

CIA REPORTS ON THE EARLY YEARS OF COMMUNISM IN ROMANIA (1946 - 1949)

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Abstract. An institution created with the main purpose of ensuring adequate knowledge, substantiated in an integrated manner, of the threat the USSR represented both to the USA and to the free world in general, the CIA carried out a sustained activity in this direction.

After the Second World War, Romania came completely under Soviet influence and became a Communist country fully aligned with the Moscow command. Declassified CIA documents on the early period of the Communist system in Romania highlight, first and foremost, the subjugation of this southeastern European country to the interests of the USSR. Exploring this reality behind the Iron Curtain in the early years of the Cold War, the study presents various documents from the CIA archives, regarding Romania, on three main elements: political intelligence, economic intelligence, and military intelligence.

Keywords: CIA, Communism, Cold War, Intelligence, Romania, USSR, Sovietization

Introduction: relevance and methodology

Almost 40 years ago, two British historians, Christopher Andrew and David Dilks, drew attention to a domain of activity that had marked - less visibly, it is true, but in a significant way, as some documents reveal - the history of the 20th century.

At that time - under the sign and power of the Cold War that had been going on for almost four decades between the USA, as leader of the Western world and undisputed defender of democratic values, and the USSR, promoter of the Communist dictatorial order - historical research had focused only to a small extent on what the two mentioned historians rightly referred to as being 'the missing dimension': the involvement and role of the intelligence communities in supporting and/ or guiding the state's political decision-making¹.

Nowadays, it can be said without any doubt that the situation has fundamentally changed. The issues raised for the previous period, backed up by several declassified intelligence agency documents, are to be found, in particular, in various thematic works, which present their histories and operations. General historical works also emphasize, in what is almost obligatory practice, the actions of the intelligence communities that have an impact on shaping history.

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Declassified documents from various archives, especially those of the intelligence agencies, today provide a necessary and particularly important addition to our knowledge of the historical past. In other words, they remove 'the missing dimension' and can thus help to provide a better foundation for historical truth.

From this perspective, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) archives are a remarkable and useful information resource. Given the global reach of US interests since the Cold War, the central structure of US intelligence has developed the capabilities to support them. This translates primarily into the accumulation of knowledge about threats and opportunities in foreign relations. Or to put it directly, intelligence.

The documents available in the CIA electronic archives on the early years of Communism in Romania mainly concern elements of political, economic, and, of course, military intelligence². This classification/ typology (based on which the present study is also structured) forms - together with other elements, such as scientific intelligence and geographic intelligence - the representative typology that was created and used in the American national security system in the early period of the Cold War.

The research carried out in the electronic archives of the CIA on the subject of this study, i. e. the reflection of various elements of interest relating to Romania in the period 1946 - 1949, attests to constant and growing concern shown by the American intelligence in this direction. However, a clarification is needed: this conclusion is relative, as it cannot give an overall picture; it only echoes the declassified/ available documents that exist in the CIA's electronic archives, namely www.cia.gov/reading-room.

The period covered by the research in these archives goes back to the establishment of the CIA's predecessor, the Central Intelligence Group (CIG), an institution founded in January 1946, and presents the main information about Romania up to the end of 1949. That year marks the completion of the USSR's actions to sovietize the country. At the same time, it notes two issues that became representative coordinates of the Communist system in Romania in the following decades: the onset of collectivization and the establishment of the secret police, the Securitate.

Before presenting some quantitative and then content aspects, in the actual part of the study, some procedural and methodological clarifications are necessary:

1) The research in the CIA archives was conducted under several alternative terms to obtain a complete picture.

2) This also involved highlighting the number of documents available for the same period about other countries located in Eastern Europe/ close to Romania, on whose territory the Soviet Communist system expanded.

Specifically, four terms were used to find the available documents on the subject matter: 'Rumania', 'Rumanian', 'Romania', and 'Romanian'. Based on these, for the reference period entered, January 1, 1946 - December 31, 1949, a total of 376 documents with one of the four terms in the title resulted.

The predominant use of the terms 'Romania' and 'Romanian' is noted. The number per year of these documents reveals the following statistical data (available/ valid on March 2022):

- 1946 (10 documents) - 'Rumanian' (8), 'Rumania' (2);
- 1947 (49 documents) – 'Romania' (1), 'Romanian' (1), 'Rumania' (16), 'Rumanian' (31);
- 1948 (74 documents) - 'Romania' (2), 'Rumania' (28), 'Rumanian' (44);
- 1949 (243 documents) - 'Romania' (1), 'Romanian' (4), 'Rumania' (76), 'Rumanian' (162).

The number of declassified CIA documents on Romania during the above-mentioned period is of immediate and important significance compared to that of other Communist countries in the region. The differentiated search for five Central and Eastern European countries, also under Soviet influence, reflects the high interest of US intelligence in Romania. Statistical rankings show that it comes second, just behind Poland (380 documents), and ahead of Bulgaria (358 documents), Hungary (324 documents), Austria (306 documents), and Czechoslovakia (129).

This study, based on documents from the CIA archives, aims to complete the historical picture of the situation in Romania in the early years of the Cold War, marked by deep Sovietization. In the background, some elements of interest to intelligence agencies are mentioned.

Last but not least, their quality as chroniclers of certain historical sequences is also highlighted. Beyond, of course, the moments when they become significant determinants of events.

CIA vs. Communism: The Beginnings

'Why was the CIA established in 1947?' is the title of a notable study published by American historian Rhodri Jeffrey-Jones in 1997, half a century after the foundation of the CIA. Based on declassified CIA and US State Department documents from the early years of the Cold War, the distinguished Western intelligence agencies researcher highlights the decisive role that the threat of Soviet Communism played in the establishment of the CIA. According to his view, *"The newly released documentation confirms the importance of Sovitophobia as a motivating factor in the establishing of the CIA"*³.

In support of this claim, the author presents a document of the CIG, dated April 29, 1946. It reveals the first tasking directive that was issued by Admiral Sidney Soeurs, the head of this new American intelligence entity. The document refers exclusively to the Soviet threat by pointing out its catalytic role in shaping American intelligence in the early years of the Cold War. Verbatim, says the following: *"There is an urgent need to develop the highest possible quality of intelligence on the USSR in the shortest possible time"*⁴.

Three months later, the CIG's analysis area, the Office of Research and Evaluation (ORE)⁵ produced its first strategic evaluation material. Obviously, the subject was the threat of the USSR. Entitled 'ORE No. 1 - Soviet Foreign and Military Policy', July 23, 1946, it consists of two parts (*Enclosure 'A' - Soviet Foreign Policy and Enclosure 'B' - Soviet Military Policy*). Most space is devoted to Soviet foreign policy, which is said to be governed by the fundamental thesis that *"the peaceful coexistence of Communism and capitalist states is in the long run impossible"*⁶.

The same document also refers to Romania, which is mentioned, along with Poland and Hungary, in the category of Eastern European states where Moscow faces what the CIG assessment calls "*stubborn and widespread opposition*".

At that time, the USSR had not yet begun its decisive offensive to subordinate Romania. But it was soon to turn the country into one of its most loyal satellite states, as shown in declassified documents from the CIA archives.

An ally of Hitler's Germany in World War II, Romania took part alongside it in the military campaign initiated by the German war machine against the USSR - *Operation Barbarossa*, launched on June 22, 1941. According to the country's leader at the time, General Ion Antonescu - promoted only two months later to the rank of Marshal, by a High Royal Decree, which he would have imposed on King Michael - the motivation for Romania's entry into the war on the side of the German-led Axis powers was to regain its territories Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, seized by the USSR in the summer of 1940.

The Romanian state had already for several years been moving to close relations with Germany. The great loser of the First World War, Germany began to manifest itself more and more offensively on the European political scene with Hitler's rise to power⁸. Its strategic interests soon included Romania, which held significant oil reserves, particularly important for the German army in the perspective of changing the European order through war. This was not long in coming.

Taking power in the country in the autumn of 1940, initially with the fascist Iron Guard, General Antonescu decisively committed Romania to an alliance with Germany⁹. Without any rivals after the suppression of the Legionary rebellion in January 1941, and enjoying the full confidence of the Führer, he joined him in the military operation against the USSR.

The result is well known: just as in Napoleon's time, General 'Winter' proved more powerful than the German war machine. The Red Army's victorious counteroffensives paved the way for Moscow to liberate the Baltic and Eastern European states from Hitler's yoke. Instead, they put the Soviet one in its place.

Political Intelligence: Rising the Red Flag

One of the CIA's main areas of interest in the early Cold War (and its primary area of responsibility) was to gather data and produce material on the factual situation and expected developments on the international political scene. The situation in Eastern Europe, marked by the USSR's offensive to establish Communism in the countries that had come under Soviet influence - in fact, under Moscow's military occupation -, attracted the constant attention and concern of American intelligence, as CIA documents reveal.

Some of these refer to Romania, important both for its geo-strategic position, which could have ensured the so-called *cordon sanitaire* and the USSR's first line of defense in the event of a potential war with the West and for its significant oil reserves, which could have been decisive for supplying the Red Army in the same situation.

The seizure of political power by the Communists - mostly foreigners, trained in Moscow - was the apparent means of legitimizing the establishment of the Soviet

system in Romania, which then paved the way for the fairly rapid transformation of the country into a satellite state of the USSR, fully subservient to its interests.

The declassified documents from the CIA archives capture elements of Moscow's *modus operandi* in this regard, including aspects of the election campaign based on which Romania's pro-Communist government secured its election victory through fraud.

As a Weekly Summary Excerpt of November 8, 1946, entitled 'Communist Pre-Electoral Tactics in Romania' reveals, the Romanian Communists were preparing to use the "*Communist electoral pattern, so successfully delineated in Yugoslavia and Bulgaria*"¹⁰ in the elections of November 17, 1946 - the first after World War II.

To ensure this, the pro-Communist government imposed by the USSR, on March 6, 1945, began "*a campaign of violence and terrorism*"¹¹ against the political opposition in Romania. Further, the CIA document supports this claim with an enlightening account of the actions of the Romanian government led by Petru Groza, to stay in power and ensure Romania's transformation into a Moscow satellite state.

For example, it blocked a significant number of potential opposition voters from voting, who were asked to submit no fewer than 16 documents for registration at the polling stations, some of which could not be obtained. It has also established effective control over the media and radio, preventing the opposition from campaigning, while its leaders are kept under house arrest for alleged subversive acts without being formally charged.

Last but not least, according to the same CIA document, Petru Groza's government divided the opposition and secured consistent support from some national minorities, especially the Jewish one, which promised their "*200,000 votes to the Governmental Bloc in return for substantial concessions*"¹².

In the face of all these abusive and repressive actions that were carried out by the Communist authorities in Romania to ensure their victory in the elections, the prospects seemed quite clear. The word of the day among the country's democratic opposition seems to have been resignation. The CIA document directly highlights this attitude as follows:

*"Election day will be probably quiet. Opposition leaders admit their impotence to combat a reign of terror which on that day will be backed on Army, the secret police, the militia, and an estimated 10,000 armed Communist reservists specially called up for the occasion"*¹³.

However, the CIA's estimate of the election result was wrong. Despite the abusive and discretionary measures it took to ensure its victory, the Romanian Communist government failed to achieve this. When the votes were counted, the Communists had only 15%, to Moscow's utter surprise and anger. Faced not only with the certain prospect of losing political power in the country but especially with the imminent danger of being arrested *en bloc* by Moscow for the way it had managed the elections, the option of the Petru Groza government was hallucinatory: reversing the results. The losers had thus become winners - the will of the people had been crushed for good.

The situation is described in a CIG Intelligence Report from 11 March 1947, which states that the Romanian government sealed the ballot boxes at a time when official observers were not present. The document produced by the newly-established American intelligence institution goes on to point out that "*the seals were not the official color*"¹⁴.

The counterfeiting of official seals raises the suspicion that the perpetrators of this operation were exponents of the NKVD, the Russian secret police, or that they acted at least on its orders. The NKVD officers present in Romania likely had a good knowledge of the real situation, which highlighted the unequivocal attitude of the majority of the population to reject Communism. Anticipating the possibility that the Romanian Communist government would lose the elections to the opposition, the NKVD seized the result, which paved the way for the communization of the country.

The CIG document notes that voters concealed their true electoral choices, reflecting the atmosphere of fear in which the elections were conducted. According to the report, although the majority of voters wore the "*Sun emblem*", which was a sign of membership in the Romanian Communist Party, "*they all wanked, signifying they were going to vote for the opposition*"¹⁵.

It also highlights Moscow's major frustration with the election result:

*"The Soviet Government was so irritated by the actual results of the elections that it threatened to have the entire Romanian Government arrested. Realizing that this would be futile, however, and recognizing that political control of Romania had failed, the Russians switched to economic infiltration"*¹⁶.

No doubt this meant opening the way for the Sovietization of Romania, by placing production relations primarily on new foundations, according to the Communist vision.

It is hard to believe that Moscow could have achieved this goal of total subjugation of Romania in the presence of a political opposition that enjoyed significant support among the population, as the unsatisfactory results of the March 1947 elections showed. That is why the economic infiltration was preceded by the total annihilation of this formidable opposition force, led by the National Peasants' Party.

The destruction of the traditional political parties was a major objective of the USSR's actions in Romania, which began shortly after the Red Army entered the country and occupied it. The imposition of pro-Soviet governments continued with the terror unleashed against democratic parties in the 1946 election campaign followed by the fraudulent acquisition of political power. The *coup de grâce* dealt to Romanian democracy by the Communist authorities, also carried out (how else) under the direct and careful supervision of Moscow, was what has gone down in history as *Operation Tămădău*: the arrest of several leaders of the National Peasants' Party for attempting to leave the country illegally for Britain, where they aimed to form a government in exile. The operation was *a mise en scene* for the dissolution of this historic Romanian party¹⁷.

One of the CIA's early assessments of the political situation in Romania and the population's relationship to Communism are noted in another Intelligence Report

of this entity, dated December 1947. The document is entitled 'Report on the Romanian Resistance Movement' and also gives a snapshot of both the hope Romanians put in the USA, from whom they expected liberation from Communism, and some of the measures envisaged by the CIA - which were far from the Romanians' expectations. (The full report is presented in the Appendix).

The CIA report underlines, still in its first paragraph, what was the consequence of the dissolution of the National Peasants' Party by the Communist government, namely *"open organized opposition in Romania had virtually ceased to exist"*¹⁸. This meant the destruction of the democratic system, which also confirmed Romania's firm commitment to the service and cause of Soviet Russia. In this regard, the CIA report's assessment of Romania is unequivocal, stating that: *"The subjection of this country to Soviet Russia has now been completed almost 100 percent, both in the political and economic field"*¹⁹.

Meanwhile, the internal situation in Romania continued to deteriorate, as a CIA report from early 1949 notes²⁰. It contains intelligence on various issues, including, of course, political ones. In this regard, the main issue addressed in the document concerns the struggle for power between the illegalists and the Moscow group within the leadership of the Romanian Communist Party²¹. The CIA report notes as follows:

*"Old Communist officials who contributed to the establishment of the present regime in Rumania and who personally assisted the present ruler of Rumania have been removed from their posts (in the Party) and are under political surveillance"*²².

The document also presents the reasons that led to these repressive actions against those who had suddenly become the 'bad Communists' of the country:

*"The cause of this tactic is said to be the fact that, at the recent meetings of officials of the Communist Party of Rumania, many of the leading members had the courage to express the opinion that 'the policy of the Soviets followed at present in Rumania, regardless of the fact that we owe them our liberation, tend to transform our most fanatical followers into enemies of the Party'"*²³.

In parallel with the Communist purge among its own 'trusted cadres', carried out according to the Soviet model, from where it had, of course, been imported as a truly 'good practice guide', the Romanian authorities maintained, with a similar dose of fanaticism, as history has recorded, the subordination of the country to the USSR.

While some countries in the region began to show increasing tendencies to distance themselves from the dogmas of the Communist Party of the USSR, which assumed the role of supreme leader - the most representative example in this direction is Yugoslavia, with Tito's Declaration of Non-Alignment -, Romania continued to commit itself with all its might to the path of Sovietization. Unlike Tito, the Romanian political leader at the time, Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, firmly embraced Soviet political ideology.

A relevant CIA document illustrating Romania's unique situation vis-à-vis the USSR is the report entitled 'Moscow sees Rumania as only reliable vassal'²⁴, September 13, 1949, which presents the USSR's fundamental change in foreign policy towards the Balkans.

Initially, *"Stalin supported the idea of creating a Balkan Federation between Yugoslavia, Bulgaria and Albania"*²⁵, but the project stalled and was abandoned after the 'Yugoslav crisis' that broke out in 1948. The CIA report describes the change as follows:

*"Stalin has given up plans of forming a Balkan bloc and now regards Rumania as his only reliable vassal. The news has leaked out to the other satellite states and has rocked their Communist parties to the very foundations"*²⁶.

Apart from pointing out Stalin's decision, the CIA document highlights the case of Romania, to which Moscow could look with satisfaction: the Communist government it installed in Bucharest, closely coordinated by Soviet advisers, remained loyal to its master.

Probably the most comprehensive and significant document produced by the CIA on Romania in the early years of the Cold War is the Strategic Report (SR-12) of 5 October 1949. Representing a country report, which is also suggested by its name – 'Rumania', it contains a detailed analysis conducted from a multi-dimensional perspective (addressing political, economic, military, and foreign relations elements).

The political situation in Romania is presented in the first chapter of the CIA document²⁷. It begins with a brief and eloquent characterization of the country:

*"Rumania is today a police state controlled by fanatical Communists who follow the Moscow line in its entirety. While the key positions in the government are in the hands of trusted Communist party members, the cabinet still contains a small number of fellow-travelers who are being replaced as they out-live their usefulness"*²⁸.

The Communist Party of Romania, which was under the direct control and coordination of Moscow, is portrayed as a *"super government"*. Under its leadership, all state institutions (including the Grand National Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Militia and Armed Forces), as well as private organizations, *"function as mere agents of the Party and its Politburo"*²⁹. Alongside outlining the visible way in which the Communist Party in Romania intended to run the country, the CIA report again highlights its subordination to the USSR, noting the following:

*"The Party no longer operates in the background, under the façade of a coalition of government, but represents both the State and a power apart, responsible only to the Kremlin"*³⁰.

Finally, this narrative that runs like a red thread through the presentation of the political situation in Romania is resumed, conclusively, in the last part of the chapter of the CIA document. As a result of the developments that have taken place in Romania since the establishment of the first pro-Soviet regime in 1945, the

situation in the country and its prospects are presented in the clearest possible light: the continuation of full commitment to the USSR and the principles of Communism it proclaimed. In CIA terms, this was described as follows:

"[...] it has become steadily more apparent that the Rumanian Communists are motivated by two basic desires: to prove their fidelity to the USSR and to transform Rumania, as rapidly as is feasible, into a facsimile of the Soviet Union"³¹.

Economic intelligence: Implementing Sovietization

In parallel with the offensive to seize political power and annihilate the opposition forces, the Romanian Communists, directed from Moscow, worked vehemently to sovietize the country, which meant bringing the entire economy into line with Communist principles and model.

The preconditions for the subordination of Romania's economy to the interests of the USSR had already been laid by the Armistice Agreement between the two countries, signed in Moscow on September 12, 1944.

Along with the amounts that were fixed for the benefit of the USSR, the Soviet state took over assets worth more than \$600 million the following year³². In the same year, it also imposed a so-called "*economic cooperation agreement*"³³ on the Romanian Communist government, which gave it control over several strategic areas. The interest of the Soviets was widespread, covering, in particular, the Romanian oil industry, the mineral (iron) and timber industries, continuing with agriculture and banking.

Documents in the CIA archives show that the economic situation in Communist Romania was of constant interest to American intelligence. It closely monitored the developments that took place and produced a variety of materials that captured the issue either sequentially or, in some cases, in a complex approach.

An attempt that comes close to the second category is, for example, an Intelligence Report entitled 'Rumanian Economic Information'³⁴, drafted by the IGC and dated December 16, 1946. It is structured in 8 points, according to the fields of interest briefly addressed in its contents (Agriculture, Fuel, Textiles, Coal, Metallurgical Industry, Leather, Banking, International Trade).

What stands out from the beginning is the subordination of the Romanian economy to Russian interests. As regards the agricultural situation, it is noted that drought has affected most crops. Instead, "*fruit and grape crop has been good, but most of this is being exported to the Soviet Union*"³⁵. Livestock numbers are said to be low, also due to Russian actions: "*The number of cattle has been greatly reduced because so many animals have been taken to Russia*"³⁶. The same situation is described concerning oil, taken by the Soviets as war compensation, the metallurgical industry, and leather. Things were no different in banking either:

"The Bancara and the Banca Comerciala Romana had been taken over completely by the Soviets. Soviets commissars are working at the Banca Crisseveloni and the Banca de Credit. It is believed there are Soviet agents in other banks as well"³⁷.

The last point of the CIA report gives a brief overview of Romania's trade with neighboring countries, with the following points in particular: trade with Bulgaria, estimated at an annual value of four million Swiss francs, was "*carried out mainly by Radu Xenopol's firm, which exchanges Romanian fuel, glassware and salt for Bulgarian eggs, drums and small skins*"³⁸; trade with Hungary was much smaller and operated "*on a compensatory basis*" ("*Romanian glass and caustic soda are exchanged for Hungarian bulbs and corn*"³⁹); a trade and compensation agreement between Romania and Yugoslavia, that came into force in December 1945; as regards trade with the USSR, it is noted briefly: "*Virtually no Soviet industrial products are sent to Romania, although a few electric light bulbs of very poor quality are delivered*"⁴⁰.

A particularly important objective for taking over the Soviet model was the collectivization of agriculture. Aware of the very weak support they had among the population (the Romanian Communist Party had barely 1,000 members at the end of the Second World War), the Romanian communists achieved this gradually, going through several stages.

The first was the land reform of 1945. According to its governing act, Decree-Law No. 187 of March 20, 1945, this measure was aimed at no more and no less than "*the liquidation of landed property from an economic point of view*"⁴¹ by abolishing land ownership of more than 50 hectares. More than 1,460,000 hectares were expropriated, of which almost 1,110,000 hectares were distributed to the poor and landless and the rest became state property⁴².

Vladimir Tismaneanu notes that the agrarian reform succeeded in reducing the distrust that the population had of the Communists' true intentions. Even more, as the same author points out, "*The communist rhetoric, imbued with pathetic declarations praising democracy and equality, proved to be extremely successful in attracting a certain degree of popular support*"⁴³.

In a similar register, Gail Kligman and Katherine Verdery consider in a representative paper analyzing collectivization in Romania that "*the reform was the regime's first significant effort to build a relationship with the poor and middle peasantry*"⁴⁴.

Alongside the removal of mistrust of the Communist authorities, the agrarian reform also aimed at something else: the fragmentation of Romanian society, carried out according to the old Latin saying 'Divide et impera'. In this respect, the Communists were not bringing anything new.

An Intelligence Report prepared by the CIG under the title 'Introduction of Model Kholkos in Rumania'⁴⁵, February 17, 1947, presents several data on what could be called in modern terms the pilot project for the collectivization of agriculture in Romania.

The document contains intelligence on the establishment of three new farms near Constanta, organized by the Russians and designated as "*so-called experimental stations*"⁴⁶. These were set up under the 1945 land reform, but work on them was carried out according to Soviet principles, as the CIA report notes: "*In point of fact, the three farms are run on kholkos pattern, worked by Soviet citizens and directed by Soviet engineers*"⁴⁷.

Also mentioned are the propaganda activities carried out by the Romanian Communists, including among schoolchildren, to expand these farms in the area and thus implement the collectivization of agriculture on a large scale: "*School children from*

Constanța, as well as workers and members of the Communist Party, are often taken over to these collective farms on propaganda tours"⁴⁸.

Finally, for the reference period covered by this study, the aforementioned 'Rumania' strategic analysis document of October 5, 1949, stands out. Romania's economic situation is presented in the second chapter of this material, to which a considerable amount of space is allocated, which highlights the particular importance of the field.

A brief characterization of Romania's economy is made at the beginning of the chapter, within the broader framework of presenting its historical background. In this respect, the following is pointed out:

*"The Rumanian economy is geared primarily to agriculture and the petroleum industry. Other producing segments of the economy – iron and steel, coke, textiles, non-ferrous metals, chemicals, and electric power – are of relatively minor importance. Among all Rumania's products, only petroleum and grain have any international significance"*⁴⁹.

The CIA document also underlines the total subordination of Romania's economy to the USSR. Thus, through its control of the Romanian government and de facto control of the Sovroms, Romanian-Soviet corporations created in various fields, the USSR *"has virtually become the supreme Romanian economic authority"*⁵⁰.

Detailing issues of interest related to Romania's oil reserves and their exploitation, the CIA document notes that Romania's oil industry *"is important both as a potential source of supply for the USRR in the event of war and as a pillar of the Romanian economy"*.⁵¹ On the other hand, Romania's oil industry, a significant reservoir of fuel for the German war machine in World War II⁵², was not doing great at all at the time. Its overuse and the damage it suffered from repeated bombing by the United States Air Force visibly affected its capabilities in the aftermath of the war. The Soviet government's management (looting) also contributed to this situation.

According to the CIA's evaluation, the following factors led to the decline of Romania's oil industry in the immediate aftermath of World War II: *"over-intensive exploitation, extensive Soviet dismantling of equipment; insufficient maintenance; a lack of modern equipment and spare parts; and inadequate exploratory and development drilling"*⁵³.

In terms of prospects, the development of Romania's economy was directly linked to *"the extent of Soviet assistance in capital goods and technical guidance, and the ability to acquire foreign exchange for necessary imports"*⁵⁴. But the situation was not encouraging at all, as the document points out: *"Thus far, Kremlin exploitation has outweighed its assistance"*⁵⁵.

Military Intelligence: Ensuring Communism

The *coup d'état* by which Romania turned its weapons against Germany (August 23, 1943), failed to change its fate as a defeated country in the war. The armistice with the USSR, signed in Moscow, on September 12, 1943, meant the country's unconditional surrender⁵⁶.

In fact, after the signing of the armistice, Soviet troops occupied the entire territory of Romania. Their stationing allowed the communist system to be set up and the country to be rapidly Sovietised. In other words, the presence of the Red Army

was *"to guarantee the outcome of the party's activities and its smooth functioning."*⁵⁷ The claim is reinforced by Veaceslav Molotov, the Soviet Foreign Minister, who *"held to the idea that Socialism in Romania could only be supported by the presence of the Red Army in the country; he believed that three days after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, Socialism would collapse"*⁵⁸.

To avoid such a situation, Moscow maintained significant troops on Romanian territory: if at the end of the war (May 9, 1945), their number was about 80,000 soldiers, at the end of 1945 it was over half a million soldiers; in the spring of 1946, there was a maximum of 620,000 soldiers, and then their number steadily decreased, reaching 240,000 soldiers at the end of the same year and about 100,000 soldiers in 1947; in the spring of 1948, about 35,000 Soviet soldiers were still stationed in Romania, a number that was maintained in the following years⁵⁹.

The earliest declassified document in the CIA archives regarding military intelligence about Romania was produced by the CIG on February 10, 1947. It is called 'Soviet Military Activity in Romania' and contains two short paragraphs about Soviet military depots in the Constanta area, as follows:

"1. The largest depot of Soviet war material in Rumania is in the district of Rasova-Murfatlar, west of Constanta. Material continues to arrive at this depot which is well guarded.

*2. At Mangalia on the Black Sea coast, there is a well-camouflaged Soviet tank depot whose exact position is not known"*⁶⁰.

A few days later, another document, called 'Order of Battle for Rumanian Army; Miscellaneous Military Information' reveals a series of troop movements of the Romanian army. The last paragraph highlights the cold relations between the Romanian and Russian military, stressing that *"there is no fraternization between Rumanian and Russian officers in the Constanta area"*⁶¹. Explaining this statement, the document further highlights the following factual situation: *"Contact is limited to the minimum necessitated by service requirements and the Russians are noticeably cold and distant"*⁶². The 'liberating' army looked rather hostilely at the Romanian military. This emphasised the fact that the Soviet Red Army was, in reality, a force of occupation.

The Romanians were soon convinced of the USSR's true intentions. Aware of the deeply anti-Communist and, to a very large extent, anti-Russian attitude of the Romanian population, Moscow acted to prevent, first and foremost, all public demonstrations of this kind in the country. Limiting Romania's armed forces and subsequently bringing them under control was imperative from this point of view.

A significant example is provided by an Intelligence Report from the last months of the CIG - distributed to American legal beneficiaries on November 28, 1947, when the CIA was already operating -, entitled 'Romanian Air Force Strength'.

The respective document states that under the Paris Peace Treaties of February 10, 1947, Romania could hold *"150 aircraft altogether, of which not more than 100 are to be fighters"*.⁶³ Further, it also notes that *"No bombers are allowed"*⁶⁴.

Without taking into account these provisions, Moscow aimed through its actions to achieve the de facto annihilation of the Romanian Air Force, to render it inoperative. The elements presented in the CIA report show the following:

*"The Soviets are doing their utmost to reduce the Rumanian Air Force to a point even below the strength allowed by the treaty. To this end, they have cut down the quantity of fuel to such an extent that it is impossible to keep aircrews in training"*⁶⁵.

A recurring theme in reports containing elements of military intelligence is, as already mentioned, the movement of armed forces - both Romanian and Russian occupation forces. In one such report of March 1, 1949, 'Soviet and Rumanian Troops Disposition in Rumania'⁶⁶, the existing situation in the Constanta area is presented. According to this document, 1) Soviet units, consisting of two infantry regiments, an artillery regiment, and various tanks, left Constanta at the end of November 1948, heading for Hungary; 2) approximately 1,500 Russian soldiers continued to remain in Constanta; 3) the Romanian units stationed in Mamaia consisted of "One infantry regiment", "One artillery, anti-tank regiment", "One heavy howitzer, artillery regiment"⁶⁷.

A few months later, another Information Report, 'Soviet Troop Movements in Romania'⁶⁸, August 19, 1949, presents current developments on this subject of the utmost interest in the country. It also sheds light on Russian troop movements:

- "1. Large movements of Soviet troops are presently taking place in upper Moldavia, the Constanta area, the Focsani, area, and in the Rumanian Banat.*
- 2. 'Noticeable members' of Rumanian officers formerly placed on reserve are being recalled to active duty.*
- 3. [Censored] Soviet military activity in Romania is in preparation for maneuvers in the Banat as a 'show of strength'"*⁶⁹.

What was really behind these maneuvers is revealed in a CIA document that was drafted shortly after the one mentioned above.

The true Soviet military intentions are revealed in the Information Report of September 1, 1949, entitled 'Cominform Preparations in Romania for an Offensive against Yugoslavia'⁷⁰. According to the first paragraph of the document:

*"Four divisions of troops are being organized under Soviet control in Rumania for possible use against Yugoslav Government forces. This unit, known as 'Slobodna Jugoslavia' (Free Yugoslavia), is under the military command of General Pero Popivoda, who lives in Bucharest. General Popivoda frequently travels to Hungary on Cominform business. Funds for Slobodna Jugoslavia are provided by Vasile Luca, Rumanian Minister of Finance. Units of the organization are stationed at Timișoara, Ivanda, Sân Martin and Diniș"*⁷¹.

Also noted are the political issues surrounding Cominform's involvement. According to the CIA document, the political leader of the pro-Cominform Yugoslavs in Romania was Radonja Golubovic, the official representative of the Yugoslav Communist Party in Cominform. He was the former Yugoslav ambassador to Romania, who resigned in the summer of 1948 in protest at the Tito government's

decision to refuse to align with Soviet Communism. Based on his friendly relationship with the Romanian Prime Minister Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, the former Serbian diplomat managed to obtain *"sizeable funds for propaganda services"*⁷².

Last, but not least, it is worth mentioning again the strategic document 'Rumania', October 5, 1949, which also contains a comprehensive picture of the Romanian armed forces at that time. In line with what has been presented above about the USSR's actions to prevent Romania's military aviation from remaining operational, this document notes, on a similar note:

*"After World War II, the Rumanian military establishment was allowed to deteriorate until its military capabilities were virtually nil. In December 1947, Minister of National Defense, Bodnarus began a revitalization program. At the present time, the Army is being reorganized under Soviet direction [...]"*⁷³.

While admitting that *"substantial improvement"* has taken place over a year, the CIA rates the combat capability of the Romanian armed forces as low. According to the document, they were *"still incapable of successfully conducting offensive or defensive military operations against any force, except that of a minor power"*⁷⁴.

On the other hand, the CIA report stresses Romania's relevance in the new force equation that emerged at the beginning of the Cold War:

*"The strategic importance of Rumania, however, is not based upon the amount which its manpower and production can add to the Soviet war potential, but upon the fact that control of Rumania is essential to Soviet defensive strategy"*⁷⁵.

Conclusion

American intelligence in the early years of the Cold War took a constant and significant interest, on several levels, in developments in Romania. Initially the CIG, and later its successor, the CIA, acted to obtain and supplement, by specific means, intelligence issues for policy-makers. These were presented in various reports grouped according to their content into political, economic, or military intelligence, which were the most representative and usual.

The declassified documents from the CIA archives on Romania during the period of interest mainly report on various aspects that are subscribed to these typological categories (to which it could be added some more restricted cases of geographic intelligence - without, however, comprising elements that fall within the research theme of this study).

In comparative terms, the high number of reports on Romania, which, as we have shown, ranks second among the Communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, stands out. This directly attests to the high interest it has had in American intelligence.

The qualitative assessment of these reports reveals that they do not always contain the most relevant or high-impact aspects. They are also usually of a post-factum nature. Rarely, do they present some ongoing situations, while anticipatory data have a low weight. With its inherent limitations, primarily due to a lack of

expertise in intelligence work - the basis of which is the creation and management of human sources to provide information -, the CIG/ CIA has managed to build up a consistent picture of what was happening in Romania at the beginning of the Cold War.

The various aspects presented in American intelligence reports on Romania in the early post-World War II years capture many facets of what was, in essence, the broad process of the Communist takeover of state power and subsequent Sovietization of the country. Both objectives were implemented under the direct control and coordination of Moscow. The latter enjoyed the unreserved support of the Romanian Communist leaders for the Soviet vision, which facilitated the rapid subjugation of the country under the interests of the USSR.

The Soviet offensive in Romania revealed in declassified documents from the CIA archives, took place in all areas of social life. It also meant the destruction of the former system. The slogan 'The light comes from the East', put forward at the time by one of Romania's greatest writers, Mihail Sadoveanu, also actively involved politically in the implementation of Communism in Romania, is an emblematic illustration of Soviet propaganda in this Eastern European country. However, it fails to mention that this 'light' was brought in on the Red Army tanks and shared, fraternally, by NKVD officers known as 'Soviet advisers' and their Moscow-trained stooges.

APPENDIX

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE GROUP

COUNTRY: Rumania

SUBJECT: Report on the Rumanian Resistance Movement

ORIGIN [censored]

DATE [censored]

DIST. 26 December 1947

[The first line is censored]

1. After the suppression of the National Peasant Party, the chief Rumanian opposition party, open organized opposition in Rumania had virtually ceased to exist. The subjection of this country to Soviet Russia has now been completed almost 100 percent, both in the political and economic fields.

2. The present dictatorship, exerted by a handful of Moscow trained Communists, who entered Rumania together with the Russian troops and were joined by a minority of adventurers and opportunists belonging to the former class of professional politicians, was established by direct Russian intervention, aided by the presence of the Soviet Army within the country. It is a dictatorship that relies entirely on police methods and is maintained exclusively by terror, being devoid of any popular support.

3. In fact of all the nations in Southeastern Europe, the Rumanian people is structurally perhaps the most impervious to Communist influence. Two main factors contributed to the feeling of revulsion with which the great mass of the Rumanian people regard and judge Communism as an ideology or as a practical form of government. First, Russia even under the Czars had repeatedly endeavored to annex or absorb within her sphere of influence the region inhabited by Rumanians. Since the present Russian government is Communist, Rumanians regard Communism as the hitherto most perfected vehicle used by Russia to establish her long-desired permanent domination over Rumanian territories. Second, by temperament, the Rumanian is strongly individualist, and this trait is further enforced by the existence of a numerous peasant class within the country which, being constituted of individual small landowners, is inherently hostile to a Communist economic or political program.

4. On these grounds, any great power which challenges the Soviet domination of Rumania, has both the moral and active support of the great mass of Rumanians.

5. Seeing that the United States is determined to check the expansion of Communism and has assured the leadership in this sense, the Rumanian people are putting their entire hope in the struggle undertaken by the United States and consider its successful outcome as their only hope of salvation.

6. Therefore, whatever course the United States may adopt to defeat the Russian Communism bid for world domination, it will find in the Rumanian people a sure and devoted ally.

7. *The value of Rumanian contribution to such a struggle may be assessed by considering the following factors:*

- (a) *The geographical position of Rumania which offers great possibilities for decisive strategic operations; the strategic value of Rumania is re-enforced by the presence on Rumanian territory of the rich oil fields.*
- (b) *The existence in Rumania of a national resistance movement which is only awaiting orders to start operations throughout the country. The aims of this movement are:*
 - (1) *to maintain the morale and the hope of the people in an early salvation;*
 - (2) *to organize an active underground resistance against Communism;*
 - (3) *to render active help in the eventuality of war operations against Russia;*
 - (4) *to overthrow at the opportune moment the present regime and dislodge the Communist supporters from their post of authority.*

8. *The Rumanian resistance movement needs help and guidance to preserve its fighting spirit; it also needs an authoritative control able to co-ordinate its actions.*

9. *In the first place the Rumanian people as a whole, should be informed in clear terms that American policy is consistently aiming at re-establishing the freedom and independence of the Communist-subjected countries, including Rumania, and that will never give up the struggle in this sense. For this purpose it would be useful to submit the information to be broadcast from America to Rumania to advisers selected from among the members of the democratic opposition abroad of proven loyalty and sincerity. The re-adjustment of the American broadcast service for Rumania is needed also because of the recent constitution of the Cominform and its publicly confessed objectives.*

10. *In addition to this step, the following other means subject to a gradual and opportune consideration, are needed to help the Rumanian resistance movement:*

- (a) *Facilities for the establishment of secret radio communications with selected resistance group centers;*
- (b) *Help in equipping the resistance groups with weapons and other materials needed for "maquis" and guerrilla actions;*
- (c) *Other convenient arrangements designed to improve the efficiency of the resistance movement.*

11. *The backbone of the Romanian resistance movement is composed of young officers, either still in active service or outside the ranks since about 14.000 officers have been discharged from the*

Rumanian Army by the present regime. It also includes civil servants and persons belonging to the free professions.

12. As a potential following, the resistance movement practically has the whole of the University youth and the peasantry. It can also count on the ultimate support of a large percentage of workers, but the latter for the moment cannot be rendered any substantial help because they are under the strict surveillance of the Communist factory committee bosses.

[The last line is censored]

References

¹ Andrew, C., Dilks, D. (ed.), *The Missing Dimension, Governments and Intelligence Communities in the Twentieth Century* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1984).

² Alongside these, there are also several documents presenting abusive practices of the Communist authorities, in particular of the Security and Militia; also some analyses materials of a documentary nature, referring, for example, to the characteristics of Communism in Romania.

³ Andrew, C., Dilks, D. (eds.), (1984): 23.

⁴ Andrew, C., Dilks, D. (eds.), (1984): 23.

⁵ Initially, the analytical area was represented by the Central Reports Staff, whose name was changed in July 1946 to the Office of Research and Evaluation and shortly afterward, in October 1946, to the Office of Reports and Estimates. For details, see the introductory study signed by Woodrow J. Kuhns, prefacing his collection of documents *Assessing the Soviet Threat: The Early Cold War Years*, Center for Studies of Intelligence, Central Intelligence Agency, 1997.

⁶ Leary, W. M., *The Central Intelligence Agency: History and Documents* (University of Alabama Press, 1984), 21-26.

⁷ Leary, W. M., (1984): 21-26.

⁸ For example, the attempt to buy the Fuhrer's goodwill was made through the Treaty on the Promotion of Economic Interests between the Kingdom of Romania and the German Reich, which was signed in Bucharest on 23 March 1939. The document, available online at the World Legal Information Institute (www.WorldLII.org), substantiates Romania's total economic subordination to the interests of Hitler's Germany, especially in the exploitation of Romania's oil resources for Germany. According to point 4 of the Treaty, it was envisaged to set up "a joint Romanian-German company, which will be responsible for the fourth point of the treaty, the exploitation of oil and the execution of a drilling and oil processing program", essential for the German war machine.

In connection with the same objective, which meant the exploitation of the Romanian oil fields for the benefit of Hitler's Germany, Mihail Moruzov, head of the Romanian Army's Secret Intelligence Service, sent a letter to Manfred von Killinger, the future Reich Minister in Bucharest, in a meeting he held with him in the spring of 1940, his categorical position for the strengthening of Romanian-German ties and assured him that if the USSR came too close to the Ploiesti oil field, he would personally direct its destruction to prevent it from falling into

Russian hands. For details, see Watts, L. L., *Romanian Cassandra. Ion Antonescu and the Struggle for Reform, 1916-1941* (New York/ Boulder: Columbia University Press, 1993), 214; Buzatu, Gh., *Din istoria secretă a celui de-al doilea război mondial*, II (București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1985), 97.

⁹ A comprehensive overview of this issue is offered by Deletant, D., *Hitler's Forgotten Ally. Ion Antonescu and His Regime, Romania 1940-44* (Palgrave Macmillan: New York, 2006).

¹⁰ Kuhns, W. J., (1997): 88.

¹¹ Kuhns, W. J., (1997): 89.

¹² Kuhns, W. J., (1997): 89.

¹³ Kuhns, W. J., (1997): 89.

¹⁴ www.cia.gov/reading-room, CIA document No. CIA-RDP80-00926A000100010008-3.

For the following references to the CIA archives mentioned above, only the document number will be given.

¹⁵ No. CIA-RDP80-00926A000100010008-3.

¹⁶ No. CIA-RDP80-00926A000100010008-3.

¹⁷ The operation was carried out by the Romanian Special Intelligence Service (SIS) together with the Bucharest Ministry of the Interior and the Soviet NKVD, to lure the leadership of the Romanian National Peasant Party into a trap, to arrest it. It was led by Avram Bunaciu, secretary general of the Bucharest Ministry of the Interior, under the control of a Soviet adviser. As for the *modus operandi*, agents of the SIS presented some leaders of the National Peasants' Party with the possibility of clandestinely leaving the country in two planes. They accepted the proposal and fell into the trap that had been set for them. On the morning of 14 July 1947, the Communist authorities arrested the so-called 'group of fugitives' at the airfield of Tămădău (located 40 kilometers from Bucharest) as they were trying to board two planes to leave the country. Just in case, the Communist authorities, in particular the SIS, made sure that the planes were fuelled for only 40 minutes, not enough time to cross the border. For details, see Onișoru, Gh., *Operation Tămădău: The Dissolution of the National Peasant Party (1947)* (Bucharest: Romanian Academy Publishing House, 2008).

¹⁸ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R001100410003-4.

¹⁹ *Idem*.

²⁰ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R002300430012-0.

²¹ The first group was made up of illegal Communists who were imprisoned before by the Romanian authorities for ideological reasons, the most representative being Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Nicolae Ceaușescu. The second group included Moscow-educated Communists who were in the USSR during the Second World War, such as Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, and Emil Bodnăraș. For details, see Deletant, D., *Romania under Communism. Paradox and Degeneration* (London: Routledge, 2019).

²² No. CIA-RDP82-00457R002300430012-0.

²³ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R002300430012-0.

²⁴ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4.

The CIA station in Stockholm transmitted the document and the source is an (unspecified) daily newspaper in the Swedish capital.

²⁵ Boguslaw Jagiello, "The Balkan Kettle: Russia's policy toward the Balkans", in *Security and Defence Quarterly* 35/3 (2021): 50.

²⁶ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4.

The CIA document also outlines why the USSR changed its plans for the Balkans. According to the CIA's assessment, the Soviet decision would have been driven by several things, as follows: "*The reorganization of the Balkans seems to depend on Stalin's desire to come to an agreement with the Western powers, and it is presumed that he is now willing to shape his policy in accordance with the agreements made at Yalta [...] There are three good reasons for Stalin to alter Soviet policy in such a radical manner. The first is that Molotov's 'get tough' policy could not be affected by means of the Cold War. Instead, it could have led to a third world war which the USSR could not survive. The second is that the Kremlin's experts gave faulty information on the attitude of the Balkan peoples, as was the case with Hitler when he attempted to invade the USSR. The third is that the USSR's internal conditions were not such that Stalin dared embark on an adventurous foreign policy.*"

²⁷ The constituent parts of the chapter deal with "1. Genesis of the Present Political Sistem", "2. Political Parties", "3. Basic Structure and Operation of the Present Government", "4. Pressure Groups" "Goals and Stability of the Present Regime" (3-12).

²⁸ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4., 3.

²⁹ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4., 8.

³⁰ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4., 8.

³¹ No. CIA-RDP80-00809A000600260035-4., 11.

³² Markham, R. H., *România sub jugul sovietic* (București: Fundația Academia Civică, 1996), 388.

³³ Békés, Cs., Borhi, L., Ruggenthaler, P., Trașcă, O. (eds.), *Soviet Occupation of Romania, Hungary, and Austria 1944/45–1948/49* (Budapest – New York: Central European University Press, 2015) 75-80.

³⁴ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

³⁵ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

³⁶ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

³⁷ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

³⁸ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

³⁹ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

⁴⁰ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200100006-6.

⁴¹ Nicolae Păun, *op. cit.*, 112.

⁴² Nicolae Păun, *op. cit.*, 112.

⁴³ Tismăneanu, V., *Stalinism for All Seasons: A Political History of Romanian Communism* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), 90.

⁴⁴ Kligman, G., Verdery, K., *Peasants under Siege: The Collectivization of Romanian Agriculture, 1949–1962* (Princeton University Press, 2011), 105.

⁴⁵ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300630010-2.

⁴⁶ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300630010-2.

⁴⁷ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300630010-2.

⁴⁸ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300630010-2.

⁴⁹ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 13.

⁵⁰ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 14.

⁵¹ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 18.

⁵² For details, see Buzatu, Gh., *O istorie a petrolului românesc*, (Iași: Casa Editorială Demiurg, 2009). The aspects of interest from the perspective of this study are presented in chapters X and XI of the book (311-454).

⁵³ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 18.

⁵⁴ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 18.

⁵⁵ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 18.

⁵⁶ According to Article 3 of this document, "*The Government and High Command of Rumania will ensure to the Soviet and other Allied forces facilities for free movement on Rumanian territory in any direction if required by the military situation, the Rumanian Government and High Command of Rumania giving such movement every possible assistance with their own means of communications and at their own expense on land, on water and in the air.*"

The text is available online at The Avalon Project: The Armistice Agreement with Rumania; September 12, 1944 (yale.edu), accessed January 2022.

⁵⁷ Hlihor, C., Scurtu, I., *The Red Army in Romania* (Las Vegas: Center for Romanian Studies, 2021), 78.

⁵⁸ Niculescu-Mizil, P., *O istorie trăită* (București: Ed. Enciclopedică, 1997), 103.

⁵⁹ Verona, S., *Military Occupation and Diplomacy: Soviet Troops in România, 1944-1958* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1992), 47-51.

⁶⁰ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000200340001-5.

⁶¹ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300620002-2.

⁶² No. CIA-RDP82-00457R000300620002-2.

⁶³ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R001100360009-5.

⁶⁴ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R001100360009-5.

⁶⁵ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R001100360009-5.

⁶⁶ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R002400400009-6.

⁶⁷ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R002400400009-6.

⁶⁸ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R003100320006-0.

⁶⁹ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R003100320006-0.

⁷⁰ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R003100610010-3.

⁷¹ No. CIA-RDP82-00457R003100610010-3.

⁷² No. CIA-RDP82-00457R003100610010-3.

⁷³ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 37.

⁷⁴ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 48.

⁷⁵ No. CIA-RDP78-01617A001500040001-0, 49.