations were interesting to say the least.

The book was criticised for exaggerating the actions of the Romanian bourgeois-democratic intelligentsia, as well as for a few other things: that its introductory part was intended to strengthen the national policy of the Romanian Communist Party, that it justified the takeover of Transylvania by the Romanians, that it raised the question of Bessarabia, that it did not make a clear distinction between the Russian people and tsarism, that the manner in which the manuscripts were translated was edgy - by using harsh accents in the description of the Russians and Hungarians, that it was placed in the wake of the famous *April Declaration of the Enlarged Plenary of the C.C. in the P.M.R.* etc. The information revealed the disagreement of the socialist diplomatic milieu in Bucharest, which deemed both the overtly nationalist form and the timing of the publication of Marx's *Notes* as inappropriate. The correspondence also expressed concern with the fact that some western newspapers had labelled the *Notes* as an act of questioning the righteousness of Bessarabia's inclusion in the Soviet state²⁶.

In the end, the diplomatic resonances of this editorial event faded, as much more important historical affairs took the spotlight. Nevertheless, it is a noteworthy case for it demonstrates how history can be manipulated under the pressure of propaganda and of other more or less significant agenda. The documents presented here do not intend to change the perspective on what happened within the first half of the seventh decade of the last century – specialists are extremely familiar with this period, and excellent historical assessments on it have been recorded. But details always carry a significance of their own.

References

¹Felician Velimirovici, referring to this meeting: "I never said that Roller is not Roller. The Romanian Historians' Meeting of 17 November 1954", in *Anuarul Institutului de Istorie "A.D. Xenopol"*, LI, Suppl, (2014).

²Velimirovici, F., *History and Historians in Communist Romania* (Cluj-Napoca: Mega Publishing House, 2015), chapter "The Beginning of the End".

³Marx, K., *Notes about Romanians* (Andrei Oțetea, Stanislaw Schwann editors, Bucharest: Academic Publishing House, RPR, 1964).

⁴Head of the History Institute in Bucharest at that time.

⁵The "support system" included the manager of the Social History International Institute in Amsterdam, prof. dr. Rüterand, A.J.C. and his collaborators Nyhoff, D.D.P. and dr Schuster., D.. See Marx, K., (1964), 7.

⁶Bottoni, S., *Red Transylvania. The Romanian Communism and the National Problem 1944-1965*, (Cluj-Napoca: The Institute of Studying the National Minorities Problems Publishing House - Kriterion, 2010).

⁷The Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/1, document from 11th January 1965.

⁸In fact, Cornelia Bodea, although she contributed to the processing of the text, does not appear among the signatories of the Preface and Introduction. See Marx, K., (1964), 7-23.

⁹ Paris, 1855. On Regnault, see also Nicolae Iorga, "Something from Franco-Romanian relations. A French writer about Romanians and a Romanian writer in France: Regnault, E. and Gănescu, G. ", in *Analele Academiei Române*, series II, volume XXXIX, *Memoriile Secțiunii Istorice* (Bucharest: Extract, 1920).

¹⁰One of the three manuscripts also referred to another work by Regnault, *La fois de Traités: Les Puissances signataires et L'Empereur Napoléon III*, Paris, 1859, but the passages copied by Marx came from Regnault's 1855 work. The interest in Regnault is also justified by the fact that he used the writings of some Romanian authors of the time of 1848 as sources. The fourth manuscript, entitled *The Russians in Moldavia and Wallachia*, was extracted by Marx in 1853 from an unidentified English author whose work appears to have been completed in 1849.

¹¹Marx, K., (1964), 5.

¹²Petrescu, D., "1956 mint identitás formáló tapasztalat", in *Az 1956-os Forradalom Visszhangja a Szoviet Tömb Országában*, Évkönyv, XIV/2006-2007, Budapest, 1956-os Intézet, (2007), 177-200.

¹³An episode of reproach from the USSR took place in September 1965, at a meeting between Ceausescu and Brezhnev, when the latter mentioned, among other things, that Soviet academics had evaluated the manuscripts. In their opinion they did not go beyond the limits of simple notes by bourgeois authors. As such, from a scholarly point of view, these writings lack consistency and do not reflect Marx's position, although the editors arbitrarily present them as embodying his conclusions. See Anton, M., Chiper, I., *The Establishment of the Ceausescu Regime: Continuity and Rupture in Romanian-Soviet Relations* (Bucharest: Nicolae Titulescu Institute of International Relations Publishing House, 2003), 163.

¹⁴Petrescu, D., (2007), 177-200. Aspects mentioned in the stenogram of the meeting of the Political Bureau of the C.C. of the P.M.R. on 19 February 1949.

¹⁵Petrescu, D., (2007), 177-200.

¹⁶Theoretician with a performance in the social sciences domain, who gradually became an anarchist, dead in 1918.

¹⁷Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/2, undated document.

¹⁸His contribution to the organisation of Khrushchev's 1963 visit to Romania is noteworthy. See Cătănuș, D., "Romania and the Soviet-Chinese schism. Conclusions on the last visit of N.S. Khrushchev.1963", in *Arhivele Totalitarismului*, no.3-4, (2002).

¹⁹Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/1, document dated 11 January 1965.

²⁰Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/1, document of 7 January 1965.

²¹See also Haiduc, M., "With Marx against Moscow", in *Studia Universitatis "Babeș-Bolyai"*, Series *Historia*, 65/2 (2002): 21-41.

²²Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/2, document of 12 January 1965, indecipherable signature.

²³Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/2, document of 27 January 1965, indecipherable signature.

²⁴This refers to the volume *Horthy Miklós titkos iratai (Secret Writings of Miklós Horthy)*, Kossuth, K., Budapest, (1962).

²⁵Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Fund*, no. package 00413/1, document of 30 January 1965. As regards the quick citation of the *Notes*, it is in the work *The Destruction of*

the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. 1900-1918 (Daicoviciu, C., Constantinescu, M. editors), Romanian Academy Publishing House, 1964).

²⁶ Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. package 00413/3, document dated 28 April 1965. The historiographical dispute about Transylvania does not only revolve around the *Notes*. The Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest informed the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that a Romanian historian, Lajos Demény, had drawn attention to the fact that Romanian scholars had noted a passage in Anonymus' work which supported the theory of the Dacian-Roman continuity (Hungarian National Archives, *Ministry of Foreign Affairs Fund*, no. 002071, document of 28 February 1965).