FORMATION OF THE POLITICAL ELITE IN THE MSSR (1944-1945)

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Abstract. Personnel policy in the USSR pursued the goal of forming a layer of “national cadres” dedicated to the cause of communism, the local leadership elite. Its direct conductor on the ground was the republican party leadership, county, city and district party structures and the primary party organizations subordinate to them in organizations and enterprises. After the war, control was also established over all of them in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova by specially created Bureaus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks for each of these republics. The situation with personnel in the MSSR in Moscow was considered the most difficult of all those mentioned above. However, Moscow did not intend to directly control the republican power structures permanently. Local party leaders also had to take the initiative and train young cadres. For this purpose, in 1945, the Republican Party School was created in Chişinău under the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M. The main sources of replenishment of the personnel reserve were also party, Komsomol, and trade union activists, production leaders, and authoritative team leaders.

The main mistakes in the personnel policy of the Soviet period were considered to be the lack of people with higher education, especially specialists in the field in which they worked, the presence of a large number of vacant positions due to staff turnover, and the transfer of control over personnel training from Moscow to the leadership of the republics. When selecting personnel, the nationality of the applicant was taken into account and often, especially in the first post-war years, when there were few Moldovans in the party bodies, the nationality of the applicant played a decisive role.

Keywords: control, party, personnel policy, power, personnel training, national composition

Personnel policy was one of the key areas of party work in the MSSR. It pursued the goal of forming a layer of “national cadres” dedicated to the cause of communism, the local leadership elite. Its representatives were then distributed to all areas of economic and cultural construction and, under the strict control of Moscow, carried out the instructions of the party leadership of the CPSU (b) / CPSU1. Its direct conductor on the ground was the republican leadership of the party, the county, city and district party structures and the primary party organizations subordinate to them in organizations and enterprises. They had to control the process of correct execution of Moscow's decisions, and be responsible for the quality selection of personnel.

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In the first years after the war, control was also established over all of them in Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Moldova by specially created Bureaus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party(b) for each of these republics. The tasks of these bureaus included strengthening the leadership cadres of the central and local apparatuses of party and state bodies, the fight against “bourgeois nationalists” and other anti-Soviet elements, leading the restoration of the economy, organizing ideological work among the population and the “Bolshevik education” of party and Soviet cadres.

It should be said that the situation with personnel in the MSSR was considered by Moscow the most difficult of all those mentioned above. If in the Baltic republics the Bureau of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) existed only from November 1944 to March 1947, then in Moldova, although it appeared a little later, on March 13, 1945, it lasted longer, until April 9, 1949, and then, in its place, a structure created by Moscow appeared - the apparatus of the authorized representative of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b) for the MSSR, which was liquidated only on July 14, 1950. This situation was explained by the fact that there was a catastrophic shortage of local pro-Soviet personnel in the MSSR, and there were too few officials of the former MASSR who had such experience for the entire republic; in addition, some of them remained in Ukraine in 1940 during the delimitation of territories between Ukraine and Moldova.

However, even with all the centralization of power that existed during the Stalinist period, Moscow did not intend to directly control the republican power structures permanently. Local party leaders also had to take the initiative and train young cadres. For this purpose, in 1945, the Republican Party School was created in Chisinau under the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M. Marxist-Leninist theory, economics and technology of industrial and agricultural production, party and Soviet construction were studied here. At that school there were permanent courses for training and retraining of personnel, and since 1947 - a correspondence department of the Higher Party School under the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b). The school staff also conducted scientific research. Party graduates were sent to work in party and Soviet bodies, ideological institutions and various organizations, where they were supervised by the relevant department of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M. Despite numerous reforms of the party and state apparatus, this scheme worked decades later, in the 1970-1980s.

The main sources of replenishment of the personnel reserve, in addition to party schools, were party, Komsomol, trade union activists, leaders of production, authoritative leaders of collectives, whom they tried to involve in the party, so that the latter would not only know in all details the existing moods there, but could also direct them in the right direction. At various specialized courses, training and retraining of personnel was carried out. A strategic reserve of personnel was created, which was used in the process of filling vacated positions by specialized departments of the Central Committee, city committees, and district party committees.

The main mistakes in the personnel policy of the Soviet period were considered to be the lack of people with higher education, especially specialists in the
field in which they worked, the presence of a large number of vacant positions due to staff turnover, the transfer of control over personnel training from Moscow to the leadership of the republics.

When selecting personnel, the nationality of the applicant was taken into account and often, especially in the first post-war years, when there were few Moldovans in the party bodies, the nationality of the applicant played a decisive role. The more multinational the team was, the more positively it was treated in the party bodies. The diversity of nationalities in the teams also pursued another goal - it accelerated the process of mixing nations and transforming them into a single Soviet people, in which Russians would play a key role. This process was therefore stimulated through the exchange of labor personnel of the RSFSR with other republics of the former USSR, including the MSSR.

However, the main emphasis was still on training personnel on site. Since as of June 10, 1944, the republic had only 6357 people of varying degrees of preparedness working in various ministries and departments, even before the end of 1944 the Bureau of the Central Committee planned to train more than 10000 people in short-term courses to work in various positions in various ministries and departments, more than half of them in the People's Commissariat of Agriculture (2678) and Education (2520). Of these, as of July 1, 1944, 3813 were already being trained.

In the party structures the situation was even worse. The first information about what the party was at that time concerned only its Central Committee and only its quantitative composition. As of June 5, 1944, it included 90 senior employees (including 17 women - 18.8%), including key figures (secretaries of the Central Committee, heads of special and financial economic sectors, accounting workers, etc.) - 14 , organizational and instructional department - 12, party board - 3, agitation and propaganda department - 13, schools department - 4, agricultural department - 9, transport department - 4, industrial - 8, trade and public catering - 5, construction and building materials department - 4, military department - 3, personnel department - 19. There were also 28 technical workers. This was noticeably less than in 1940 (108 and 40, respectively). Since these personnel were not enough, the Bureau of the Central Committee requested an increase in the staff of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M.

A month later, on July 1, 1944, for the first time, an analysis of the party apparatus was compiled at the level of secretaries of district committees (ukoms), city committees and district party committees. Here there were already half as many women - 8 out of 142 (5.63%)10. This difference is explained by the fact that the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M included many women who worked in the party apparatus back in the MASSR. Whereas in districts and cities, the party leadership was just beginning to get acquainted with local women's activists and the process of their nomination was just beginning. The average age of the secretaries was from 36 to 45 years (35 out of 48 first secretaries, 40 out of 58 second secretaries, 20 out of 36 third secretaries). However, their level of education was catastrophically low. Only 15 out of 142 secretaries (including the first 6) had completed higher education (10.56%), including 1 agronomist and 1 economist. Only 11 had incomplete higher
education (7.74%), 19 (13.38%) had specialized secondary education, 46 (32.39%) had secondary education, 31 (21.83%) had incomplete secondary education, and 20 (14.08%) in general had primary education. Almost all secretaries of the district committees had never previously worked in the districts to which they were appointed (121 out of 142, 85.6%). But that wasn’t the worst. The overwhelming majority of them had very little experience in party leadership in general: 32 (22.53%) - 1-2 years, 30 (21.12%) - 2-3 years, 24 (16.90%) - 3-5 years, and only 6 (4.22%) had more than 5 years of party leadership experience, i.e. basically had the skills to manage party and economic structures at the district level. According to the national composition, the secretaries of district committees were divided as follows: 13 (9.15%) - Moldovans, 90 (63.38%) - Russians, 37 (26.05%) - Ukrainians, 1 (0.7%) – Belarusian, 1 (0.7%) – Mordvin.

In the summer of 1944, a list of Central Committee employees was compiled for the first time, which indicated their nationality. According to this list, out of 66 employees of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M, only 6 (9.09%) were Moldovans, and all of them, without exception, had previously worked in the MASSR or were left bankers (secretaries of the Central Committee N. Salogor and S. Zelenchuk, deputy head of the HR Department D. Otyan, Head of the HR Department, E. Kuznetsov, Deputy Head of the Agitation and Propaganda Department S. Tsaranov, and Instructor of the Organizational Instructor Department, M. Mokryak). There were also 46 Russians (69.69%) and 14 Ukrainians (21.22%). Thus, Russians were represented in the Central Committee even more than in counties and districts, and the percentage of representatives of the indigenous nation - Moldovans - did not even reach 10%.

After the capture of the entire territory of the MSSR by the Soviet army and the establishment of the Soviet regime, the lists of personnel of the party-Soviet apparatus were revised and a new one was approved on October 27, 1944. They separately approved the lists of leading officials of Soviet bodies and also requested a significant increase in staff (by December 1, 1944 there were only 1080 party workers, of which 130 were women (12.03%). However, they finally decided on the list of the republican nomenklatura only a year later. On December 24, 1945 the Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) approved its full composition, which included 2117 people, of which 440 were approved by the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b), including all the secretaries of the Central Committee and their assistants, heads of departments of the Central Committee, all secretaries of city committees, district committees, people’s commissars, their deputies, and in the case of the NKVD and NKGB, even the heads of leading departments, etc.

The Bureau of the Central Committee planned to replenish these staff in various ways - both by inviting personnel from other republics, and by returning party and Soviet functionaries evacuated to different regions of the USSR, who had previously worked in the MSSR in 1940-1941. For this purpose, they compiled a detailed list of planned candidates according to the model: last name, first name, patronymic, intended position, previous position, location at the time of drawing up the document. This made it possible, even before the end of 1944, to attract 4418
people from different regions of the USSR to the republic, including 112 party and 63 Komsomol workers. In addition, another 558 people were sent to Moldova by the Personnel Directorate of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (b), of which 408 were sent to party work. As a result, out of 1121 (as of February 1, 1945) posts in the leadership structures of the Communist Party (b)M, 712 (63.5%) were filled. However, due to the fact that the bulk of the arrivals were not Moldovans, this did not affect the national composition of the party bodies. On January 1, 1945, in the apparatus of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b)M there were only 12.5% Moldovans, among the secretaries of party committees - 20.8%, district committees - 7.4%, and among the secretaries of city party committees there were no Moldovans at all. A similar situation developed in the district and city councils. (22.4% of Moldovans), regional departments of agriculture (18.3% of Moldovans). This created the ground for further Russification of party bodies and the republic as a whole.

Conclusion

Summarizing what has been said, it is necessary to note the following. The party leadership of the USSR considered the Communist Party of the Moldavian SSR to be the weakest and most unprepared of all the territories captured by the USSR in 1940. Therefore, Moscow retained direct control over the state of affairs in Moldova longer than in the other republics occupied before the war. Due to the catastrophic shortage of specialists, it was necessary to resort to the formation of short-term courses for training specialists in the field of agriculture, education and some other areas, as well as to actively attract personnel from outside the republic. But even despite this, there was an acute shortage of managers. The situation in the party structures was the same. Although the leadership of the MSSR already in 1945 created its own Republican party school, the number of personnel it trained was too small for the republic. In this situation, the Bureau of the Central Committee of the CP(b)M was forced not only to call party officials from other republics who had previously worked in the republic, but also to seek help from the Central Committee of the CP(b)M, so that Moscow would help speed up the search for party leaders throughout the country who want to work in the MSSR. As a result of this policy, the number of Moldovans themselves in party bodies was small, inferior several times to the ratio of the number of Moldovans to other nations in the republic (64.5%). This created the basis for the rapid Russification of the republic, which resumed after the capture of Moldova by the Soviet army in March-April and August 1944.

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